Descartes’ Ambiguity of Innate and Adventitious Ideas

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In Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes illustrates that the objective reality of some of his ideas seems so great that he cannot be the cause of such ideas, thus something else also exists in the world (29). Though Descartes inquires particularly into adventitious ideas to support his claim, he does not offer the definitions of innate and adventitious ideas clearly, nor does he explain the differences of them in any detail. In this paper, I will demonstrate that the ambiguity of innate and adventitious ideas undermines Descartes’ argument. As a result, if the so-called adventitious ideas were understood as innate, one possible outcome would be that he is indeed alone in the world, and the existence of God would be meaningless. After summarizing Descartes’ major logical reasoning, I will claim that he is unclear about how we can tell spontaneous impulse and light of nature apart. Then, I will introduce alternative explanations to his argument, which would produce contradictory results. Though this is another interpretation of Descartes’ thoughts, I will argue that his ambiguity on spontaneous impulse and light of nature might diverge from his original deliberation.
The argumentation I am about to confront root from Meditation Three of the book. Descartes starts with the claim that, “I am certain that I am a thinking thing,” and that sensing and imagining are merely modes of thinking existing within him (24). Then, as he is certain about clear and distinct perceptions, he implies that “everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true (24).” Nevertheless, there still tends to be many things that he thinks he is certain about, but then finds them doubtful (24). After questioning himself, Descartes realizes that he us...

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...In addition, Descartes is not capable to figure out spontaneous impulse from light of nature either. Plus, the examples of the idea of heat and the idea of sun do not tend to support Descartes’ reasoning, as the alternative interpretations are offered in this paper. The consequence of this weakness is to undermine Descartes’ overall argument that there is something else in the world. Ultimately, this weakness results in the loss of the necessity of proving the existence of God. At last, this paper does not prove Descartes’ argument to be false, since I have only indicated some explanations and consequences of the weakness in his argument.

Works Cited

Descartes, René, and Donald A. Cress. Meditations on First Philosophy: In Which the Existence of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Demonstrated. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1993. 24-29. Print.

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