Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York and Washington, DC leaders in our government and military realized that there was a need for a special force with the capabilities to respond to major incidents that typically would involve weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Currently nearly every state and territory in the United States has a rapid WMD reaction force known as a Civil Support Team (CST), these teams are compromised of highly trained multi component individuals ready to respond at a moment’s notice to any conceivable attack that may occur.
The history of the CST is a brief one compared to other units and entities in the Army’s vast history, but this history and necessity is very important. The CST started in 1998 as program to create a reactionary force for any WMD incidents that occur in the United States (Besosa, 2001). There were two critical events that occurred causing the need for the CST to arise and they were the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing. The two incidents, one of international terror and the other of domestic terror, shook our country and showed how vulnerable we truly were. Because of this leaders began to come up with a plan to help lessen the impact of a terror related event in the future. After these two attacks leaders began to develop means to deal with future WMD attacks, but they struggled to determine the best course of action to follow. During the initial development of the CST government leaders had to determine who would lead this charge against or enemy threats. The Department of Defense became the logical choice due to its experience and structure, but there are many limitations on the DOD such as how do we mobilize th...
... middle of paper ...
...reventing a larger crisis than what could happen in the event of a WMD attack.
Works Cited
Besosa, M. A. (2001). THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN RESPONDING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) ATTACKS IN THE U.S.: WHERE DO WE STAND? Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Univ.
Bradford, Z. B., Brown, F. J., & Sullivan, G. R. (2008). America's Army: A model for interagency effectiveness. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPT OF DEFENSE . (2001). Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams. Arlington, VA: Department of Defense.
Mabis, C. M. (2013). The Army National Guard Division Headquarters in the Army of 2020. Fort Leavenwoth: US Army Command and General Staff College.
Walker, L. S. (2001). Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST): A Necessary Failure. Maxwell AFB, AL: AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief analysis of the United States Army’s organizational structure and its culture and how these two elements impact its workers, associates and affiliates. This paper will first examine the Army’s history, development and structure to highlight the origins of the Army’s culture. Secondly, a brief history of the Army’s organizational development will be followed by a close examination of its philosophy and supporting beliefs. Lastly, this paper will discuss the role of the Army’s leadership, their response to critical issues and the organizational structure of the Army. An analysis of the army’s top leaders will help the reader to understand the Army culture more thoroughly in the context of the Army’s organizational structure. More specifically this section of the paper will examine the Army leadership’s response to the current geo-political environment and other related issues. In conclusion, this paper hopes to highlight the Army’s overall functioning from an organizational standpoint and emphasize that idea that the Army is like a functional corporation. This will be accomplished by addressing various key questions throughout this text.
Stewart R. W. (2005). American Military History (Vol. 1). The United States Army and the
Weigley, Russel F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1st Edition, 1984.
The United States Army has been a leader in military prowess on the world stage since its inception in 1775, and with such a record, it is reasonably assumed that there must be solid foundation within the organization working to maintain the high level of performance. The Noncommissioned Officer Corps is one institution within the Army that serves as a large portion of this foundation that makes it the fighting force that it has always been, and the noncommissioned officers have been an integral piece since the very inception of the Army. The Prussian General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, organizer of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, encapsulated this idea when he coined the noncommissioned officer (NCO) as the backbone of the Army. (Arms, 1991) In an Army that is continuously adjusting to world around it while maintaining its status as the military leader to all other nations, the Noncommissioned Officer Corps has always provided the platform for continuity through a growing rank system based on its original core, an evolving training program to develop effective leaders, and a creed that moves us forward while remembering the rich history of the corps that came before us.
...in technology and tactics have made Special Forces units more reliable. For example, the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and the incident with the Somali pirates of the coast of Somalia show the capabilities of today’s Special Forces. The author asserts that, in the future the United States will shift away from major combat operations. These large engagements have proven to be costly in lives and treasure. For that reason, she infers that the US Military will choose the “go small, go long” model for future engagements in the Middle East. Special operation forces are uniquely suited for this model. Their conspicuous nature and low cost make them politically and strategically ideal. The author also suggests that future large scale operations may look like the conflicts in Libya and Somalia rather than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
According to Major General Lowenberg in The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security (2005...
...s in the cohesiveness and mutual trust between the military and the people ' ( AH Nasution , 1953 , ... ) .
... Sept. 11th, 2001, terrorist attack on theWorld Trade Center and the unreliability of U.S. intelligence onWeapons of mass Destruction in Iraq have been a focus of intense scrutiny in the U.S. in 2004 particularly in the context of the 9/11 Commision , the continuing armed resistance against U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the widely perceived need for systematic review of the respective roles of the CIA, FBI and the Defense Intelligence Agency. On July 9th, 2004 the Senate report of Pre-war Intelligenceon Iraq of the Senate Intelligence Committe stated that the CIA described the danger presented by Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq in an unreasonable way, largely unsupported by the available intelligence. In a briefing held Sept 15th, 2001 George Tenet presented the Worldwide Attack Matrix, a "top-secret" document describing covert CIA anti-terror operations in 80 countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The actions, underway or being recommended, would range from "routine propaganda to lethal covert action in preparation for military attacks". The plans, if carried out, "would give the CIA the broadest and most lethal authority in its history".
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
From the creation of the Army’s Technical Escort Unit, there has always been one mission that has never changed; the removal, transportation and disposal of chemical weapons. “The U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit was formed in 1944 and is the longest, continuously active, military chemical unit in existence... The unit was formed as a group of specialist to escort chemical weapons”(Cashman, 2000, p. 104). Although this mission type has not faded, the overall mission of these units has expanded to a larger arena.
Col. Randy Larson, renown author and Director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Center, speaks on an in-depth prospective of the field of homeland security and factors that drive the continued efforts to address future threats to the nation for the 21 century. The area of focus presented in the interview are the various ways an individual may enter the field but are not limited to a particular area of study. For example, health care, agriculture, or political science, there is essential no set track for finding a career in homeland security. Challenges surrounding area of homeland security are the mounting financial burdens and the need for the appointment of leadership at a national executive level to address this realistic future threat. Despite these concerns, evidence suggests quality system practices can assist in guiding theses area and the adoption of tools that support quality improvement when addressing homeland security and future concerns.
Kent, Randolph and Mackinlay, John. May/June 1997. “International Responses to Complex Emergencies: Why a new approach is needed?” NATO Review, 27-29.
In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Reagan presented his vision of a future where a Nation’s security did not rest upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, but on the ability to protect and defend against such attacks. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program was designed to tell whether, and how, advanced defense technologies could contribute to the feasibility of this vision.