BACKGROUND
GEN Mattis, U.S. CENTCOM Commander, has noted his command’s main focus is the war in Afghanistan. Along with NATO Coalition partners, U.S.CENTCOM is conducting a comprehensive yet focused counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to ensure Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists.1 This campaign encompasses a wide range of mission objectives such as counterterrorist operations, detainee operations, rule of law, and developing the Afghan Security Forces, and Afghan National Police capacity. Therefore, Congress has provided a variety of resource mechanisms to U.S. CENTCOM in order to carry out its COIN strategy; such as the Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP), Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF), Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), and the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP). However, not all the mentioned funding streams are being used efficiently and effectively; most notably ARP. As U.S. support for the war in Afghanistan and DOD budgets decline, U.S. CENTCOM must reevaluate how to strategically leverage ARP as a key enabler in executing COIN. With this in mind, the roadmap for leveraging includes, eliminating competing funding programs, obtaining Afghan government buy-in and providing leadership emphasis on the program.
ARP authority provides the U.S. military the vehicle to counter violent extremism, as outlined in CJCS National Military Strategy, by assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in the peace and stability process. The program aims at convincing insurgents, their leaders and their supporters to cease active and/or passive support of the insurgency and to become peaceful members of society.2 Most Afghan insurgents are ...
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Ideally the U.S. and international partners would like to see a peaceful and stable Afghan society that is able to protect and secure itself from the insurgency and an environment that prevents the fostering terrorism. The U.S along with NATO has invested insurmountable resources over the past ten years; invested countries can no longer afford to provide Afghanistan plush budgets. The Afghan government must take full responsibility and become accountable for the efforts put in place by the U.S. and allied partners. In the preparation of a possible troop withdrawal, in 2014, the U.S. must wean Afghanistan now by eliminating funding programs that offer no tangible return. Competing programs such as CERP, AIF, and ASFF must be eliminated. ARP is fully capable of being a standalone program, the key enabler, in executing COIN in Afghanistan.
The author detailed the many of the difficulties faced by the special operations forces in Afghanistan. They made significant gains with the Village Stability Operations and a major concern for them was losing ground. However, certain factors threatened those gains. In particular, the wars unpopularity at home and President Obama 2014 timetable to withdraw were major hurdles. The author explained that this complicated the efforts of the special operations forces because; a counterinsurgency strategy takes time to cultivate. Many military leaders fear that their efforts will not hold up in their absence. They believe the assistance of the United States is crucial to continued success in the war. The biggest obstacle to this effort was the relationship between American and Afghani Leadership. President Karzai insisted Afghan Special Forces accompany U.S. Special Forces on night raids. Military leaders were hesitant at first nevertheless, president Karzai insisted. In addition, he wanted Afghan approval for every mission launched. The author concludes that the real intention for accompanying the U....
In the post Afghanistan period, the Army will focus on regaining readiness to support the full range of combat operations and would be a key part of any large scale offensive or security requirement. A rebalance within the active and reserve components will achieve significant cost savings by placing a large percentage of the forces only necessary for extended ground campaigns in the reserves. The Army is essential to any large-scale force projection operation and functions as an integrated force with partners and allies
Research of the Arp2/3 complex helps us understand how and why the complex is necessary in cells, specifically for the extension of lamellipodia and fibroblast cell migration in situations such as the healing of wounds. Prior to this article being published, the Arp2/3 complex had already been extensively studied and was known to be a protein made up of seven subunits that is a major player in a cell’s ability to regulate actin cytoskeletons. The idea behind the study discussed in this article is that Arp2/3 will be genetically disrupted to understand its function in fibroblast motility within cells. The hypothesis deduced based on this is that fibroblasts can’t form in lamellipodia without Arp2/3.
In addition to strategic deployment, the defense budget should be reformed to allocate more money towards specialized, agile units and counterterrorism efforts. By doing so, the United States would be more efficient in fighting the small terrorist groups that pose such a large threat today. In his article supporting defense reform, Berger points out, “many analysts have pointed out in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, future threats to the United States are likely to come from relatively small terrorist organizations and not from state entities which could not realistically defeat us.” The most prevalent danger regarding military within the continental U.S. is not an invasion by another nation, but rather unexpected acts of terror.
The United States strategy overwhelming resembled “Hearts and Minds” with its focus on establishing a capable and honest government by addressing corruption and abuse within the Afghanistan government. The strategy aimed to improve the standards of living in Afghanistan by focusing on security and improving the overall safety of the citizens of Afghanistan. While the United States strategy had some elements of “Cost/Benefit,” such as the “stick” approach to insurgents unwilling to reintegrate, it was not the dominate
Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations including Afghanistan.2 With so many different nations fighting along with our own branches of military, it would test our ability to conduct joint operations on multiple levels.
It has been argued that foreign forces cannot defeat an insurgency—the best they can hope for is to create the conditions that will enable local forces to do so. The most important contribution the U.S. Army makes to the develop¬ment of security forces like the Iraqi Army (IA) and Afghan National Army (ANA) is embedded advisory (or
President Obama first attempted to address this Afghanistan-Pakistan problem by committing 17,000 troops to safeguard the integrity of Afghanistan’s presidential election. After the election, US troops
Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) exercise command authority over assigned forces and given geographical area of responsibilities (AOR) in accordance with Unified Command Plan (UCP), and they are responsible to the President and SecDef for preparedness of their commands and performance of assigned missions. Today’s world is complex and it has been changing in many ways and with globalization these changes are faster and grooving in complexity. Globalization and constant competition for resources along with failed states and climate changes generate conditions for more intensive human migration and also make the contemporary environment more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. Each of the U.S Unified Geographical Combatant Commanders
A core military doctrine, fighting, is no longer a priority when dealing with 21st century conflict. The American military contends that a legitimate government, in addition to protecting the people, must be established to combat insurgency-generating instability. The military’s ability to “establish local governance, conduct information operations, build economies, service infrastructure, and provide security” now takes precedence over combat abilities (Gentile 27). The Army’s experience with this new core objective of nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan has revealed not only the military’s limited ability to reform governments and societies, but also the significant amount of resources the process requires. For example, the Karzai administration in Afghanistan “neither funds nor delivers the key public services offered in the country” and is void of an incentive “to improve his state’s effectiveness or accountability” (Eikenberry 6). This motivation to resist rule-bound Afghan institutions indicates a failure by the American military to establish government legitimacy and regional stability. By the end of 2014 Afghan forces will take on the responsibility for Afghanistan’s security from US combat troops. According to current projections, a stalemate between the Taliban and the
“The hearts and mind (HAM) theory is identified as winning the hearts and minds of the population which is a technique based on the implementation of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy of persuading the population to support the government and reject the insurgents.” The counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy as outlined by President Obama and General Petraeus’s most closely embrace is the heart and minds (HAM) theory. President Obama speech identified the United States strategic approach with Afghanistan in three elements. The three core elements addressed by President Obama during his speech on the strategy in Afghanistan are identified as: 1) utilize the military effort to create conditions for transition, 2) a civilian surge that reinforce positive actions, and 3) an effective partnership with Pakistan.” These elements align with the premise of HAM and the strategy of COIN. Furthermore, in General Petraeus’s COIN strategy he specifically shifts the focus from the enemy and toward the empowerment of the Afghanistan population and its government.
Tse H. (n.d), A Focused and Targeted Expansion of NATO and ISAF Involvement in Afghanistan Counter narcotics Operations pdf, pp 22 [Retrieved on: 10/05/2014]
Recently Afghanistan has grown significantly in terms of its ability to care for itself. A national army and a developing police force are becomi...
In the past ten years the Afghan Government has been dealing with a number of issues that have caused problems for the country, problems such as illegal drug trade, terrorism and violence. But nowadays they are fighting a problem that has long existed between people, and quite recently has taken a whole new aspect to it. Ethnic conflict is the destructive factor that has caused problems between people for generations, often leading to fights, outbreak of violence and grudge between different ethnicities.
Council, H. P. (2012). Afghanistan's vision by 2015 . Kabul: High Peace Council law committee .