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essay about ludwig wittgenstein
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Profound ideas often arise out of the most uncanny situations. Ludwig Wittgenstein composed what may be the most influential philosophical work of the twentieth century as a prisoner of war during the First World War. His poignant writings included many propositions that flew in the face of contemporary philosophers at the time, unveiling a new perspective from which to consider the study of logic. While peers struggled with the rules governing the logic of semantics, Wittgenstein sought to emphasize the whimsical nature of language.
One of Wittgenstein’s key points reads, “Logic must take care of itself.” He elaborates, explaining that, “In a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic.” These statements at first seem cryptic. One may wonder if they contain any significant thought at all. These two ideas, however, represent the quintessential difference between Wittgenstein’s philosophy and that of his colleagues. Any thinkable name, symbol, or designation is logically permissible, according to Wittgenstein. He considers, as an example, the sentence, “Socrates is identical.” Many well known philosophers, such as Frege and Russell, would contend that this sentence is nonsensical because the term “identical” is the wrong kind of symbol for such a sentence structure. Logic demands that the expression “Socrates is” may only be followed by a particular group of symbols. In general, it is presumed that logic dictates the way in which words may be stringed together to form a logical thought. Wittgenstein, however, explicitly denies this sentiment. This sentence, according to him, fails to make sense not because of a mismatched symbol, but because we have failed to assign any meaning to “identical” at all. This departure from previ...
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The key to understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy is recognizing that language itself does not add sense to sentences - people do. Confusion arises when we assume meanings for words that don’t hold, or take meanings for granted when they fail to exist at all. Logic, fortunately, is not concerned with such confusion. For a symbol or name to be conceivable means that it is logically valid in any context, but the symbol itself holds no meaning until we assign one. This is exactly what is meant by the claim, “Logic must take care of itself.” The sentence, “Dandelion run cow,” as nonsensical as it may seem, makes perfect sense if we define the words to mean “he”, “enjoys”, and “cinema”, respectively. This illustrates the ultimate whimsical nature of language and its independence from logical value, a point masterfully indicated by Wittgenstein.
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
Quine's indeterminacy differs from Wittgenstein's in several aspects. First, Wittgenstein and Kripke's indeterminacy applies to a single individual in isolation and this indeterminacy disappears when the single person is brought into a wider community. Thus, this indeterminacy is only logically possible or hypothetical. Second, in Quine's problem, two translation manuals are distinguishable; while Wittgenstein's hypotheses, such as 'plus' and 'quus' and many others, are indistinguishable for the subject's past and the subject would never aware of the distinctions. Third, in Wittgenstein's view, whether a member follows the rules or not can be determined by 'outward criterion'. Quine's indeterminacy denies the existence of such 'outward criterion' for his two translation manuals.
implacability of the natural world, the impartial perfection ofscience, the heartbreak of history. The narrative is permeated with insights about language itself, its power to distort and destroy meaning, and to restore it again to those with stalwart hearts.
He also has a continuing theme of his work being premature. This theme comes from his strong ego believing that the reason that he is not widely read is because his ideas are too revolutionary to be understood. "But it would contradict my character entirely if I expected ears and hands for my truths today: that today one doesn't hear me and doesn't accept my ideas is not only understandable, it seems right to me" (715). His continual focus on the stupidity of Germans becomes irritating after a while. "To think German, to feel German-I can do anything, but not that" (719).
The signifying monkey invariable repeats to his friend, the Lion, some insult purportedly generated by their mutual friend, the Elephant. The Monkey, however, speaks figuratively. The Lion, indignant and outraged, demands an apology of the Elephant, who refuses and then trounces the Lion. The Lion, realizing that his mistake was to take the Monkey literally, returns to trounce the Monkey. It is this relationship between the literal and the figurative, and the dire consequences of their confusion, which is the most striking repeated element of these tales. The Monkey’s trick depends on the Lion’s inability to mediate between these two poles of signification, of meaning. (p.55)
“We perceive things in three ways: through experience, through reasoning, and through a representation.” (Leibniz, Gottfried and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. (Translator). Confessio Philosophi. 1671–1678). Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz learned and taught by this principle. Known as the last “universal genius”, Leibniz made astounding leaps in fields of study such as mathematics, metaphysics, geology, logic and philosophy, along with many others. Leibniz was highly respected by many and even though their views did not coincide they could not help being amazed by his achievements. (Brandon C. Look, 2007) “When one compares the talents one has with those of a Leibniz, one is tempted to throw away one's books and go die quietly in the dark of some forgotten corner.” (Oeuvres complètes, vol. 7, p. 678).
Deep-seated in these practices is added universal investigative and enquiring of acquainted conflicts between philosophy and the art of speaking and/or effective writing. Most often we see the figurative and rhetorical elements of a text as purely complementary and marginal to the basic reasoning of its debate, closer exploration often exposes that metaphor and rhetoric play an important role in the readers understanding of a piece of literary art. Usually the figural and metaphorical foundations strongly back or it can destabilize the reasoning of the texts. Deconstruction however does not indicate that all works are meaningless, but rather that they are spilling over with numerous and sometimes contradictory meanings. Derrida, having his roots in philosophy brings up the question, “what is the meaning of the meaning?”
The philosophy behind The Crying of Lot 49 seems to lie in the synthesis of philosophers and modern physicists. Ludwig Wittgenstein viewed the world as a "totality of facts, not of things."1 This idea can be combined with a physicist's view of the world as a closed system that tends towards chaos. Pynchon asserts that the measure of the world is its entropy.2 He extends this metaphor to his fictional world. He envelops the reader, through various means, within the system of The Crying of Lot 49.
Baruch de Spinoza, or as later known by Benedictus de Spinoza, was a 17th century philosopher that came under much hostility because of his renunciation of the accepted religious perceptions of god. This is not to say that Spinoza repudiated god’s existence, on the contrary, Spinoza considered himself to believe in god, but in a different more natural sense. Spinoza received much denunciation and criticism for his beliefs from religious figure heads. He was excommunicated from the Jewish community because his ideas were contrary and revolutionary to the traditional Jewish religion. In addition to that, all works of Spinoza were considered prohibited by the Roman Catholic Church. This is not to say that no one agreed with Spinoza, in fact, he was offered prestigious teaching positions but declined them. However, when you butt heads with the religious status quo within the Jewish community that he was apart of, one has to expect to receive opposition and criticism.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
This paper will focus on a modern worldview that uses theories and other ideas presented by the great minds of the past. I will seek to explain why some philosopher’s ideas have become engrained in our thoughts without us even realizing they exist. My goal is to invert the title of this class, A Brief History of Imagination, by using imagination to explain why many historical events occurred.
To some, truth is something that is absolute and unchanging. To others, truth is volatile and inconstant. In the 16th and 17th century, the foundations of civilization itself had been shaken. Many of the ideas which were thought to be absolutely true had been plunged into the depths of uncertainty. The cosmological, geographical, and religious revolutions called into question the nature of truth itself. It is no wonder, then, that some of the great writers at the time included within their works a treatise on the ways in which truth is constructed. Because of the major ideological revolutions that shaped their world, Milton, Montaigne, and Shakespeare all used characters and theatrical devices to create their own ideas on the construction of truth.
Moore, Brooke Noel., and Kenneth Bruder. "Chapter 6- The Rise of Metaphysics and Epistemology; Chapter 9- The Pragmatic and Analytic Traditions; Chapter 7- The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries." Philosophy: the Power of Ideas. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2011. Print.
Wittgenstein L. On Certainty G. E. M. Anscombe and Denis Paul editors (Oxford Blackwell, 1969)
This might seem a pointless endeavor when we consider the kind of paradox that Wittgenstein’s theory of language presents, yet Wittgenstein was deeply familiar with the paradoxical nature of his argument. Wittgenstein advances that “[i]t is clear ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental” (TLP 6.421). Yet, the philosopher advances in one of the final sections of the Tractatus that “[t]here are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (TLP 6.522). If these ineffable things do indeed exist outside the realm of language—that realm which Wittgenstein’s linguistic solipsism denotes as the limit of our thought—in what realm do they exist? In the same letter I previously mentioned that Wittgenstein wrote to von Ficker, the philosopher