The notion of Persistence gives way to several predominant theories; of which, attempt to account for many possible questions that arise from it. As in most cases of debate, when more than one account of such is held to be true, there will clearly be much disagreement. Two views that claim to account accurately for persistence that remain widely known are , that of an endurantist (Threeist) and that of a perdurantist (Twoist). The endurantist will hold that objects are wholly present at all times, a persistent object ‘endures’ over time. The conflicting view of a perdurantist claims that objects are actually composed of temporal parts, more precisely, proper temporal parts. Further, a Twoist (vs. Oneist), will say that a name most often refers to the sum of one’s temporal parts, whereas a Threeist believes a name to refer to one who is wholly present during all times of its existence. The two opposing theories stated very simply, as above, give insight as to the nature of their arguments against one another. It does seem, however, that the Twoist’s account of persistence gives an exceedingly useful notion in regards towards many more subjects of philosophy, as well as an explanation that accounts for much more in terms of the problems associated strictly with persistence itself.
The argument posed by VanIwagen, a Threeist, against the Twoist is known as the problem of Essential Duration; and the counterpart argument given by the Twoist is referred to as the problem of Temporary Intrinsics. VanInwagen’s (modal) argument goes as follows: One could have lived longer than did in the actually world; this must be accounted for by either, one having been composed of more temporal parts that actually was, or at least some of one’s temporal parts had a longer duration than did in the actual world. VanInwagen continues with; a twoist must clearly hold that temporal parts have their duration essentially; their duration can not be shorter or longer. It then follows that a person is also a temporal part, which is to say they are the sum of all his or her temporal parts, making this the largest part. If this is so, says VanInwagen, then the Twoist must hold this duration essentially and one could not have lived longer than did in the actual world. A contradiction is reached, VanInwagen then very quickly disregards any additional consideration of such an avenue.
Opposed to this view of the persistence of objects through time is three dimensionalism. Three dimensionalism appears to be more in line with our common everyday sense of how objects persist through time; one in which we believe in, as Chisholm puts it, “the concept of one and the same individual existing at different times” (143). In contrast to the four dimensionalist, then, the three dimensionalist maintains that objects persist by being “wholly present” at each point at which they exist. Ultimately, Chisholm uses his arguments against temporal parts in order to support his general theses concerning personal identity over time. However, it is not within the scope of this paper to explore the underlying reasons Chisholm might have had for arguing against the four dimensionalist: that topic is best left to a more extensive project on the subject of the persistence of objects through time. For now, we will just take a look at three criticisms that Chisholm proposes for the temporal parts theorist: (1) that the so-called spatial analogy is not accurate, (2) that the doctrine of temporal parts does not solve the Phillip drunk/ Phillip sober puzzle, and (3) that the doctrine is of no use in solving various other metaphysical puzzles.
To answer the question of whether a person can persist through time, it is important to consider what is meant by a ‘person’. This consideration seems trivial at first, and if one were to take the physicalist route, it would be – a person persists through time by existing as the same human animal. However, it is in fact a lot harder to pinpoint what the ‘self’ actually consists of if we were to take the psychological route and consider the voice inside our heads, the voice that thinks and experiences and suffers. What is this mysterious immaterial phenomenon that we hold to be our personal identity? And what makes it the same entity as the one yesterday? Although these questions don’t have an explicit answer yet, in this essay I will attempt to give an insight on how they could be answered, offering a psychological
In this essay I am going to be discussingthe question of the persistence ofpersonal identity. Particularly, defending the theory that I think is the best. Therearethreemajor competing theoriesthat are brought upwhen it comes to personal identity. They are the brute-physical, psychological-continuity, and the antichriterialist view. Here,I will be defending the psychological-continuity view because I think this theorybest explains what we call personhood; and I think it gives the most satisfactoryanswer to the question.The psychological continuity theory states that what makes a certain individual who they are is their psychological state (i.e. memories, mental functions); and these mental functions are a product of a functioning physical organ
The 'doctrine of recollection' states that all true knowledge exists implicitly within us, and can be brought to consciousness - made explicit - by recollection. Using the Platonic concepts of 'Forms', 'particulars', 'knowledge' and 'true opinion', this essay explains what can or cannot be recollected, why all knowledge is based on recollection, and why the doctrine does not prove the soul to be immortal.
Quine's essay, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, is an investigation into the nature of identity, and how it is that a particular object can remain consistent in itself despite subjection to the continuous material fluctuation inseparable from temporal existence. Quine has identified the notion of identity as a source of perplexity which has puzzled many philosophers throughout the history of the philosophical sciences, and has attempted to explore its relation to ostension, or the means by which a particular object can be said to possess a certain nature through the provision of multiple exemplary instances of property instantiation. Although philosophers have remained uncertain as to how it is that any one person can retain the same identity throughout time, despite being immersed in the causal process of time, Quine believes that those who wish to accept the notion of a “changeless and therefore immortal soul,” as the foundation upon which identity rests, must also be able to sold the same to be true for other, less humanistic, phenomena.
For millennia, human beings have pondered the existence of supreme beings. The origin of this all-too-human yearning for such divine entities stems in part from our desire to grasp the truth of the cosmos we inhabit. One part of this universe physically surrounds us and, at the end of our lives, consumes us entirely, and so we return from whence we came. Yet there is another, arguably more eternal, part of the cosmos that, in some ways, is separable from the transient, material world we so easily perceive but that, in other ways, is inextricably linked to it by unexplored, divinable forces. The argument of Aristotle’s Metaphysics is not that this worldview is provable or disprovable; the mere fact we are able to reason about abstract objects without having to perceive them is evidence enough of this order. Rather, Aristotle attempts to tackle some of the most fundamental questions of human experience, and at the crux of this inquiry is his argument for the existence of an unmoved mover. For Aristotle, all things are caused to move by other things, but the unreasonableness of this going on ad infinitum means that there must eventually be an ultimate mover who is himself unmoved. Not only does he put forth this argument successfully, but he also implies why it must hold true for anyone who believes in the ability to find truth by philosophy.
. Its most famous defender is Descartes, who argues that as a subject of conscious thought and experience, he cannot consist simply of spatially extended matter. His essential nature must be non-m...
...e person themselves, and as such, lasts only as long as that identity as chosen by the individual.
For Aristotle objects are “material enactments of mental decay. […] If objects are made to stand for memory, the decay or destruction of the object implies forgetting” (Forty 4). The issue here is that memory does not lend to a physical description and physical objects endure a different decaying process than that of mental material (Forty 6). This leads to doubts in the relationship between memory and material objects.
Depending upon your definition of the present, it is hard to distinguish when the present time really is. Trying to pinpoint the exact time of “now” seems to be impossible because when we actually finish saying “now” it is already in the past. It is believed by many people that when a human dies for example, they cease to exist. In this essay I will be looking at two key concepts that relate to the topic of existence and the present time. These concepts are ‘Presentism’ and ‘Eternalism’. I will begin the essay by outlining what ‘Eternalism’ is and how its followers may see the present in a different way because of it. From here I will propose some of its weaknesses followed by objections to these weaknesses. The second main concept will be ‘Presentism’ which will be the opposing argument that suggests that things only exist in the present time instead of the past, present and future. After giving this argument, I will also be giving objections and counters to it. I, myself believe that there is a present time and existence, as we I find it difficult to believe that something exists in the same way once it has died and decomposed.
Briefly, we can conclude by deduction that body, brain, and soul are not sufficient to explain personal identity. Personal identity and immortality will always cause questions to arise from philosophers, as well as other individuals, and although many philosophers may object and disagree, the memory criterion offers the most sufficient explanation.
In order to understand the meaning of existence in relation to philosophy, we need to discuss its ordinary meaning and the various levels of existence. The Chambers Concise Dictionary (1992, 362) defines ‘exist’ as having an actual being; to live; to occur; to continue to live’ and it defines existence as ‘the state of existing or being’. In other words, the Dictionary does not make a distinction between existence and living. However, philosophically there is the view that existence is different from living. What then is the meaning of existence in philosophy? In order to answer this question we shall examine how philosophers have used the term in their various works. Our attention shall focus on Plato and Sartre.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2014), A Peer Reviewed Academic Resource. Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/milljs/ on February 15th, 2014.
All the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy admit in thinking of the soul as not only immortal but also as endless. The reasoning of the materialists like Charvakas amount to this that, however consciousness is unseen in external objects, it develops i...
This essay is written to introduce the Russell’s Theory on Definite Description. The main content of this essay including: the definition of definite description, the puzzles concerning definite description, Russell’s Theory on Definite Description, how this theory solves the puzzles, Strawson’s objection to this theory, my evaluation on the convincingness of Strawson’s objection and my evaluation on the convincingness of Russell’s Theory of Definite Description.