Sir Karl Popper's Falsifiability Claim
Popper's claim that "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability" (Klemke, 1988) may be viewed as an observation of, rather than a complete departure from, earlier criteria for science. Klemke states in his introduction to part one (p. 16) that defining science (or the scientific method) has traditionally consisted of utilizing seven criteria that must be met in a specific order. Criteria number (5) and (6) refer to deduction rather than induction, and will negate criterion (4) if not met. Specifically, if one is unable to "deduce other statements from these", or one is unable to "verify those statements by further observations", it is not science. Therefore, the difference between Popper's claim and earlier theories of what constitutes science may be in definition.
Popper himself states (Klemke, 1988, p.27) that observations are interpretations relative to the theory one wishes to support (or refute). One must define one's terms so that the theory itself is clear and open to rebuttal or verification. Perhaps the conflict between the earlier criteria for science and Popper's criterion is one of clarity, not theory.
Although traditional theory on what science consists of is viewed as inductive, it appears that at least some of the criteria are, in fact, deductive. Criterion (5) explicitly refers to deduction, and criterion (6) refers to verification of said deduction(s). It would seem that Popper's conflict with accepted theory may be relative to traditional criteria (1)- "making observations as accurate and definite as possible." If one approaches the criteria for science previously regarded to be inductive as deductive (since it is not science without all seven criteria being met), perhaps Popper's own claim (that in order to be scientific a claim must be falsifiable) is a test of the previous theory.
Accordingly, if one approaches Popper's claim as an attempt to falsify the previous theory of the criteria for science, one may address his theory somewhat differently. In Popper's own words (Klemke, p.27), " ... we may reject a law or theory on the basis of new evidence without necessarily discarding the old evidence which originally led us to accept it.". Popper rejects induction as the method of science and offers an alternative method - deduction. Using Popper's falsifiability criterion, the common theory of science as inductive has been rebutted. Popper's observation and testing of induction as a criterion for science has suggested a new criterion.
Popperian hypothetico deductivists would find several problems with the view of science Alan Chalmers stated in ‘What is this thing Called Science?’ From “Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge” to “Scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven” popper would disagree to everything. With Chalmers falsificationism or hypothetico-deductivism view, his statement indicates that scientific induction is completely justifiable. However as it is now known, induction is not a reasonable way to prove or justify science.
Popper asserts that "it is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory--if we look for confirmations." Kuhn illustrates (page 6), in his discussion of cosmologies, that man needs a structure for his universe. Man needs to explain the physical relation between his personal habitat and nature in order to feel at home. Explaining this relation gives meaning to his actions.
In science, a theory will refer to an explanation of an important feature of the world supported by testing and facts that have been gathered over time. It’s there scientific theories that allow scientists to make predictions about untested and unobserved concurrences in the world. The American Association for the Advancement of Science has this explanation of what a theory means to those in the science field, and it is as follows, “A scientific theory is a well substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world, based on a body of facts......Such fact supported theories are not guesses but reliable accounts of the real
...ave to accept unless unification is further revised. Because as it stands, Popper’s idea of a new theory replacing the old is that it “corrects the old theory, so that it actually contradicts the old theory.” (Popper, p.16) This contradiction is what causes the winner-take-all problem because the lower explanation has been trumped by the general explanation which eliminates the lower theories ability to be explanatory.
Any hypothesis, Gould says, begins with the collection of facts. In this early stage of a theory development bad science leads nowhere, since it contains either little or contradicting evidence. On the other hand, Gould suggests, testable proposals are accepted temporarily, furthermore, new collected facts confirm a hypothesis. That is how good science works. It is self-correcting and self-developing with the flow of time: new information improves a good theory and makes it more precise. Finally, good hypotheses create logical relations to other subjects and contribute to their expansion.
At first Popper seems to just be criticizing the integrity of some sciences and/or scientists who nebulously back their vague and general theories with references to observations that may be inconclusive or scanty which they presumably call "scientific method." He cites Freud and Adler's psychological theories, as well as the socio-economic or historical theory or Karl Marx as theories in which "Whatever happens always confirms it."
Messenger, E., Gooch, J., & Seyler, D. U. (2011). Arguing About Science. Argument! (pp. 396-398). New York, NY: Mcgraw-Hill Co..
Consequently I propose an empiricism approach to science. Empiricism takes empirical adequacy (not truth) as the goal of science and when it accepts a theory it accepts it as empirically adequate.
Since the mid-20th century, a central debate in the philosophy of science is the role of epistemic values when evaluating its bearing in scientific reasoning and method. In 1953, Richard Rudner published an influential article whose principal argument and title were “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1-6). Rudner proposed that non-epistemic values are characteristically required when making inductive assertions on the rationalization of scientific hypotheses. This paper aims to explore Rudner’s arguments and Isaac Levi’s critique on his claims. Through objections to Levi’s dispute for value free ideal and highlighting the importance of non-epistemic values within the tenets and model development and in science and engineering,
A scientific theory is an explanation that is well- substantiated explanation in regards to some aspect of the natural world that is attained through scientific method and is tested numerous times and usually confirmed through vigorous observation and experimentation. The term theory can be seen as a collection of laws which allow you to show some kind of phenomenon. The strength of a scientific theory associated with the diversity of phenomena can explain its elegance and simplicity. However when new evidence is gathered a scientific theory can be changed or even rejected if it does not fit the new findings, in such cases a more accurate theory is formed. Scientific theories are used to gain further
In addition to logical consistency, testability is an important piece when evaluating a theory. According to Akers & Sellers (2013), “a theory must be testable by objective, repeatable evidence” (p.5); thus, if the theory is not testable then it has no scientific value. There are several reasons why a theory might not be testable; such as its concepts may not be observable or reportable events and tautology. Tautology refers to a statement or hypothesis that is tr...
Popper believes that science does not begin with the collection of empirical data, but starts with the formulation of a hypothesis (Veronesi, 2014, p1). Alexander Bird outlines Popper’s view on the scientific method in his book Philosophy of Science (1998, pp.239-240). This view is that scientists use a process of imagination to invent a hypothesis. However, once this has been established, scientists must attempt to
The Chalmers's view against the Popperian hypothetico-deductive. Popper mentioned that people shouldn't concentrate our hopes on an unacceptable principle of induction.Also, he claimed that without relying on induction we still can work out how science works and why it is rational.1 Hence, I would like to said Popper would disagree with Chalmer's opinion. Also, I think Popperian might say Chalmers is wrong because his falsifiable in Popperian sense. Chalmers might be falsified if scientific knowledge is observed not reliable due to some experiment and observation might contain mistakes and we do not find them now. Furthermore, the Popperian might argue that science can not be prove but can justify the better theories or laws.1 We can justify which scientific laws or theories are better ones as there is falsified is found, or not scientific. When they are found falsified or not scientific, we can seek for novel bold hypot...
Beginning with the scientific revolution in the fifteen hundreds, the Western world has become accustomed to accepting knowledge that is backed by the scientific method, a method that has been standardized worldwide for the most accurate results. This method allows people to believe that the results achieved from an experiment conducted using the scientific method have been properly and rigorously tested and must therefore be the closest to truth. This method also allows for replication of any experiment with the same results, which further solidifies the credibility and standing of natural science in the world. Another aspect that allows for the reliability on the natural sciences is the current paradigm boxes, which skew the truth to remove anomalies. This affects the outcome of experiments as the hypotheses will be molded to create results that fit the paradigm box.
The major strength of science is that it has uncertainty and skepticism. Science never claims to be hundred percent accurate. There is always some degree of ambiguity and probability in science. The Heisenberg’s uncertainty in quantum mechanics is a good example of this. According to the Heisenberg’s uncertainty, we can never be sure of the position of the quantum particles. There is always a degree of fuzziness in nature and a fundamental limit to what we can understand about these particles and their behavior. We can only calculate the probability of the nature of the particle and ho...