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Athens Political Life
The development of Athens
The development of Athens
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A result of the division of forces was the Peloponnesian's establishing a permanent garrison at Decelea in northern Attica. This was approximately fifteen miles from Athens itself. This forced the Athenians to give up the surrounding land and permanently live in the city. Thousands of slaves deserted to the Peloponnesians and industry and commerce shrank (Botsford and Robinson 218). This had a tremendous impact on Athens' economy and ability to finance the war.
With enemies at its back, Athens was unable to mass its forces in Sicily to conquer Syracuse. This hampered the expeditionjespecially in its lack of cavalry which Athens held back to defend Attica. Another failure was the Athenian utter disregard for operational security that greatly hampered the expedition.
During the Syracusan expedition the Athenian's lapses in security proved fatal to their campaign. A major error at the beginning of the campaign involved Alcibiades and the Athenian assembly's attempt to recall him. Immediately before the expedition's departure, the assembly suspected Alcibiades of religious sacrilege. Afraid of Alcibiades' power in the army, the Athenian assembly decided to wait until they departed to pursue the issue. The Athenian assembly indicted Alcibiades for sacrilege after he sailed for Sicily and ordered him to return to face charges.
On the return journey in a separate ship, Alcibiades escaped at Thurii and later went into exile in Sparta (218). The Athenians failed to anticipate Alcibiades' possible defection and take action to prevent it. A side consequence was that the assembly took the soul and tactical advantage out of the expedition by recalling Alcibiades. The expedition had a better chance of success if the command had gone to Alcib...
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To worsen matters, faced with these problems, Nicias became too cautious and would not listen to his subordinates. He repeatedly violated the principles of surprise, mass, maneuver and offensive. Nicias proved incapable of imposing his will on the Syracusans. He failed to anticipate their actions and consequently his forces could not quickly respond. It is little surprise that the Syracusans, when motivated and decently equipped, eventually defeated the Athenians. They understood these principles and used the Athenian lack of them to their advantage.
If the Athenians had used the proven principles of war, they would have had two courses of action. One, not become involved in the dispute,or two, take decisive action immediately and crush the Syracusans. Instead, as history points out, the Syraclisans defeated the Athenians who, as a result, lost their empire.
According to Thucydides, t... ... middle of paper ... ... henian who had lead the siege against Samos, realised this but also appreciated the dangers of changing this tactic all together – ‘Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go’. To this extent, it is reasonable that Athens should use such extreme measures, as it seemed to be the only way in which she could uphold her power and keep her allies close. Yet by doing so she had transformed the original aims of the Delian League entirely, which had a purpose to promote freedom and independence.
Demosthenes began his series of orations, known to history as The Philippics, against Philip following the conquest by Philip of the Illyrians to the west of Macedonia and the Thracians to the north and east of Macedonia. The continued agitation of Demosthenes and the speed with which Philip was acquiring his empire spurred Athens, finally, into a disastrous alliance with Thebes in an uprising against Philip in 338 B.C.E., the result of which was the destruction of Thebes by Philip as example of consequence to all who would potentially rise against him. Athens, however, receiving treatment as ally and friend, was spared the consequence o...
We have now examined Thucydides' strongest arguments for Athenian rule. It is clear that Athens had a stronger claim to rule than the Melians had to remain sovereign. We also know that Athens' claims hold up when we examine them for validity. Thucydides beliefs in Athens' claims were therefore well founded.
Of all the history of the Ancient Greece, there were two events that showed really well how disunity among the Greeks highly contributed to its downfall, which were the Peloponnesian War and Successors’ War. Interestingly, both wars occurred after a unity and followed by a unity that was carried out by “outsiders”. This may have actually shown that the Greeks had never learned from their past
The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.
The decision of Achilleus is a crucial moment in understanding how fate works in epic (Homerian) literature. Thetis tells Achilleus of his opportunity to win renown as the greatest warrior of all time, earning glory through his fearless acts in battle against a foe who is sure to overcome the Achaians. The fate of ten years of attack on Troy hinge upon the decision of Achilleus, who is given the choice to win glory for the Achaians and, more importantly, himself.
When examining the causes for the Peloponnesian War, which was between 431-404 B.C., there are a number of causes that factored into the cause of this war. However, one of the most important causes to this war was largely due to the fact that the Spartans feared the growing power and success of Athens. The Spartans were “particularly alarmed at the growing power of Athens” (Cartwright, “Peloponnesian War”). During the Persian war in 479 BC, Athens grew fiercely strong with power with help of its many allies and continued with their no mercy attacks on Persian territories. When the Persians left Greece, Athens further enraged Sparta when they built large and tall walls around its empire in the event of an attack, which was mostly thought to be from Sparta if it happened.
... weaker state will remain neutral from a military strength. Melians’ loss reaffirms the absolute power of imperial conquests and nationalism in theories of realism. Since the Melians were allied with the Spartans and failed to cooperate, it is justifiable that the Athenians had the right to want to rule and invade the Melians as means to protect their own strengths.
In this regard, Athens failed. Athens was not prepared to conduct warfare against an unknown opponent. Athens was unsure of how fervent the Syracusans would fight having never faced them in battle. Little was known about the terrain of Sicily and where it was vulnerable . In the face of uncertainty, a sensible military leader would heavily weight his attacking force. Mass becomes the crucial factor to ensure victory is achieved. Athens had trouble in formulating a military strategy to guarantee success. The three Athenian generals had differing opinions in dispatching Syracuse. Alcibiades pursued a path of alliance followed by attacking the dissenters, Lamachus favored a surprise attack on Syracuse to crush political will, and Nicias preferred a demonstrative show of force to deter Syracuse from further action . Each of these actions required varying levels of means from lowest to highest concentrations of military force. An unclear, disjointed strategy cannot be adequately resourced. Nicias realized this early on in preparing for the Sicilian campaign, and had thus heavily weighted the Athenian military in the pursuit of the campaign . The military was appropriately resourced to execute each of the three Generals’ strategies, but at a great cost. For success and holding Sicily, the Athenian military would most likely
...edicted it would, and without a leader like him willing to direct them away from this mindset rather than pander to it to get votes, the political constitution of the city was doomed to dissolve. Speaking of the revolution in Corcyra, which occurred after the Athenian decision to spare Mytilene but before its destruction of Melos, Thucydides wrote, “In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants and so proves a rough master that brings most men’s characters to a level with their fortunes” (III.82.2). This was precisely the change Athens underwent, and the cause of its eventual demise.
There are times in history that something will happen and it will defy all logic. It was one of those times when a few Greek city/states joined together and defeated the invasion force of the massive Persian Empire. The Greeks were able to win the Greco-Persian War because of their naval victories over the Persians, a few key strategic victories on land, as well as the cause for which they were fighting. The naval victories were the most important contribution to the overall success against the Persians. The Persian fleet was protecting the land forces from being outflanked and after they were defeated the longer had that protection. While the Greeks had very few overall victories in battle they did have some strategic victories. The Battle of Thermopylae is an example of a strategic success for the Greeks. The morale of the Persian army was extremely affected by the stout resistance put up by King Leonidas and his fellow Spartans. The Greeks fought so hard against overwhelming odds because of what they were fighting for. They were fighting for their country and their freedom. They fought so hard because they did not want to let down the man next to them in the formation. Several things contributed to the Greeks success against the Persian invasion that happened during the Second Greco-Persian War.
As can be expected from pioneer governmental institutions, Athenian democracy was not perfect. In fact it was far from it. It resulted in the establishment of poor policies by aggressive populists who sought "...private ambition and private profit...which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and their allies." (Thucydides). These self interested populist leaders with personal gain in mind established extensive internal political instability "...by quarrelling among themselves [and] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state." (Thucydides). Repeated opportunities to accept terms of peace after the battles of Pylos (425), Arginusae (406) and Aegospotami (405) were ignored by the inefficient Athenian demos eventually resulting in the devastation of the once dominant city-state. Internal political strife can also be attribu...
One of those traits is that although Athenian citizens and soldiers live a more leisurely life and are not trained as rigorously as the Spartans in land warfare, Athenians’ natural courage makes up for that (Thucydides pg. 42). Athens was definitely the dominant naval power in Greece at the time, but the Athenians’ devaluing of land warfare led to a stalemate in the first phase of the Peloponnesian War before the Peace of Nicias in which Sparta ravaged Athens’ countryside and forced its citizens to be holed up in the city walls and to live in close quarters, making them susceptible to the plague. Another trait of Athens that can be argued as not a positive factor is its institution of democracy. Athenian democracy was quite limited in the modern sense since its citizenry only included ethnic Athenian males over the age of 20, but it was remarkable in the ancient world for the amount of civic participation it allowed of those that it considered citizens. The Athenians prided themselves on including people of lower economic status into the citizenry, but this trait may be not as positive as Pericles proclaimed (Thucydides pg. 40). In an oligarchic system such as Sparta’s, if the city-state was to win a war, it
...rated the superiority of the Greek long spear and armor over the weapons of the Persians, as well as the superior tactics of Miltiades and the military training of the Greek hoplites. The choice of weapons, training of warriors, selection of battle site, and timing had all worked together to help the Athenians prove that size doesn’t always matter.
In the year approximately 500 B.C., the Greek civilization came upon a time of peace. Because of the tranquil times, the civilization’s society had more time to focus on writing, math, astronomy, and artistic fields, as well as trade and metallurgy. Out of all the city-states of Greece, two excelled over all the rest, Sparta and Athens. Even though they were the most advanced and strong civilizations, they were bitter enemies. While Athens focused mainly on the people’s democracy and citizen rights, Sparta were ferocious and enslaved its original inhabitants, making them unable to leave