execution of Operation Anaconda made it hard to delineate who had TACON and OPCON of every air and ground asset. CENTCOM was not centrally located during the operation making it hard to have operational control. CENTCOM failed to have available assets ready in case of loss of original combat power. Unity of Command during Operation Anaconda failed due to the lack of presence from a central command structure, improper air and ground
its first days of contact due to the lack of Unity of Command. The Unity of Command initially failed due to different commands operating within Afghanistan, a long distance leadership style, the lack of control over all Special Operations Forces, exclusions of the United States Air Force (USAF), and not having a proper Joint staff. U.S. Forces in Afghanistan The command and control (C2) element had some flaws. The first being a failure in long distance
10th Mountain would report all activity in country. Order to bring cohesion in the command structure, 10th Mountain commander appointed two generals as deputies, which BG Gary Harrell and BG Mike Jones, both experienced as Special Forces Officers, well known among the special operation group. This gave the 10th
The 10th Mountain left to deploy to Uzbekistan while 101st Airborne Division held in reserve for possible operations in Iraq. The most mindboggling was 101st Airborne Division, with no deployments ongoing and able to perform conduct helicopter air assaults, CENTCOM could have been solve manning problem by deploy the 101ST as a Forward Headquarter. Lack of Information The flow of information was in chaos because commanders of task forces in the field was doing their own reporting
planning process that was not in place in with U.S. Special Operation Forces. Equally important was the fact the Combined Arms Operation Center (CAOC) did not participate in the planning process until the
Hundred Victories: Special Ops and the Future of American Warfare is a study of the changing role of America’s Special Forces. It shows how the role of Special Forces has changed during the war in Afghanistan. The book is a meticulous look at the difficulties faced by special operation forces in their effort to implement the strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Additionally, it covers the general strategy of Village Stability Operations. Moreover, she explored what exactly Special Forces were and
governments, and establish strategic bases and logistic support. By October 19, Special Operation Forces teams and the Central Intelligence Agency were well placed with the Northern Alliance Forces. Similarly, CENTOM commanded
change to the hammer and anvil plan. On 02 March 2002, hours before the invasion the United States Air Force had scheduled to drop bombs in Shahikot Valley on 13 known enemy targets. During this time, Special Forces were in the area maneuvering through an area known as the Whale. This immediately created danger for the Special Forces in the area and they would have to radio the United States Air Force to cease their operation (Kugler,
his life. Three months later he kissed his mum goodbye as mixed emotions of fear and excitement flooded his body. Cameron had quite a number of family members in the military. His father served in the army for over 30 years and his grandmother in the Air Force. Long, hard days of recruit training began for the army. Every day he was up at 6am, doing physical training, learning battle tactics and how to use weapons, lunch, going out to the rifle range, dinner, and then night lessons until 10pm. After
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a complex environment, in which four continents border and many countries operate (Bhaskar & Kemp, 2011). Maritime security of the IOR is an extremely broad area of concern. It covers everything from terrorism, the physical security of ports and ships, right through to the security of energy resources into the future (Brewster, et al., 2013). The principal maritime security challenges of the IOR include maritime borders/ disputes, energy and mineral resources security