The ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’ argument by Arthur Prior (1959), illustrates that our language fundamentally uses tenses, and not ‘space-time’ tenseless talk. In this essay I shall explain prior’s argument, along with a potential critique for it.
Prior begins by identifying and supporting N.L. Wilson’s account of ‘substance-language’ where, in our everyday speech, we talk about events as they go on and change. In opposition, Prior highlights that mathematical logicians (such as Quine) wrongly promote ‘space-time’ language, where words that we use to describe individuals existing through time are replaced with words describing ‘word-lines’ or ‘life-histories’ of events.
There on, Prior explicates Wilson’s position, and adds more to it. In our space-time language we might record a simple matter of fact- the colour of the sky, this book and my coat is blue. Instead, substance-language would claim ‘My book is blue at 5pm’, with the essential use of ‘is’ directing a tense i.e. in the present sense, the book I am holding is blue. For Wilson, a statement such as this ‘the book has the quality of blueness at such a time’ is the simplest kind of empirical statement. Or, saying Dave is tired, is the same as saying Dave is tired at some time.
Albeit, in ordinary language, Prior recognises that we drop the ‘at some time’ and are left with “the too simple, noun-copula-adjective form of sentence.” Wilson adds that it may be true that a thing “changes qualitatively and is numerically the same” such as a leaf changing colour according to the season, the changing of the leaf is nevertheless a “compound, temporalized property” of the leaf. That is, in August 2013 the leaf is green and in October 2013 the leaf is red- the leaf has obviou...
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... using substance-language (being thankful for something), but with temporal propositions (because the something is in the past).
Although, Prior does not seem to account for the present tense in his argument. If one were to instead claim ‘Thank goodness I’m here!’ there is only a sense of being thankful for the present moment. So, if one were to claim ‘Thank goodness I’m here, on February 10, 2014’, the tense in which the event is being thanked, appears rather vague. It seems to insinuate that there has been a past event worth ending, and yet the sentence does not say specifically state anything of a past event. It seems then, we actually tend to think in the past, even when we are claiming the present in our statements. Prior therefore may need to explain why our reactions or attitudes towards time can remain in this fixed state.
Works Cited
A.N. Prior
(2)Indirect reason: I can assume I used to exist like now, but I cannot ignore the discontinuity of time and...
First, a brief background in the three dimensions of language discussed throughout this paper. The functional, semantic, or thematic dimensions of language as previously mentioned are often used in parallel with each other. Due, to this fact it is important to be able to identify them as they take place and differentiate between these dimensions i...
Depending upon your definition of the present, it is hard to distinguish when the present time really is. Trying to pinpoint the exact time of “now” seems to be impossible because when we actually finish saying “now” it is already in the past. It is believed by many people that when a human dies for example, they cease to exist. In this essay I will be looking at two key concepts that relate to the topic of existence and the present time. These concepts are ‘Presentism’ and ‘Eternalism’. I will begin the essay by outlining what ‘Eternalism’ is and how its followers may see the present in a different way because of it. From here I will propose some of its weaknesses followed by objections to these weaknesses. The second main concept will be ‘Presentism’ which will be the opposing argument that suggests that things only exist in the present time instead of the past, present and future. After giving this argument, I will also be giving objections and counters to it. I, myself believe that there is a present time and existence, as we I find it difficult to believe that something exists in the same way once it has died and decomposed.
This is inconsistent with the fact that each of those differences reject the statement about time. He admits to this contradiction defending that any attempt to explain why there are difference in time is strictly due to the fact that we need to detail the order in which those events occurred (past, present, or future). The description of the “different times” raises the purpose of the past, present, or future and in turn will lead to a “vicious infinite regress” (Christensen, 1974). The vicious infinite regress is invoked because in order to explain why the alternative appeal to the differences in time, doesn’t go through that effort again, we must first be able to explain why each apply consecutively and then explain why that sequence appeals to the differences in time, which has no end to clarification. In McTaggart’s The Nature of Existence he explains how he no longer goes against the circulatory doubts, which is arguable in itself because he has come begin to treat the differences in tenses as unpretentious and inexpressible concepts, arguing that the tenses don’t need to be explained at all. McTaggart now claims that despite his inability to describe what the time differences mean, we can now apply them without additional scrutiny. This still leads to
“ We perceive events in time as being present, and those are the only events which we actually perceive. And all other events which, by memory or by inference, we believe to be real, we regard as present, past, or future. Thus the events of time are observed by us form an A-series.”
all those expressions that I had been used to incorporating in my daily language as indicators of time were turned around. Or at the very least, required review. The first time a random shop owner saluted me with an “hasta luego” as I exited his shop, I found it odd: How did he know that we would be seeing each other again? He had surely mistaken me for someone else. When it happened again, this time in another shop, I began to realize that the...
Overall, memories does not provide certainty because what we see or remember may not be reality. Also, the way we remember something can be changed throughout time and that memory will eventually fade away. Although certainty is blessing because it provides us warmth, comfort and secure, it is more of a great danger because it gives out false information and tricks our mind into believing something that is not real or true. Therefore, I am fully convinced by Gould’s essay because I completely doubt what people observe or remember since memories does not provide certainty.
Donnellen (1966) criticized the Russell and Strawson’s view. He claimed that there are attributive and referential uses of definite description. The former is about attributively using definite description in an assertion which stating something about “A is B”. The latter is about speaker using the description to let the audience to know what is “A is B” about. Donnellen claimed that Russell focus on former and Strawson focus on latter.
The authors of After the Fact The Art of Historical Detection, make the assertion that history is not an account of what happened in the past because what happened in the past is only the raw material: "History is not some inert body of knowledge `out there' in the past, but a continual act of construction whose end product is being reshaped and made anew every time someone ventures into the archives" (Davidson and Lytle IX). Davidson and Lytle mean that the interpretation of history changes based on the methods of investigation used by the historian. Interpretations also change based on how long "after the fact" we choose to go back and investigate. Current beliefs, social trends, and a person's racial background can't help but play an influential role in how we perceive a past event.
When you are awake; The things you think come from the dreams you dream; Thought has wings-; And lots of things- are seldom what they seem; Sometimes you think you have lived before; All that you live today.; Things you do – come back to you,; As though they knew the way.; Oh, the tricks your mind can play!; It seems we stood and talked like this before.; We looked at each other in the same way then; But I can’t remember where or when.; The clothes you’re wearing are the clothes you wore.; The smile you are smiling you were smiling then,,; But I can’t remember where or when.; Some things happen for the first time,; Seem to be happening again - ; And so it seems that we have met before, and laughed before and loved before,; But who knows where or when! (1)
“It was a new discovery to find that these stories were, after all, about our own lives, were not distant, that there was no past or future that all time is now-time, centred in the being.” (Pp39.)
Her approach is capable of identifying and describing the underlying mechanisms that contribute to those disorders in discourse which are embedded in a particular context, at a specific moment, and inevitably affect communication. Wodak’s work on the discourse of anti-Semitism in 1990 led to the development of an approach she termed the Discourse-Historical Method. The term historical occupies a unique place in this approach. It denotes an attempt to systematically integrate all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a written or spoken text. As a result, the study of Wodak and her colleagues’ showed that the context of the discourse had a significant impact on the structure, function, and context of the utterances. This method is based on the belief that language “manifests social processes and interaction” and generates those processes as well (Wodak & Ludwig, 1999, p. 12). This method analyses language from a three-fold perspective: first, the assumption that discourse involves power and ideologies. “No interaction exists where power relations do not prevail and where values and norms do not have a relevant role” (p. 12). Secondly, “discourse … is always historical, that is, it is connected synchronically and diachronically with other communicative events which are happening at the same time or which have happened before” (p. 12). The third feature
“Can the future affect the present, and can the present affect the past?”(1) This is the question posed by the philosophical concept of retrocasualty – the product of time travel to the past. Time travel has been a common staple in science fiction writing, so many of its explanations owe their origins to tales of protagonists discovering its often confusing implications. Many people may already have a great understanding of a few hypothesized behaviors of time travel due to popular media, such as Back to the Future, Star Trek, and many other works of fiction. Currently, scientific knowledge is too premature to know if time travel is possible, no less how it behaves, so questions and answers are open for anybody to contemplate. The most famous question of time travel is the one posed by the temporal paradox, in which the time traveler invokes a condition which causes the circumstances that led up to time travel, or the time traveler’s presence, to become impossible. Many theories have attempted to answer this paradox, introducing behaviorally diverse concepts such as merging time lines, multiple dimensions, or a nature of time where everything is predestined. The act of time travel can produce radically different effects, depending on which solution to the temporal paradox is applied.
Jenkins has stated that history and past are two different things. One of the quotes about the history
In the second premises, he states that the past and future don’t exist. Presentism states that only the present exists and that the past and the future doesn’t exist, which supports Grey’s second premises. However saying that the past doesn’t exist is like rejecting the fact that Muhammad Ali is the greatest boxer or the fact that Michael Jordan is the greatest basketball player. In common sense would suggest that they do exist, but according to presentism, it states that they don’t exist. How can the past not exist when past-tense sentences like “Nixon was the president of the 20th century” or “Abraham Lincoln stopped slavery” exists?