The Suez Crisis Of 1956

The Suez Crisis of 1956

Introduction

Among the most important foundations in the continuing Arab-Israeli

conflict was the seeds that were sown in the aftermath of the 1956 Sinai

Campaign, or the Suez Crisis. Whatever the operation is referred to as, its

consequences involving both relations internal to the Middle East and with the

world are impossible to ignore. Looked at simply as an objective event in

history, one could note several key outcomes of the war. It marked the

beginning of the end of British and French colonial leadership in the region,

and the start of an increasingly high American and Soviet involvement. The war

also proved to the Arab nations of the area that the Israeli military machine

was not one to be taken lightly, a lesson which would be forgotten and retaught

in the 1967 "Six Day War". The positive impact that the United Nations would

have on ending the conflict, through Canada's idea of creating a UN peacekeeping

force to help enforce the ceasefire, was another important outcome.

This paper, however, will not have the goal of examining these specific

events in relation to the war, nor will it try to determine which factors were

most significant. My aim will be to gain a more complete understanding of the

effect of the crisis by reviewing key events of the war from two different

perspectives: the Israeli and the Arab points of view, plus the experiences of

the European powers as well. Through a brief comparison of both the coverage of

the War by the differing authors and the varying interpretations seen throughout

my study, I will be best able to make an informed evaluation on how the event

was, and is today, seen in the political and historical forum.

Comparison of Coverage

The war, which was begun on October 29, 1956 when the Israelis moved

their units into the Sinai peninsula, has had its origins traced back to many

historical events. Which is the most important of these is a point of contention

for the authors I have studied. There does seem to be for all parties involved

a consensus that the ascent to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser to President of Eqypt

in 1956 , and his move to nationalize the Suez Canal as the main precipitating

factor in setting off the conflict. Why Nasser did this, however, is where

my various sources diverge.

Quite predictably, sources used from...

... middle of paper ...

...tter idea of how the Egyptian army forces

viewed and dealt with the crisis.

To help in a general rounding of the Israeli view of the crisis, I used Yitzak Shamir's

autobiography (Shamir, Yitzhak; "Summing Up"; London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson

Press; 1994.), a man who was to play an integral role in the Arab-Israeli

conflict as the Prime Minister of Israel in the 1980s.

My search for an Israeli military perspective was quite arduous, but finally settled on the work of Chaim Herzog in "The Arab-Israeli Wars" (1982). As Herzog was a major-general in the crisis of 1956, he not only provided me with detailed information of the

invasion itself, but of the various meanings and causes behind it.

In trying to find Jewish academic sources, I eventually settled on the works of Itamar Rabinovich's "Seven Wars and One Peace Treaty" (1991), and M.E. Yapp's "The Near East Since the First World War" (1991). While Rabinovich was based in Tel Aviv and had

stronger pro-Israeli views, Yapp, who was a professor in London, England, who's

ideas were a little more moderate and yet, at least in this author's perspective,

seemed to lean quite distinctly towards the Jewish State's cause.