Spinoza argued for substance monism. For the purpose of this paper, I will discuss Spinoza’s argument for substance monism. I will then explore how Spinoza’s view of substance monism is relevant to absurdist claims that there is no meaning in existence. I will then raise an issue with Spinoza’s seventh axiom. I will then conclude with why Spinoza’s substance monism is not entirely convincing in large part because of his definition of God and his seventh axiom. Substance monism is the claim that one infinite substance is the only substance that exists. Spinoza begins by arguing that substances essentially exists and that every substance has at least one attribute. This can be seen by his definitions of both substance and attribute. That question is the one raised by absurdism. Being, how can we derive meaning when nothing that exists has meaning, nothing exists on purpose, and therefore human life is absurd. Spinoza’s substance monism directly confronts this question by asserting the claim that there is essentially meaning in life because we are all a part of one substance which is God. However, while this may seem like it directly refutes the absurdist’s claim that nothing in existence has meaning it does not. The issue with the solving of this problem is in Spinoza’s definition of God. Spinoza defines God as “a being absolutely infinite-that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.” The issue with this definition can be found within the word essentiality. I take issue with this definition because I disagree with his definition of God. Nothing in existence is essential and therefore to posit the claim that God is essential is a direct contradiction. Spinoza’s method of proving one substance relies upon his definitions and reason. I take further issue with this method because God cannot be proven through reason alone. Through this same reasoning Spinoza gives life too much meaning. In his argument, he claims that since God is the only substance all things flow from God. Meaning that everything in existence is a part of Axiom seven states that, “If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.” This axiom can be attributed to God. I can certainly conceive of God as non-existing just as I think of a chair as non-existing. By saying God does not exist does not imply a contradiction. This does not imply a contradiction because I can think of all things as non-existing, everything has the potential to not exist. Therefore, I can also think of God as non-existing and by Spinoza’s seventh axiom it is clear that Gods essence does not involve existence. Since I can think of God as non-existing then it follows that the God does not have to exist. Therefore, the one substance that is everything does not have to exist because everything has the potential to not
The first argument comes from knowledge and extension. From knowledge, he says if he clearly and distinctly understand one thing as distinct from another then he is certain that he exists as a thinking thing but he still isn 't sure about the existence of his body. Therefore, he is a thinking thing and nothing else. From extension, he is a thing that thinks and not an extended thing but he has a distinct idea of body as an extended thing, therefore his mind is distinct from his body. The second argument he makes is that material objects exist. He can understand himself without imagination and sense, but he cannot understand imagination and sense without attributing them to a thing that thinks. Movement is also a power of mine but movement is a power only of extended things. This leads him to the conclusion that although he is essentially a thinking thing, he is not only a thinking thing. He also has an extended body that we are certain of. We not only have the power of passive sense but an active sense too. This active sensing does not require intellect and comes to us against our will. Therefore, it is either God or and external extended body and since God is no deceiver, material objects
He has no prove of the existence of anyone he thinks and analyze so he exists.
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
Anselm’s classical ontological argument is criticized precisely for its attempt to define God into existence. The argument is deductive and its form known as reduction ad absurdum. “That is, it begins with a supposition S (suppose that the greatest conceivable being exist in the mind alone) that is contradictory to what one desires to prove” (Pojman 41). In other words, the argument attempts to show a contradiction or absurdity in the opposite view in order to claim his own view is correct.
stronger than those saying it can be. The definition of God for which is being argued is the Christian God who has the qualities of being. perfect and who created the universe. The ontological argument follows that God is perfect and no greater. being is imaginable.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
The fundamental feature of substance, as expressed by Spinoza, is its independence. Spinoza defines God as a substance that is completely unbounded, or a substance "comprising of infinity of attributes", of which every one of them illustrates an in...
Berkeley’s Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous is an argument between the Cartesian thinker Hylas and the Berkelean Philonous. In the first of these dialogues, Berkley argues that the Cartesian notion of substance is incoherent and that the word "matter" as Descartes uses it is meaningless.
Part 1: Choose one or two of the Spinoza´s Fourth Part of Ethics and explain the sense of the proposition. Add to your explanation an example and finally your own critical assessment of Spinoza 's position.
1) Oxford Readings in Philosophy. The Concept of God. New York: Oxford University press 1987
The meaning of life has been and always will be argued as long as conscious beings exist. It’s almost humorous. Once you can think outside of you own survival and top asking how to do something, you begin to question why to do something. There have been many answers, whether they are religion, science or the betterment of the human species. This goal has been in the forefront of human endeavors ever since we settled down and fostered and sedentary lifestyle in which not all members of society were required to produce food. Only until the early 20th century did it become philosophical theory to discuss whether the pursuit of meaning itself had any merit, whether the universes lack of response to our search means that our search is futile. This
Book XII of the Metaphysics opens with a clear statement of its goal in the first line of Chapter One: to explore substances as well as their causes and principles. With this idea in mind, Chapter One delineates the three different kinds of substances: eternal, sensible substances; perishable, sensible substances; and immovable substances. The sensible substances are in the realm of natural sci...
However, if we picture God as something that could be everywhere, surrounding us like air or awareness, then, understanding if and what God is - all of a sudden - becomes a possibility. I am sure you can agree: if there is a God, then God has to exist and has to be aware of His Existence (can you even picture an unconscious God). Also, He must exist on his own, which means: God must be self-energetic. That is the safest thing we can say without too much speculation.
The arguments are vast and wide spread. There are still many other philosophers out there who have weighed in on this problem who were not able to be covered in this paper. As you can now clearly see each of these three philosophers had a discourse between one another through their own works in which they tried to reconcile the issues that arose in the others. Interestingly all of these philosophers used God in quite different ways in order to make their argument fit their needs. They also all addressed the idea of substances in different ways, taking it to mean different things. Thus in conclusion neither Descartes, Spinoza, nor Leibniz have arguments that I agree on. Each one has its strong points and its weak points. By tweaking each argument I made them better fit my own understanding and beliefs.
...ranscendence of God, and ascription of free will to human beings and to God. According to Spinoza, this features made the world unintelligible.