Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. in the “The Military’s New Hybrid Warriors” suggests that splitting the U.S. Army into two separate distinct types of units, one for conventional warfare and one for stabilization operations, would better prepare our unit for future conflicts. The creation of dedicated “Security Cooperation Brigades” are unnecessary and will degrade the U.S. Army’s ability to wage full spectrum operations and defeat future threats. The splitting of the Army is not necessary because of the idea of “Full Spectrum Operations” allowing our unit to train and prepare themselves to work in numerous types of environments. The current manning policies of the U.S. Army cannot afford the creation of these units. Historically units prepared for only stabilization duties were not prepared to face conventional forces The U.S. Army understands the challenges we will face in the future. Our Soldiers have to be prepared to face a myriad of different types of threats and challenges in the future. Our Soldier can easily go from fighting in a large-scale conflict to handing out soccer balls not only in the span of a 20-year career but also in a matter of days depending on the situation they find themselves. The U.S. Army’s concept of “Full Spectrum Operations” balances the principles of offensive, defensive and stability operations to prepare our Soldiers to be adaptive to the threat and environment they are working in. This operational mindset helps create the ability in Soldiers to plan, train for and conduct missions in numerous environments. This type of dexterity is what we expect to see in our future threats, the concept of the “Hybrid Threat” as outlined in Freedberg’s article. The North Vietnamese Army’s abilit... ... middle of paper ... ...fty Years by a Participant”, Japan Policy Research Institute at the University of San Francisco for the Pacific Rim, Occasional Paper 29, February 2003. Spencer Tucker, Fact Sheet Task Force Smith, New Jersey Korean War Memorial online at http://www.nj.gov/military/korea/factsheets/tfsmith.html accessed on 19 August 2011. Ibid. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: MacMillan, 1963; reprint, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1994), 66 Timothy M. Karcher, “The Victory Disease” Military Review (July-August 2003) online at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/victory_disease.htm accessed on 18 August 2011 Ibid. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr, “The Military’s New Hybrid Warriors” National Journal, (March 1974); reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, C100 Foundations Student Issue Advance Book (Fort Leavenworth USACGSC, August 2011), 37.
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As America heads into a new year, we find our government tightening its purse strings and cracking down on excessive spending, with an emphasis on the US military. According to author Brad Plumer, a reporter at the Washington Post, “U.S. defense spending is expected to have risen in 2012, to about $729 billion, and then is set to fall in 2013 to $716 billion, as spending caps start kicking in.” Pared with a more drastic 350 billion dollar cute going into effect over the next ten years, the military finds itself cutting what cost the most to maintain and support troops (Fact Sheet par. 2). In recent years the military has bolstered an overwhelming 1,468,364 troops (Active Duty). These numbers are to be cut substantially; the biggest cut is to be seen in the Army. The Army must deal with a reduction of 80,000 troops, cutting its force of 570,000 troops to nearly 140,000.Subsequently, the budget cuts, which have led to a reduction of troops in the military, has driven the military to turn to advanced weapons technology that requires less people to m...
Berkowitz, Bruce D. The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century. New York, NY: The Free Press, 2003.
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
- - -, ed. "The Anti-War Movement in the United States." English.Illnois.edu. Ed. Oxford Companion to American Military History. 1st ed. Vers. 1. Rev. 1. Oxford Companion to American Military History, 1999. Web. 24 Feb. 2014. .
“Operational design is a journey of discovery, not a destination.” Operational design provides a framework, with the guidance of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), that staffs and planning groups can use to give political leaders, commanders, and warfighters a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives for which military forces will be committed, or are planned to be committed. Furthermore, operational design supports commanders and planners to make sense of complicated operational environments (often with ill-structured or wicked problems), helps to analyze wicked problem, and devise an operational approach to solve the problem in the context of the operational environment.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Barringer, Mark, Tom Wells. “The Anti-War Movement in the United States.” www.english.illinois.edu. Oxford UP. 1999. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.
The primary challenge for leaders in the Army is taking a group of individuals and molding them into a team. The framework that is employed to the greatest effect uses task-oriented instruction and is called battle focus training. After major objectives are defined, they are broken down into smaller sets. These smaller sets are known as collective tasks and are designed to be accomplished by small teams of soldiers. Each soldier is assigned one or more individual tasks that work together to accomplish the collective task. Training begins by teaching soldiers how to accomplish each of the individual tasks. At this point, emphasis is placed on the soldier as an individual. Although training is conducted in small groups, soldiers are evaluated independently of their peers. Once individual task mastery is achieved, leaders have soldiers begin to work together to accomplish collective tasks. This method of battle focus training incorporates aspects of both individualism and collectivism to accomplish the ultimate goal.