Introduction:
In this essay I will argue that Rosenthal's Higher Order Thought Theory provides a possible account of conscious awareness, in doing so addresses and gets to solve the mind-body problem for that particular mental phenomenon.
I will commence by defining what makes a mental state conscious. This will be done aiming to distinguish what type of state we are addressing when we speak of a mental phenomenon and how is it, that can have a plausible explanation. By taking this first approach, we are able to build a base for our main argument to be clear enough and so that we can remain committed to.
Next, I will proceed to describe what the HOT Theories are, which conditions or requirements contain, as well as mentioning some constraints they may show and that in turn can motivates them.
At this point I will start developing a more explicit account of how Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory, tries to explain consciousness in some mental states like awareness.
First order theories are a challenge to any higher order thought theories; consequently I will briefly look at some of them, for they are the other type of theories contesting the explanation of consciousness. Also, one of this FO theories is strongly supported by Ned Block, who is the main objector to Rosenthal's HOT Theories in this essay.
Some examples will be added that are necessary to assist us, in sustaining the main argument as well as to facilitate defining some requirements, for a HOT to occur in a conscious state.
Thirdly, some of Ned Blocks objections to the Higher Order Thought Theory will be considered and review in order to reaffirm the validity of the main argument. Block's objections will be taken as the main challenge to Rosenthal's HO theory....
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...higher order theory provides an encouraging investigation of the many connections consciousness has with other mental phenomena.
To conclude this essay, I like to emphazise that Rosenthal's HOT is more of an empirical hypothesis, rather than an analysis of the term ‘consciousness.’ His aim is precisely to explain the phenomena of consciousness in relation to other mental states, such as thought and perception, and while achieving this, he has elaborated a theoretical structure for comprehending the functions of our mind.
One may be able to conceive consciousness in the absence of higher-order states, but this does not mean that we can explain consciousness in the absence of higher-order states.
Works Cited
Rosenthal D 2002, 'Explaining Consciousness', in Philosophy of mind classical and contemporary readings,Chalmers D J (eds), Oxford University press, New York
Smart argues from the stance of identity theorist and believes that mental sensations are identical to a corresponding brain-process. Much of Smart’s paper is a counter argument against an identity theorist’s greatest rival, the dualist. Most of the human body has been explained by science in terms of biology, chemistry, and physics; though the brain remains largely mysterious. Recent technological advances regarding the research of the brain has allowed us to understand the mind in much better ways which is why Smart feels “that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical mechanism” (61). He introduces the concept of Ockham’s razor and feels that scientists use it to introduce simplicity into their theories, which makes their explanations of concepts simpler. This simplicity is preferred because it also adds a sense of beauty to the laws discovered. With regards to his lightning example, Smart highlights how our experience of lightning is the physical process of discharged electrons from the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. Important to note here is that the two cannot be separated; you will not have a flash of lightning and then an electric discharge, rather lightning is electric discharge. This metaphor is crucial essay’s argument that sensations are identical to brain-processes. Ockham’s razor eliminates unnecessary nomological danglers from scientific theories, so why not apply the same concept to a theory of mind? We wouldn’t describe in our theory of lightning the ‘flashiness’ or ‘jaggedne...
Chapter 4 discusses the several states of consciousness: the nature of consciousness, sleep and dreams, psychoactive drugs, hypnosis, and meditation. Consciousness is a crucial part of human experience, it represents that private inner mind where we think, feel, plan, wish, pray, omagine, and quietly relive experiences. William James described the mind as a stream of consciousness, a continuous flow of changing sensations, images thoughts, and feelings. Consciousness has two major parts: awareness and arousal. Awareness includes the awareness of the self and thoughts about one's experiences. Arousal is the physiological state of being engaged with the environment. Theory of mind refers to individuals understanding that they and others think,
There is almost no doubt that there is a relationship between psychology and philosophy. Indeed, many people actually considering that the philosophies related to and concerned with the mind and thought are the precursor to modern psychology. Of course, most of these philosophies were decidedly western, or popular in the west. However, the problem with our western views of consciousness in philosophy and psychology is that often times the way we view the conscious process leads to a so-called "infinite regression." That is to say, if we see consciousness as a set of rules guiding our experiences in life, there must also be another set of rules that defines how we know when to use those rules, and so on and so forth. (Kurak 2001, 18-19). In this paper, I will attempt to show how we can turn to Buddhist principles to help us gain a better understanding of human consciousness.
Underlying each of these claims is the theme of the unification of body and mind into a state of consciousness which greatly facilitates clarity and order in one's awareness. Through the deep periods of rest achieved during levels of transcendental consciousness, t...
In Searle’s first argument against the distinction between the mental and physical, he assumes this mistaken assumption is largely due to one’s common-sense supposition that there indeed is a distinction between the mental and physical at some deep metaphysical level. Searle confronts this assumption with the simple fact that he believes Consciousness it is a systematic biological phenomenon, much like digestion, and as such, concludes, that consciousness is a feature of the brain as such such is part of the physical world. However, I agree with Searle in the sense that the through simple reduction there incidentally will be a metaphysical distinction between mental and physical, however I disagree with the way in which he counters this.
“Contrary to what is commonly assumed by contemporary philosophers, there is no genuine conflict discovered so far between our natural understanding of what it takes to be conscious on the one hand and what we know about the world on the basis of physics, biology and neurobiology on the other. If this is correct, then the strong conviction so common among philosophers today that subject body dualism need not even be seriously considered as a theoretical option has no solid rational basis” (2).
Titchener, who was a one student of Wundt, on the other hand, described his system as structuralism, which involves the analysis of the structure of the mind. Tichener broke down consciousness into elemental feelings and sensations. Wundt held the belief that consciousness was vital in scientific psychology, thus dependent on structuralism. He used introspection to study the functions of the mind occurring in active experience. It is however, imperative to note that Wundt’s introspection could not be used to establish higher functions of the mind. He divided the active experiences as feelings and sensations (Titchener, 1915).
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
ss. Now we will talk about the Theory of Forms and the Theory of Knowledge.
"Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness." Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Oxford: Elsevier Science & Technology, 2009. Credo Reference. Web. 26 April 2011.
There are three main perspectives of metaphysics in philosophy, which “examine the nature of reality”, defined in Friedenberg and Silverman (2015). This studies the issue of mind-body, asking questions, such as, “What is the mind? Is it physical? Does the body necessarily need a mind?” As well as “What is consciousness? Does it exist in everything? “The mind-body problem addresses how physiological or mental properties are related to physical properties”.
They suggest that Freud’s observational data consisted of a patient’s disorders and the absence of conscious contents which would appear during the psychoanalytic talking-cure. With this fundamental basis Freud formulated a theory which leads to the belief that the repressed unconscious thoughts in essence caused the disorders. (Talvitie & Tiitinen, 2006) Talvitie and Tiitinen modify the historical realm of psychoanalytic terms of repressed contents and the meta-psychology towards the present era using neurophysiological and empirical studies of consciousness, which focus more on the dynamic systems approach and one’s consciousness, memory, attention, and self. (Talvitie & Tiitinen,
“Consciousness is defined as everything of which we are aware at any given time - our thoughts, feelings, sensations, and perceptions of the external environment. Physiological researchers have returned to the study of consciousness, in examining physiological rhythms, sleep, and altered states of consciousness (changes in awareness produced by sleep, meditation, hypnosis, and drugs)” (Wood, 2011, 169). There are five levels of consciousness; Conscious (sensing, perceiving, and choosing), Preconscious (memories that we can access), Unconscious ( memories that we can not access), Non-conscious ( bodily functions without sensation), and Subconscious ( “inner child,” self image formed in early childhood).
The next theory is the theory of idealism. In a regular day basis idealism in basically the ideas that a person follows and believes in in his or hers entire life time. But in the philosophical world it has another meaning to it. In philosophy the meaning of this theory is that all the things in the world and everything that we believe in are part of our consciousness. That all the things even the physical parts are in a way formed from ...