The purpose of this paper is to provide a recreation of the ideas held by Edmund Husserl post-1890 and then to elucidate them in light of modern understanding. His greatest contributions of phenomenology and consciousness as a directed event will be the focus and offer guidance for Husserl’s uncovering of the ego as not only a state of being separate of the environment but also a state of immersion within the environment.
We begin by explaining what the phenomenological attitude is not. This method contrasts with the popular framework, advocated by Husserl himself in his earlier works, of psychologism. Through this lens, the totality of human logic stems from psychological processes contained within the brain. However, Husserl did not hold that invoking the sciences was conducive to genuine philosophical pursuits due to their heavy reliance on presuppositions with which psychologism is fraught [Naturalistic Philosophy, 81]. Under the influence of psychologism, a type of species relativism is implied. Human understanding is elevated to anthropocentric psychologism. Truth cannot find its grounds in the science of matter of fact [Psychologistic Prejudices, 104]. By basing truth in the material dependent on human cognition, its scope is restricted. For example, before Mt. Everest was discovered, the tallest mountain in the world remains Mt. Everest regardless of its gnostic status . Husserl puts forth three prejudices that permeate psychologism, the first of which identifies normative mental acts must have a mental basis (Psychologistic Prejudices, 101). However, a distinction must be made between normative statements and descriptive statements that include normative motivations. It is an is-ought problem. Logic is normative and carr...
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... “heads”. This immediacy is not present in normal inference where probabilities are dependent on each other and are always less that absolute.
Knowledge of the Other, in the Husserlian sense, is then easy to distinguish due to my own sense of inherent other-ness made apparent by the twofold truth of possessing and being my body along with pairing of the self-ego with a body an object that shares our traits. A being with a body is similar to us; it is an animate organism distinct from other objects that are not motivated. This elevates the being from an object to a subject essentially an object with an ego. However, the Other has a feature that keeps it private from my own ego. It is not an extension of me, but a different self. Although I cannot access the Other’s mental and physical states, interaction is still possible between us through empathetic relations.
Genetic phenomenology is Husserl's philosophical successor to his earlier eidetic phenomenology; it represents the highest development in Husserl's project. Husserl's eidetic phenomenology holds that both the structure of intentional acts and the intentional object are given (Detmer 165). Husserl later comes to doubt the givenness in eidetic phenomenology; these structures and objects of consciousness must have developed throughout history (Detmer 166). This is the process of sedimentation: patterns of understanding and expectations gradually influence later experiences (Zahavi 94). Intentional acts themselves have eidetic structures that are not immediately given; they must be analyzed if the phenomenological project is to continue. A close
...is an account of the birth of self-consciousness through intersubjectivity or the integration within culture. It is a dialectical interpretation that acts, for Hegel, as a form for perceiving the way in which the self comes to know itself through the other and through historical processes. The master/slave dialectic is an early account of intersubjectivity and also a lack of intersubjectivity because it is not based on equal recognition. Self-consciousness, for Hegel, is attained only through the recognition by another independent self. The human world is a world based on recognition, and the human being has within themselves the desire for recognition from other human beings. Hegel proposes that one cannot become a self-conscious individual without seeing oneself in another, and that each individual bases their existence on a world that is founded upon recognition.
The ego lies within the conscious and unconscious realm and seeks to satisfy the id’s
Rationalism and empiricism were two philosophical schools in the 17th and 18th centuries, that were expressing opposite views on some subjects, including knowledge. While the debate between the rationalist and empiricist schools did not have any relationship to the study of psychology at the time, it has contributed greatly to facilitating the possibility of establishing the discipline of Psychology. This essay will describe the empiricist and rationalist debate, and will relate this debate to the history of psychology.
The mind-body problem can be a difficult issue to discuss due to the many opinions and issues that linger. The main issue behind the mind-body problem is the question regarding if us humans are only made up of matter, or a combination of both matter and mind. If we consist of both, how can we justify the interaction between the two? A significant philosophical issue that has been depicted by many, there are many prominent stances on the mind-body problem. I believe property dualism is a strong philosophical position on the mind-body issue, which can be defended through the knowledge argument against physicalism, also refuted through the problems of interaction.
In his book The View From Nowhere (1986), Thomas Nagel discusses the various problems that arise when we consider the contrast between the objective world we inhabit, and are part of, and the inherently subjective way we view that world. Nagel writes that understanding the relationship between these external and internal standpoints is central to solving these problems: 'It is the most fundamental issue about morality, knowledge, freedom, the self, and the relation of mind to the physical world' (p.3). In this essay I will survey the problems that Nagel is referring to, and will echo Nagel's view that this issue is of central importance within philosophy. However, I will also suggest that Nagel is wrong in his emphasis in dealing with the issue.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
As presented in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the aim of Life is to free itself from confinement "in-itself" and thus to become "for-itself." Not only does Hegel place this unfolding of Life at the very beginning of the dialectical development of self-consciousness; Hegel characterizes self-consciousness itself as a form of Life and even refers us to the development of self-consciousness in the Master/Slave dialectic as an essential moment in the fulfillment of this aim of Life to become 'for-itself.' The following paper delineates this overlooked thread of the dialectic. The central thesis is that each step along the path of self-consciousness' attempt at making the truth of its unity with itself explicit, is simultaneously a step in the realization of the aim of Life: to become 'for-itself.' In the review of the Master/Slave dialectic, it reveals itself that the necessary condition for the fulfillment of Life's aim lies in work. Yet...
Humanistic theories are growth oriented, optimistic, and positively subjective. A component of humanistic psychology is phenomenology which can be defined by stating a person’s only reality is what the person subjectively experiences (Schultz & Schultz, 2009, p.329). In Augustine’s view, all knowledge is aimed at helping people understand God (Stumpf, pp57). Therefore, religion has priority. However, it is the ability of human reason to be certain about specific things. Knowledge derived from senses is the lowest level of knowing because the senses give the least amount of certainty. Senses can be reliable, but have limitations because sensed objects are mutable (Stumpf, pp61).
Though not a fixed, philosophical movement, phenomenology acts in contrast to the Cartesian method which sees objects as acting and reacting with one another. Phenomenologists utilize five basic assumptions in their studies: objective research is not possible; analyzing human behavior can help understand their consciousness; people can be examined in the ways they reflect the society in which they live; conscious experience is prefered to data; and phenomenology should be more so focused on discovery than anything else. From this field comes the idea of intentionality, the topic often discussed in modern artificial intelligence (AI). Intentionality is the idea that consciousness is always consciousness of something, or that consciousness is always about some object. This phenomenological idea contrasts a traditional theory of consciousness which states that consciousness cannot be fully studied as reality is only grasped in perceptions, not in anything concrete. Similarly to cognitive psychological approaches, the most mainstream methods utilized by phenomenologists have subjects describe phenomena as the phenomena are perceived. While the field’s father, Husserl, believed consciousness to be the essence of the mind, others within the field, such as Martin Heidegger, thought consciousness is not the primary aspect of one’s existence, and so the mind is more of an effect of a being among stimuli. This shift from the philosophical-psychological study to philosophical-ontological study altered the future of the field and allowed for the rise of ideas such as the unconscious
...ating Sartre's attitudes towards the constituents of human action, that which constitutes human being. Even though it may, in the final analysis, prove to be an unsatisfactory account of consciousness, it serves to illuminate some possible further lines of study, if only as a negative example.
Psychology and morality play such large roles in the creation of both the they-self and the authentic self that some definitions are in order. Psychology explains the relationships between phenomena and both voluntary and involuntary behavior patterns. Behavior is the reaction of the subconscious with the conscious before decisions are made and actions taken. The sum of the behavioral limitations of these reactions, symbolically speaking, equals the finite potential of possibilities after already-being-in-the-world. Thus behavior displays an abundant importance when considering Dasein's interpretation of events on an authentic as well as an inauthentic level. It seems that Heidegger shies away from psychology because behavior can vary so much from one person to another and creates problems for his strictly structural analysis of being.
The mystery of consciousness has puzzled humans for thousands of years. We feel pain, hunger, and countless other perceived emotions that we know to be true. We are all aware that we are conscious; however, nobody has discovered whether or not the human body is organized in a specific way that leads to consciousness. The fact is that the existence of consciousness, the very essence of knowledge, is undeniable, regardless of the lack of a concrete systematic organization of facts to explain it. This can be explained by Aristotle’s idea that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. In order to consider the statement, “Knowledge is nothing more than the systematic organization of facts”, we must consider different ways of knowing, such as reason, perception, and emotion. By exploring two areas of knowledge, the natural sciences and ethics, I will illustrate that knowledge, which can be defined as “justified true belief” , is ultimately greater than the systematic organization of facts. The natural sciences and ethics both implement the systematic organization of facts (through the organization of models and the organization of morals, respectively), which leads to a holistic reasoning process in order to obtain knowledge in natural sciences and a categorical reasoning process to determine what is right and wrong in ethics.
Firstly, the body of the Other can be recognised as being of the same basic nature as the Individual, as an actively engaged entity. However, this is not sufficient to constitute the idea of both the Individual and Other existing in a shared world. For merleau-ponty, when the individual observes the Other, they are understood as their attitudes and projects towards the world. Meaning that when we see the Other playing a game, we see them as an individual person interacting with an object in the same way that the individual themself does themself. Merleau-Ponty explains the iea as “my world is no longer merely mine, it is no longer present only to me” (Merleau-Ponty, 2013, p. 369). Meaning that as the Individual observes the Other interacting in the world one becomes aware that one world is not wholly private and individual because here the Other is, freely interacting with the world in the same way as the Individual. Thus leading us to see that the Other not as an object, but instead as a subject.
Phenomenology attempts to describe the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness and is based on a perceptual understanding of the world. This is not to disregard logic, geometry, mathematics or the sciences in general as mere tautology. Phenomenology is the study of our subjective experience, the experience of perception. This is not however an empirical thesis because it does not disregard ideal knowledge acquired through reason, or logic, but seeks to ground them in perception. Because perception is the first truth through which we are able to make truth statements, knowledge always comes to us via perception. In Husserlian terms we are taking the Cartesian method, cogito ego sum, but disregarding its aims (namely; proving the existence of God, proving the existence of self,) and using it as the starting p...