Quantum Mechanics and Marc Lange's "An Introduction to The Philosophy of Physics"

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Of the many counter intuitive quirks of quantum mechanics, the strangest quirk is perhaps the notion of quantum entanglement. Very roughly, quantum entanglement a phenomenon where the state of a large system cannot be described by the state of the smaller systems that compose it. On the standard metaphysical interpretation of quantum entanglement, this is taken to show that there exists emergent properties1. If this standard interpretation is correct, it seems that physics paints a far different picture of the world then commonsense leads one to believe.

In An Introduction to The Philosophy of Physics, Marc Lange offers a novel interpretation of entangled quantum systems, a view that may not have these consequences. However, this interpretation seems to have interesting consequences of its own. In this paper I will formulate and examine Lange interpretation of quantum entanglement, and attempt to motivate it. In section I, I will give a brief sketch of quantum entanglement and what it's standard taken to mean. In section II, I'll discuss Lange's interpretation, and how it commits one to the existence of multiply located objects, and reasons one might not be happy with this conclusion. Finally, In section III, I'll argue that one might find motivation for Lange's view on other grounds, namely, as Lange's view preserves the notion of the ontological priority of parts to their wholes.

I. Quantum Entanglement

In quantum mechanics the state of physical systems2 can be represented by a vector |Ψ>, in a vector space, V.3 Each measurable property of a system corresponds to an orthonormal basis of V, where each basis vector corresponds to a possible value of the property. The sums and differences of vectors...

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...of prior to the whole, it seems that the best way to avoid this argument is to adopt an alternative interpretation of entanglement. And insofar as one might be motivated to defend that thesis, one can be motivated to adopt the entensional intrepretation.

At the end of the day, there certainty is something intuitively strange about admitting into our ontology objects that entend. On the other hand, thinking that composite objects are more fundamental than the parts they are composed of is intuitively strange. The only apparent way out of endorsing the latter thesis is the former. It's up to one's own philosophical conscience how to weigh these two considerations. However at bare minimum, there is at least some reason to adopt the entensional interpretation of quantum entanglement, and that makes this alternative worthy of serious consideration.

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