A Successful Theory of Mental Representation A successful theory of mental representation must answer two related questions: (1) How does representation work? (2) How is misrepresentation possible? These questions are related because answering (1) is a requisite for answering (2): in order to explain how it is is possible that cognitive systems produce erroneous representations (i.e. representations that do not correspond to their "proper" meanings), we must first explain how is it possible that cognitive systems produce representations at all. Moreover, in the contemporary philosophical scene, it is an additional requirement that both questions must be given naturalistic answers, i.e. answers which ultimately account for intentional phenomena in nonintentional terms. In this essay, I will briefly expound and contrast the theories advanced, in order to answer these questions, by three main contemporary philosophers of mind: Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, and Ruth Millikan. In his essay "Theory of Content I" Jerry Fodor presents the antecedents of his own theory of representation by referring to the work of the behaviourist psychologist B.F. Skinner. According to Skinner's theory, and following standard behaviourist dogma, semantical facts are to be explained in terms of behavioural dispositions. Thus the fact that, e.g. the (mental or linguistic) representation 'dog' expresses the property being a dog can be reformulated as a subject's production of the representation 'dog' is under the control of a certain type of discriminative stimu... ... middle of paper ... ... would mean mouse, not mouse-or-shrew, and 'mouse' representations tokened by shrews would be asymmetrically dependent on 'mouse' representations tokened by actual mouses. As Robert Cummins has shown, this can be expressed in the respective truth and falsity of the following counterfactuals: (1) If mice didn't cause 'mouse's, then shrews wouldn't either. (True) (2) If shrews didn't cause 'mouse's, then mouses wouldn't either . (False) But, as Cummins argues, if mice and shrews are indistinguishable, there is no way for statement (1) to be true while (2) is false: the same state of affairs that makes (1) true makes (2) also true. In this way, shrew-tokened 'mouse's cannot be regarded as asymmetrically dependent on mouse-tokened 'mouse's, and thus cannot see 'mouse' as meaning mouse (and not mouse-or-shrew).
Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psycho...
Fodor’s modularity thesis popularized faculty approaches to cognitive psychology. This theory bears a striking resemblance to the phenomenological theory that Merleau-Ponty proposed two decades earlier. Both theories employ a trichotomous functional architecture to explain cognition and view perception as a mid-level processing of information that lies between the world and consciousness. The key feature that differentiates the views is whether that middle level of processing is completely impenetrable by consciousness. If Fodor was to relax his strong position of the impenetrability of information in modules, modules could both be somewhat encapsulated and maintain a general independence from consciousness. Then only the degree of perception’s independance from consciousness would distinguish his theory from Merleau-Ponty’s. Currently, both theories can account for the substantive, outward, behavior of humans. Only the procedural behavior, the internal process, differentiates the theories. The conundrum of deciding between the theories is resolvable by an empirical critical experiment. While this will require more knowledge of cognitive psychology, current evidence suggests that Merleau-Ponty was correct and the mind is less encapsulated than Fodor's original claim.
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Aim of this paper is to examine and present the application of social cognition models in the prediction and alternation of health behavior. Social cognition models are used in health practices in order to prevent illness or even improve the health state of the individuals in interest, and protect their possibly current healthy state. This essay is an evaluation of the social cognition models when used to health behaviors. Unfortunately it is impossible to discuss extensively all the models and for this reason we will analyze three of the most representative cognitive models to present an integrated idea of their application.
The study of children’s theory of mind has grown tremendously attractive to many developmental psychologists in the past few decades. The reason for this being because having a theory of mind is one of the quintessential skills that define us as being human and because having this ability plays a major role in our social functioning. To have a theory of mind is to be able to reflect on the categorical contents of one’s own mind, such as dreams, memories, imaginations, and beliefs, which all provide a basic foundation to understand how someone else may think and why they may behave in the manner that they do (Bjorklund, p.199). It is the development of one’s concepts of mental activity; their ability to understand that they think things that others do not and that their thoughts are theirs alone, as well as understanding that other peoples’ minds work in the same way, in which they too, have their own individual thoughts. Our theory of mind grants us ability to navigate our personal and social world by explaining past behavior, and anticipating and predicting future actions (Moore & Frye, 1991).
The Extent to Which an Acquisition of a Theory of Mind is Essential for the Typical Development of the Child
The second is summarized by mental properties. B and C do not share the same memory or experiences, at least not as one body would. Wright gives another example of a c...
This essay will discuss both Kim and Fodor’s view on multiple realizability, and how it may affect the way we view psychology. I will first explain Kim’s response to multiple realizability in his 1992 paper “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” This paper was written to respond to Fodor’s paper on multiple realizability and functionalism. Kim believes if we advocate a thesis such as multiple realizability we will be unable to view psychology as a science. This paper will specifically focus on Kim’s jade analogy. I will then discuss why it is I believe that Fodor’s response in “Special Sciences” reveals Kim’s jade analogy to be a mistake, and of false references.
You can use the set of six questions, below, to investigate this. Before describing the false
Describe what evolutionary psychologists mean when they employ the term ‘theory of mind’. Use examples and research studies from Book 1, Chapter 2 to show why this theory is important in evolutionary psychology.
Leslie, A. M. 1987. Pretense and representation: The origins of" theory of mind.” Psychological review, 94 (4), p. 412
The study of psychology began as a theoretical subject a branch of ancient philosophy, and later as a part of biological sciences and physiology. However, over the years, it has grown into a rigorous science and a separate discipline, with its own sets of guidance and experimental techniques. This paper aims to study the various stages that the science of psychology passed through to reach its contemporary status, and their effects on its development. It begins with an overview of the historical and philosophical basis of psychology, discusses the development of the various schools of thought, and highlights their effects on contemporary personal and professional decision-making.
My research focuses on the mental models associated with leaders in a crisis situation. In order to grasp the thought process during a catastrophic event, it is essential to analyze a conceptual model as it applies to a leader’s cognitive abilities, which is composed of two facets noted as the descriptive and prescriptive mental models, (Combe & Carrington, 2015). The descriptive metal model focuses on the interpretation of external changes that occur in a crisis, (Combe & Carrington, 2015). The prescriptive model concentrates on cause and effect and future actions that provide clarity in the midst of ongoing changes, (Combe & Carrington, 2015). According to the authors, Combe & Carrington, (2015) longitudinal research perspective is beneficial
Jerome S. B. , Goodnow J. J. and Austin G.A. (1967) Overview ( p.231-247):In A study of thinking . John Wiley and Sons Ltd, USA