NASA - Organizational Change
A review of the external and internal threats will help determine the weakness of the problem analysis related to the launching of space shuttle Challenger. At the time of the accident, the country was experiencing an economic slowdown. Considering the economic climate, Congress wanted to know if the American people still support the huge requirements of the program. The government ruled out increase in taxes being an election year. Simultaneous to the congressional investigation was a launch of space shuttle Challenger. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) wanted a successful launch. A no-launch situation might convince Congress to slash the program’s budget. Furthermore, Americans were anticipating the first female astronaut-teacher crewmember. Internally, NASA undertook cost-cutting measures and approved the use of materials approved by sister industries. At the time of the launch, engineers expressed concern over two factors: a) The o-ring which is not designed to operate at the existing temperature of -32 degrees Fahrenheit; b) There was a question on the stability and predictability of engine propulsion.
Given the above problem considerations, NASA formulated two alternative decisions: launch now or wait for better weather conditions.
NASA was faced with decision traps, the framing trap and the confirming evidence trap (Langlois, H, 2007). Unfortunately, it was not able to identify and cope with them. NASA management argued a successful launch would guarantee congressional budget approval (framing trap). There was a presumption the launch will be successful, as previous launches before. This line of thinking blocked the consideration of safety factors....
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...fast forward, information will play a key part in the survival of organizations. It is essential that organizations have the capacity to learn as an organization so that new knowledge can be acquired, adopted and used.
Reference
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MCSHANE, S.L., VON GLINOW, M.A. 2005. Organizational behavior: Emerging realities for the workplace revolution, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Education (Asia).
R. M. Boisjoly had over a quarter-century’s experience in the aerospace industry in 1985 when he became involved in an improvement effort on the O-ring which connect segments of Morton Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Booster. This was used to bring the Space Shuttle into orbit (OEC, 2006). Morton Thiokol is an aerospace company that manufactures the solid propellant rocket motors used to launch the Challenger (Skubik). Boisjoly authored a memo to R.L. Lund, Vice President of Engineering and four others, in regards to his concerns about the flawed O-ring erosion problem. His warnings were ignored leading to the deaths of six astronauts and one social studies teacher.
On an unusually cool Florida morning in January 1986, the space shuttle Challenger exploded 50,000 feet above ground just moments after liftoff killing seven crew members onboard (Palmer, Dunford, and Akin, 2009). A presidential commission, dubbed “the Rogers Commission” (hereafter, the Commission) after former Secretary of State William Rogers, was appointed to investigate the cause of the disaster. Although mechanical failure of an O-ring seal in one of the rocket boosters was identified as the physical cause, the investigation revealed something much more disheartening; organizational deficiencies at NASA had allowed potential safety hazards to be disregarded. The disastrous consequences of NASA’s organizational failure prompted calls for the organization to restructure its management to provide for better control and appoint a team dedicated to identifying and tracking potential shuttle safety hazards as well as redesigning the faulty booster joint for NASA approval. Shortly before the two year anniversary of the disaster, NASA officials declared that the Commission’s recommendations for organizational change had been successfully implemented. Unfortunately, the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia nearly three decades later and a subsequent investigation revealed that the changes made in the wake of the Challenger disaster had not endured. Factors such leaders’ perception of the change process, the type of change being implemented, organizational vision, resistance to change and other challenges all play a role in how change initiatives unfold (Palmer, Dunford, and Akin, 2009). NASA’s narrative is a testament to the complexities and challenges of not only implementing, but also sustaining organizational change.
When the Challenger shuttle was set to launch NASA was feeling political pressure to gain congressional support for the space program, to help gain this support the shuttle crew had a high school teacher on board, Christa McAuliffe, and millions of people were excited and tuned into watch. NASA officials were hoping that this new endeavor would help generate funding since the U.S. budget deficit was soaring and they were afraid that their budget could be cut. Technical failure was the reason the shuttle exploding after take-off but this was not the only reason. With pressure mounting, decisions made by NASA and Morton Thiokol Corporation, the contractor who manufactured the piece with the technical failure, put political agendas in front of the technical decisions, which resulted in the tragedy (Bolman & Deal, 2008).
In the mid-1980’s, the shuttle space program was the focus of the political media since it had failed to deliver on its exp...
On January 28, 1968 the space shuttle Challenger was deployed from Kennedy Space Center in Florida. One minute and thirteen seconds after liftoff the spaceship ignited in mid air and all seven crew members were killed. The cause of the destruction of the challenger was a certain part of rubber that relieves pressure on the side of the actual rocket booster called an O-ring. When a space shuttle as used as the Challenger is about to be used for another mission there should be an even more careful with checking everything before liftoff. The Challenger could have been avoided and there was way too much evidence that shows NASA had some kind of knowledge about the consequences.
In both cases, it was an acceptable business risk to proceed at caution by upper management. So the engineers and managers in lower positions took that as law (with a few objectors). These objectors later gained fame due to the catastrophes. Upper management has taken on a mindset of wanting to see proof of failure. When the engineers could not come up with proof, their concerns were dismissed as not creditable. Perhaps a program that allows workers to protest and not work in a chilled work environment would have given those engineers the voice they needed to cause NASA to take a second look at both shuttles prior to launch.
It’s very hard to say what steps, if any, could have been taken to prevent the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster from occurring. When mankind continues to “push the envelope” in the interest of bettering humanity, there will always be risks. In the manned spaceflight business, we have always had to live with trade-offs. All programs do not carry equal risk nor do they offer the same benefits. The acceptable risk for a given program or operation should be worth the potential benefits to be gained. The goal should be a management system that puts safety first, but not safety at any price. As of Sept 7th, 2003, NASA has ordered extensive factory inspections of wing panels between flights that could add as much as three months to the time it takes to prepare a space shuttle orbiter for launch. NASA does all it can to safely bring its astronauts back to earth, but as stated earlier, risks are expected.
Before going any further with this paper, I would like to take a moment to thank the crew of the space shuttle challenger for their bravery, courage, determinations and and sacrifice for this great nation. Francis R. Scobee (2), Commander, Michael J. Smith (1), Pilot Judith A. Resnik (2), Mission Specialist 1, Ellison S. Onizuka (2), Mission Specialist 2, Ronald E. McNair (2), Mission Specialist 3, Gregory B. Jarvis (1), Payload Specialist 1, Sharon Christa McAuliffe (1), Payload Specialist 2 (science.ksc), were parents, friends, children, husbands and wives, heroes, smart human being that were killed on this tragic day. May God be with your soul and may your memories and courage and passion shall not be forgotten but instead drive future generation determination and passion. The crash of the space shuttle
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In America, space travel is a controversial issue that many discuss. Although exciting, some people find it unnecessary and a waste of money. There are also many risks associated with space travel and many issues are more important than space travel that should be focused on. There are ethical, diplomatic, and economic issues that need to be considered before making decisions about space exploration.
...fault with NASA’s top-down design and testing methods, “was designed and put together all at once with relatively little detailed preliminary study of the material and components. Then when troubles are found…, it is more expensive and difficult to discover the causes and make changes.…[A] simple fix…may be impossible to implement without a redesign of the entire engine.” The outcome of this simple issue as we all are aware could have saved billions on the project if time for safety was taken. Instead of the top down approach wouldn’t the outcome been a significantly less expense if we used a bottom-up approach. When we think of safety is there a reason to worry about price with the thoughts of the Challenger incident in mind. Safety has always been a part of the working community not only in aviation but throughout all industry. Aviation being the background of
Robbins et al. (2011, p. 186), states ‘Change is an organizational reality and affects every part of a manager’s job’. Today’s wave of change primarily created by economic condition so change is now such a constant feature of organization life (Goodman, E. 2011, p.243). Organizations need to be changed at one point or another in structure, technology or people. These changes are defined as organizational change (Robbins et al. 2011, p.18). Organizational change is important because changes can increase effectiveness and efficiency, the innovation of products, services as well as dealing with changes in external and internal forces (Goodman, E. 2011, p.243). However, ‘the bottom line is that organizational change is difficult because management systems are design and people are rewarded for stability’ (Lawler, E.E. & Worley, C.G. 2006, p.11).