Introduction
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the combined, joint, and multinational commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” links to strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II, provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces and their equipment, as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the political end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment; its imperatives and logistics planning principles; and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
Joint Sustainment, Principles, and Imperatives
Joint Publication 3.0 Joint Operations, is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint Publication 4-0 further states, “Effective joint logistics planning identifies future requirements and proposes solutions; it requires joint logisticians to understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS).” Logisticians use seven principles in their planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war to ensure operations are logistically supportable and sustainable through the duration of the operations. These principles are survivability, responsiveness, economy, attainabi...
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...om/misc/images/5/ WWII_Mulberry_harbour.jpg. Accessed March 25, 2014.
. JP 4-0, xvi
. F.A. Osmanski, The Logistical Planning of Operation OVERLORD, Military Review Vol. XXIX No. 8, (November 1949) accessed at http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ p124201coll1/id903 (accessed 23 Oct 2013) p.41
. Krysa, John C., Operational Planning in the Normandy Campaign, 1944, p.25-26. Vessels were used as sorties dropping forces at the beach and returning to England for additional forces, supplies, and equipment.
. Bowden, Mark, D-Day: June 6, 1944, 2002, p.5. The aircraft industry built 800 planes in 1939 and reached 8000 per month in 1943.
. Ibid., 21
. JP 4-0, I-2
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Effective planning is impossible without first understanding the problem. Commanders rely on personal observations, experiences, and input from others to develop understanding. They also prioritize information requests and incorporate additional information as those requests are answered. A complete understanding of the problem and environment builds the foundation for the operational process and ...
The Mission of the Army Logistics Management College (ALMC), now referred to as the Army Logistics University (ALU) at Fort Lee, VA is to enhance the readiness and sustainability of United States Forces through training, education, consulting and research in Logistics, Acquisition and Operations Research Systems Analysis. In joint with the ALU, the Sustainment Center of Excellence (SCoE) runs eight different versions of battalion and brigade-level pre-command branch or technically focused courses. Five of them are conducted at ALU; one of those five course that ALU is responsible for offering is the resident 2-week Sustainment Pre-Command Course (SPCC). The SPCC was once taught at each individual Army branch school. In 1993, ALU was given the mission to train all multifunctional logisticians.
Brigade General Scales, Robert H. JR. Certain Victory. The U.S. Army in the Gulf War.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
The 1944 Allied landing at Normandy met a strong, networked German defense that initially disrupted the timing of the invasion, slowed down the Allied advance, and inflicted extensive casualties. The German shore defenses were a result of extensive preparations that began when the German High Command appointed Field Marshal Rommel to defend the western European coast. Rommel believed the best strategy against an Allied inv...
Operation Overlord, otherwise known as the D-Day invasion, was planned out far before the actual invasion took place. This means that, unlike Pearl Harbor, American news media had time to prepare for the reporting of the event and was not caught off guard when the attack finally commenced. In 1944, radio remained the fastest way to inform the public of when D-Day had begun and all around the world, citizens of the allied nations waited breathlessly for the broadcast that the liberation of France had begun, for to them, this would mean the end of the war was soon to come. Radio’s role in D-Day does not begin on June 6th (the day of the actual invasion) however, it begins on the 3rd of June. At 4:39 p.m. eastern war time, as many Americans were
Allied war planners with the vital information about the enemy preparedness for the Russians to
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It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Readiness is of the utmost importance with training being the most significant aspect that contributes to Readiness. Each Soldier needs an individual training plan. The plan should take the Soldier from enlistment to discharge or retirement. It is each Soldiers responsibility to be proficient in their field craft. This includes being fit mentally and physically, and trained to win in a complex world. It is the responsibility of the NCO to train these Soldiers. Unit training plans will address the readiness and resilience of individual Soldiers to ensure their fitness to accomplish their mission. Units must conduct realistic training at the individual, squad, platoon and company levels focused on Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for their
Coyle, J., Langley, C., Gibson, B., Novack, R. and Bardi, E. (2008).Supply Chain Management: A Logistics Perspective. 8th ed. Cengage Learning, p.366.