Kitcher’s Account is of Accepted Explanation but not Correct Explanation

In his paper Explanatory Unification, Kitcher argues that the theory of unification is a better explanatory theory than the covering law model. Where unification represents the purpose of scientific explanation as having an objective insight, the covering law model proposes a subjective insight. I will first summarize Kitcher’s argument for unification. I will then assert that unification is vulnerable to the metaphysical problem of causal theory and correct explanations. I will show how this objection challenges unification in two ways by using David Lewis’ example of the non-unified world. Kitcher responds to this objection in his paper Explanatory Unification and Causal Structure. I argue that Lewis presents two problems with his example of the non-unified world, yet Kitcher only responds to one. I will distinguish the difference between the two problems and propose that Kitcher fails to give an adequate response to the second problem.

Kitcher argues that what makes for a good explanation, or what makes a theory explanatory, is that it unifies or ties together different phenomenon or laws (Kitcher 1981, Pg. 711). The explanatory power of unification is a matter of deriving various phenomena using the same type of reasoning pattern as the argument (Kitcher 1981, Pg.721). For example, Newtonian physics showed that the argument pattern of ‘principa’ could be extended to derive descriptions of several distinct phenomena (Kitcher 1981, Pg. 716). Newtonian physics consists of a couple of simple laws such as the law of gravity and the law of attraction. These laws unify all kinds of phenomena in the world by using the same type of reasoning pattern. Thus, Newtonian physics extends its explanatory power into all kinds of phenomen...

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...s theory of gravity in favor of Einstein’s theory. However, by doing this we gain truth but lose unification. Truth is compatible with unification with respect to alternative theories of explanation, like causal theory. However, truth is incompatible with unity within the theory of unification. Kitcher’s response fails to redeem the theory of unification against both of the worries presented by Lewis’ objection. Thus, Kitcher fails to prove that unification is an adequate theory of explanation.

References

(1) Curd, Martin, and J. A. Cover. "Philip Kitcher Explanatory Unification. 1981" Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues. New York: W.W. Norton &, 1998. 711-34. Print.

(2) Kitcher, Philip, and Wesley C. Salmon, eds. Scientific Explanation. Vol. 13, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.