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operational factors in falklands war
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BACKGROUND
The Falklands conflict began on Friday, 02 April 1982, when roughly 500 Argentinean special forces landed at Mullet Creek on East Falkland Island. Under Operation Rosario, Argentina advanced on the Government House at Port Stanley against an unorganized garrison of British Royal Marines stationed on the island. Little opposition was encountered and the Argentinean Junta quickly assumed control. On the same day, Brigadier General Mario Menendez was appointed governor of the islands and Port Stanley was immediately renamed Puerto Argentino. Argentina expected at this point that the British would cede sovereignty over the islands through negotiations and with little or no armed conflict. Argentina had been claiming the Falkland Islands, or Las Islas Malvinas as they call them, since 1833. However, the United Kingdom responded differently with Britain's UN ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons sending a draft resolution to the Security Council condemning the hostilities and demanding immediate Argentine withdrawal from the Islands. Upon rejection of British demands, the British government announced the islands would be retaken by force and began their largest mobilization of British forces since World War II. Since the Argentinean government expected Britain to cede sovereignty of the islands with little or no conflict, no response planning had been performed or preparations made to extensively defend the islands by force. Argentina was obliged to hastily prepare for war with a British task force expecting to arrive within three to four weeks seeking to reclaim the Falkland Islands. This was to be Argentina's first war in almost 120 years. This paper will discuss the command and control structure of both the Argentine ...
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For four hundred years Spain ruled over an immense and profitable global empire that included islands in the Caribbean, Americas, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. After the Napoleonic Wars (1808-1815) many of Spain’s colonies followed the US’s lead, fighting and winning their independence. These revolts, coupled with other nations chipping away at Spain’s interests, dwindled Spain’s former Empire. By 1860, only Cuba and Puerto Rico were what remained of Spain’s former Empire. Following the lead of other former Spanish colonies, Cuban fighters started their campaign for independence, known as the Ten year war (1868-1878). This war developed into a Cuban insurgency which fought a guerilla war against the Spanish occupation.2
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Much confusion has arisen from misinterpretation of Clausewitz’s discussions on Schwerpunkt or “center of gravity”. Many students of military theory interpret Clausewitz’s ideas through their own historical perspectives. For example, military officers tend to confuse military objectives for centers of gravity, assuming physical objects such as ships or cities are the source of a countries power. While these objects may provide tactical advantages, true power arises from the critical strengths possessed by a country, be they political, diplomatic, military, or informational. The Argentinean military junta made similar mistakes during their invasion of the Falklands. Without fully understanding the source of British power in the region, the Argentineans attacked military objectives, while missing British centers of gravity. Because they failed to analyze the critical factors and capabilities of both the enemy and themselves, they were doomed to failure from the outset of the mission.
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