Thucydides multifaceted yet thorough account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BC allows a modern strategist an opportune and relevant model for the application of the end-ways-means construct for analyzing Athenian strategy. Through insights gained reviewing this campaign’s planning and execution, I will illustrate and link justifications for the Athenian intended ends. I will similarly articulate their ways through their planning and methods, then their means through their resources and force composition and strength. Finally, an evaluation of risks ties these factors together and allows an assessment on overall failures. As background to the expedition in 415 BC, Thucydides reviews colonization efforts and founding of at …show more content…
The Athenians had essentially three desired ends for the 415 BC Sicily expedition; all were described by Nicias in his speech to the Athenian assembly and in Thucydides assessment of speeches. The first two objectives were clear; first to respond to the Alliance with Egesta and remove the threat from Selinus and second to restore Leontini. The third objective was less solid in that it was to take opportunities for the “conquest of the whole of Sicily.”4 These objectives were formulated based on pleas and evidence of funding from Egesta. Greed played its part in that Athens felt that Egesta would be covering the costs for keeping the navy in a state of readiness as well as justifying the opportunities for expansion. This in essence was also the same set of objectives as the 426 BC expedition but in a less resource-constrained environment than previously. This expansion was justified as an effort to continually tip any balance of power in its primary national interest against Sparta, even if preemptive actions (as advocated by Alcibiades)5 against powers like Syracuse were needed. Thus Athens, using the means of an idle yet powerful army and navy, could expand their influence at no cost to the greater war with Sparta. This theory had already been employed successfully against …show more content…
From Athens and its Aegean and Ionian allies, they would send 134 triremes with over 7100 hoplites and lighter infantry (not including crews) and an additional 130 merchant ships and boats of tools, equipment, and supplies to meet logistics and engineering challenges.11 To augment this they counted on whatever forces, particularly cavalry, Egara could provide. Egara was to fund much of the endeavor and went to great lengths to deceive Athens that they could.12 Finally, Athens would establish bases of support and add to its strength by bringing various cities in Sicily to its side.13 By my account this was a feasible list of resources (means) to support the intended courses of action (ways) as it provided potentially overwhelming force compared to any local forces singly and was at least a match for the combined efforts of a few of them. However, the failure to secure two of these major means - the required funds from Egara and the friendly cities as bases of supply and to maintain their fleet - immediately limited the flexibility of operations. Athens assumptions about Egara and other Sicilian cities had simply failed to become fact. Subsequently, the list of opposing cities and forces was longer than
There is no coincidence that the rise of Athenian Democracy goes chronologically hand in hand with the rise of the Athenian Navy. Following the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks, Athens’ naval successes allow it to surpass the previous naval power of Corinth; create the Delian league to fund and support this navy; and eventually ruffle enough feathers with their fellow Hellenic neighbours that they inspire the Peloponnesian war. Overall their naval reputation and intimidation comes from the skill of the men who maneuver and command the ships, and the tool they use to wield their power, the Athenian trireme. By looking at the design of the trireme, and the work and numbers put both into the ship and the men that drive it, hopefully both the wealth and skill of the Athenian navy can be appropriately highlighted. In the end, it is this immense power and resources that allow the Athenians to overstep their limits and caused such demoralizing defeats such as the expedition at Syracuse and the eventual loss of the Peloponnesian war, after which they prove unable to grow to the same undefeated sea power they were.
Thucydides accounts that the allies saw this as a great advantage – ‘Because of their dislike for Pausanias, [the allies] were glad to see her [Athens] do so’. Yet this seems terribly ironic considering the events that followed Athens’ promotion of leadership. Athens first task as leader was to assess the various forms of finance that were crucial to the league. It required a strong fleet of ships and strong funds in order to function.
In 480 and the years prior the Athenians and Spartans, banned together to defeat the Persian Army. The Spartans stand at Thermopylae, allowed the Athenians time to prepare, and ultimately allowed the victory. With both of these great city-states located so close together in Hellas, there differences would ultimately lead to dissension. Throughout the course of this paper, I hope to explain the reasoning behind the dissension between Sparta and Athens, made war between these former allies inevitable.
Works Cited: The Melian Dialogue, Thucydides
The book written by Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, contains two controversial debates between distinguished speakers of Athens. The two corresponding sides produce convincing arguments which can be taken as if produced as an honest opinion or out of self-interest. The two debates must be analyzed separately in order to conclude which one and which side was speaking out of honest opinion or self-interest, as well as which speakers are similar to each other in their approach to the situation.
Robert B. Strassler (80) is President of Riverside Capital Management and General Partner of Weston Associates. He is also self-described “unaffiliated scholar,” a viola da gamba musician, a collector of musical instruments and Secretary/Treasurer of The Barrington Foundation, where his brother David is president. He has been an AJWS major gift donor since 2004.
While the army reached Thermopylae intact, the fleet suffered at the hand of two storms, with Herodotus attributing them to God attempting to equalize the opposing forces . The disparity between the size of the Persian and the size of the Greek forces was huge – thus, the Greeks’ strategy relied on geography . Holding the narrows at Thermopylae and the concurrent straits of Artemisium meant that Xerxes’ numerical superiority was reduced. It was here, on land and sea, that Greece showcased the superiority of it...
The causes of the Peloponnesian War proved to be too great between the tension-filled stubborn Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. As Thucydides says in Karl Walling’s article, “Never had so many human beings been exiled, or so much human blood been shed” (4). The three phases of the war, which again, are the Archidamian war, the Sicilian Expedition and the Decelean war, show the events that followed the causes of the war, while also showing the forthcoming detrimental effects that eventually consumed both Athens and eventually Sparta effectively reshaping Greece.
The battle demonstrated that the Athenian-led Delian League could accomplish its objectives (“Battles”). In the Aegean Sea, the Persian fleet was no longer a real threat to the Greeks (“Battles”). A year after the battle, Cimon invaded and defeated the remaining Persian forces in the Thracian peninsula (“Battles”). This victory acquired the Greek fleet's definite control of the Aegean Sea and allowed the Athenians freely to follow their broader political motive; making the Delian League allies tributary states in an Athenian empire and challenging for the supremacy in the Greek world (“Battles”). This situation lasted until the annihilation of the Athenian expeditionary force in Egypt, probably between 460 BC - 456 BC, which contributed that the Persians became a major naval power in eastern Mediterranean again
In this regard, Athens failed. Athens was not prepared to conduct warfare against an unknown opponent. Athens was unsure of how fervent the Syracusans would fight having never faced them in battle. Little was known about the terrain of Sicily and where it was vulnerable . In the face of uncertainty, a sensible military leader would heavily weight his attacking force. Mass becomes the crucial factor to ensure victory is achieved. Athens had trouble in formulating a military strategy to guarantee success. The three Athenian generals had differing opinions in dispatching Syracuse. Alcibiades pursued a path of alliance followed by attacking the dissenters, Lamachus favored a surprise attack on Syracuse to crush political will, and Nicias preferred a demonstrative show of force to deter Syracuse from further action . Each of these actions required varying levels of means from lowest to highest concentrations of military force. An unclear, disjointed strategy cannot be adequately resourced. Nicias realized this early on in preparing for the Sicilian campaign, and had thus heavily weighted the Athenian military in the pursuit of the campaign . The military was appropriately resourced to execute each of the three Generals’ strategies, but at a great cost. For success and holding Sicily, the Athenian military would most likely
1) According to Thucydides, during the civil war at Corcyra a re-evaluation of values took place in the populace (3.82). Explain the nature of these re-evaluations, and the reason(s) they took place.
...s. Through the definition of Athenian nature, the Corinthian anticipate the inevitable conquest of Sparta. The differences between Spartan and Athenian character is meant to facilitate a new approach by Sparta for defending peace. The Corinthians argue that the Athenians by nature are dangerous and the Spartans must attack first. The Corinthians address the differences in Athenian and Spartan natures to depict the inevitable dominance of a single one. According the Corinthians, the “use [of] their power” invokes a preemptive attack. The preemptive attack is capable of deterring the Athenian interest in the Peloponnesus. The Corinthians imply an initial attack against Athens is capable of preventing the growth of Athenian confidence. The Corinthians imply preemptive attacks are justified if they prevent an aggressor from posing a threat to an empire or alliance.
The main reason that the Greeks were able to win the Second Greco-Persian War was the fact that their victory on the sea dealt a crippling blow to the land army. The Greeks owe their naval success to a man named Themistocles. If it had not been for him then Athens would have not used some newly found silver to build 200 new ships for their navy. These ships were later used in the war against the Persians. The two forces were working in unison and they were dependent upon each other for victory. The Persian naval forces were there in order to protect the flank of the army's advance. If the Persian navy were not present then the Greeks would have been able to get on ships and sail to a spot behind the Persian lines and outflank them. They also delivered supplies to the armies that were necessary for its survival.
As can be expected from pioneer governmental institutions, Athenian democracy was not perfect. In fact it was far from it. It resulted in the establishment of poor policies by aggressive populists who sought "...private ambition and private profit...which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and their allies." (Thucydides). These self interested populist leaders with personal gain in mind established extensive internal political instability "...by quarrelling among themselves [and] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state." (Thucydides). Repeated opportunities to accept terms of peace after the battles of Pylos (425), Arginusae (406) and Aegospotami (405) were ignored by the inefficient Athenian demos eventually resulting in the devastation of the once dominant city-state. Internal political strife can also be attribu...
There was lots of debate between all of the Greek military leaders about whether they should go with Themistocles plan or not. Luckily, they went with it because who knows what would have happened if they did not. This was the last chance for Greek survival, and everyone knew that. Attica was already under attack by the Persian land force, which was commanded by Xerxes, Darius’s son. The bay of Salamis was also a convenient battle location because, if needed, the Greeks could draw the Persian fleet to the Peloponnese where the Greek reinforcements would meet them....