In this paper I will argue that Kuhn’s defense on the two charges against his view is good although it does have weak spots in them. When Kuhn came out with his book The Structure of Scientific Revolution in 1962, it became quite controversial. There is one specific charge that was held against Kuhn’s view that his view makes it seems that theory change is merely a matter of “mob psychology.” In response to all the critical things that were said about his book, Kuhn wrote The Essential Tension in 1972, within this book he defended his view against the charge in the chapter “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.” While his defenses against these charges are acceptable, they are no where iron clad strong and do have a few weak spots in them.
First I will explain what Kuhn’s view is. Kuhn’s view surrounds the notion of theory change called paradigms. A paradigm can be defined as ‘a way of seeing the world’ or ‘a whole way of doing science in a particular field’. Godfrey-Smith explains that paradigms can also be divided into the broad or narrow sense. To use it in a broad sense would be for example methods for gathering and analyzing data, and habits of scientific thoughts and action. It could be seen as whole ways of doing science. While to use the word “paradigm” in a narrow sense would be to have examples that are used as models, inspiring and directing further work of the paradigm. In general, paradigms in the broad sense would include within them paradigms in the narrow sense. A particular scientific filed would only have one paradigm guiding it in any particular time.
Inside a paradigm there are four phases of scientific inquiry. The first phase is called “normal science.” Godfrey-Smith defines this p...
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...t are favorable to the specific theory, thus making it seem more likely to be chosen. Secondly, while Kuhn does mention what should influence theory choice, he does not say what should be the leading factor. He does prove his point that if the criteria are used as values and not rules, these will lessen the amount of problems that build up while in the process of theory choice.
Works Cited
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003. Print.
Kuhn, Thomas. “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice,” The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in the Scientific Tradition and Change. Reprinted from The University of Chicago, 1974. Accessed, February 18, 2012.
http://commonsenseatheism.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Kuhn-Objectivity-Value-Judgment-and-Theory-Choice.pdf
Modern scientific trends developed from philosophies of the past, they are part of the philosophical path that a philosopher must walk when undergoing self-reflection. They are a presentation of modern-day prejudices, which the philosopher must seek to understand and overcome
Henry, John. (2001). The scientific revolution and the origins of modern science. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Publishing
This discussion focuses on two issues: the relationship between evidence and hypotheses; and, the role of "contextual" values in inquiry. Longino contrasts contextual values with constitutive values. The latter, the "values generated from an understanding of the goals of scientific inquiry," "are the source of the rules determining what constitutes acceptable scientific practice or scientific method" (L1990, 4). That these values influence inquiry is not a problem. But the former, "personal, social, and cultural values," are thought to threaten the integrity of scientific inquiry (L1990, 4-5).
Kuhn states that the first stage is the pre-paradigm period, next is the normal science stage, than the crisis period, and last is the scientific revolution. The pre-paradigm stage only happens once, this is when multiple paradigms compete to target a certain problem without a consensus on which is correct. This stage evolves when the scientific community
Since the mid-20th century, a central debate in the philosophy of science is the role of epistemic values when evaluating its bearing in scientific reasoning and method. In 1953, Richard Rudner published an influential article whose principal argument and title were “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1-6). Rudner proposed that non-epistemic values are characteristically required when making inductive assertions on the rationalization of scientific hypotheses. This paper aims to explore Rudner’s arguments and Isaac Levi’s critique on his claims. Through objections to Levi’s dispute for value free ideal and highlighting the importance of non-epistemic values within the tenets and model development and in science and engineering,
Any hypothesis, Gould says, begins with the collection of facts. In this early stage of a theory development bad science leads nowhere, since it contains either little or contradicting evidence. On the other hand, Gould suggests, testable proposals are accepted temporarily, furthermore, new collected facts confirm a hypothesis. That is how good science works. It is self-correcting and self-developing with the flow of time: new information improves a good theory and makes it more precise. Finally, good hypotheses create logical relations to other subjects and contribute to their expansion.
...ually throughout the processes of the theory, certain words and definitions need to be decided on and kept. Confusion prevails when the terms and ways to understand the theory are continually changing.
Cooper, Lawrence, Cary Murphy. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Chicago: Taylor & Francis, 1996
Popper claims basic statements are not justified by experience, but accepted by choice or convention. This claim is argued through a rejection of ‘psychologism’ and inductivism. According to Popper, scientific theory can be seen the fog above a swamp full of basic statements; the acceptance of a theory comes from an evaluation of basic statements and the conscious decision to accept or reject the theory. Popper comes to this conclusion after considering the problem of psychologism, distinguishing science from non-science, examining the falsification of theories and their testability, and then comparing perceptual experience and basic statements to illustrate how we come to form and accept scientific theory as empirical. Poppers arguments are
Vary, David. "Brief history on the Scientific Revolution." New York Times 02 Feb. 1990: 12B
Voltaire said “the perfect is the enemy of the good” (Voltaire 74). In striving for a perfect definition and application of scientific analysis, Karl Popper established an impractical and ineffective approach to science. In this paper, I will discuss the premises and principles behind Popper’s scientific method of critical rationalism. I will then explain where I believe his method succeeds, where it fails, and why I consider his method both impractical and ineffective. I will do so by first explaining his thoughts on science versus the status quo, then I will take the position that his approach is flawed and impractical, and lastly conclude with a commentary on why truth has to be flexible. My thesis is that in defining highly rigid parameters
Science can be defined as a concept of observations and inquiries that the whole world applies depending on certain natural laws which are discovered and tested. Some academics come across ideas which have existed, they explore and test these ideas using scientific methods. These methods are based on observations or experience which compel academics into hypothesis testing (Comer, Gould, & Furnham, 2013). It is suggested that science has key
In contemporary Western society, there is an impulse to find something to project ones alienation upon. For those who support Berry’s outlook in the essay Life Is a Miracle, this entity is the scientific method. Berry argues that science, in its purest form is good, but that we rely too heavily upon the scientific method and the pursuit of knowledge, which leads to disenchantment and loss of wonderment about the world .
Shapere, D. (1964). Review: The structure of Scientific Revolutions. The Philosophical Review , 73 (3), 383-394.
Thomas Kuhn's book The Copernican Revolution effectively demonstrates how the conceptual schemes of science are constantly changing and being replaced. Kuhn was able to recount the past with diagrams, and full explanations of the different theories and systems that lead up to the Copernican revolution. He also gave a full explanation of the theories that followed. This book was surprisingly enjoyable to read, and should be read by anyone interested in the evolution of science and western thought.