Type identity theory is a subcategory of physicalism. In physicalism it is understood that physical things form the basis for all things that exist. When this approach is taken it is incorrect to distinguish the mind from the body. The mind in a sense is not regarded as a thing. When discussing the mind it would be a better representation to reference mental states and particular processes that the brain performs. These properties, states and processes are physical objects which may be referred to as processes of the brain, opposed to the idea that said properties are linked to the mind. This is the general view taken by physicalists however there is disagreement on what a mental property actually is and furthermore their relation to physical …show more content…
His reasons for this are mainly due to Occam’s razor. Occam’s razor is the idea that if there are two justifications for a phenomenon the simpler one that employs fewer assumptions is more viable. As science is forever successfully progressing in giving answers to the various occurrences of living things, it would be odd for this progression to stop when inquiring into consciousness. Science has revealed that the world is a very complex organisation of physical components which interact casually. It would then be a much less viable stance, with this revelation of information, to still speak about man with reference to separate physical processes and consciousness. It would also be incorrect to say that the physical and consciousness are correlated. If one was to talk of two things being correlated then one of the things would have to be ‘over and above’ the other as Smart puts it. He exemplifies this, “You correlate footprints with burglars, but not Bill Sikes the burglar with Bill Sikes the Burglar.” In the context of the issue he is asserting that there is no correlation between the mental and the physical as they one and the
Davidson argues that there can’t be type-type identities between metal and physical events because: (a) if there were such identities, then there would be lawlike statements relating mental and physical events, and (b) there can be no such lawlike statements. According to Davidson, there can be no lawlike connections between the mental and the physical because of the ‘disparate commitments’ (3) of the two realms. Davidson’s argument for this claim can be schematized very roughly as follows:
Personal identity, in the context of philosophy, does not attempt to address clichéd, qualitative questions of what makes us us. Instead, personal identity refers to numerical identity or sameness over time. For example, identical twins appear to be exactly alike, but their qualitative likeness in appearance does not make them the same person; each twin, instead, has one and only one identity – a numerical identity. As such, philosophers studying personal identity focus on questions of what has to persist for an individual to keep his or her numerical identity over time and of what the pronoun “I” refers to when an individual uses it. Over the years, theories of personal identity have been established to answer these very questions, but the
Smart argues from the stance of identity theorist and believes that mental sensations are identical to a corresponding brain-process. Much of Smart’s paper is a counter argument against an identity theorist’s greatest rival, the dualist. Most of the human body has been explained by science in terms of biology, chemistry, and physics; though the brain remains largely mysterious. Recent technological advances regarding the research of the brain has allowed us to understand the mind in much better ways which is why Smart feels “that science is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are able to be seen as physicochemical mechanism” (61). He introduces the concept of Ockham’s razor and feels that scientists use it to introduce simplicity into their theories, which makes their explanations of concepts simpler. This simplicity is preferred because it also adds a sense of beauty to the laws discovered. With regards to his lightning example, Smart highlights how our experience of lightning is the physical process of discharged electrons from the ionization of water vapor in the atmosphere. Important to note here is that the two cannot be separated; you will not have a flash of lightning and then an electric discharge, rather lightning is electric discharge. This metaphor is crucial essay’s argument that sensations are identical to brain-processes. Ockham’s razor eliminates unnecessary nomological danglers from scientific theories, so why not apply the same concept to a theory of mind? We wouldn’t describe in our theory of lightning the ‘flashiness’ or ‘jaggedne...
Although the concept of identity is recurrent in our daily lives, it has interpreted in various ways.
I assert that Armstrong successfully argues that mental states in humans are equivalent to brain states in humans by avoiding the main objections of behaviorism and justifying that all behaviors can be explained through methods of science.
In David Lewis’ article “An Argument for Identity Theory” Lewis defends the psychoneural identity theory, arguing that mental states or experiences are neural states. In his main argument, he argues that physics can explain the causal relationship between mental states or experiences and physical phenomena. He uses an analogy of a cylindrical combination lock to explain the causal role that mental states play in producing physical phenomena. In order to put the lock into a state of being “unlocked”
Physicalism is a substudy of philosophy that is ripe for debate. Generally, it is divided by two opposing groups of belief; traditional physicalism, which serves to explain the world in purely physical terms, and anti-physicalism (dualism), which asserts a certain duality and lack of physicality within certain mental states and properties. To be physical, in this context, is entirely dependent on the school of thought accompanied by the person considering it. The dualist claim is that the world cannot be fully explained in purely physical terms, rather, that it needs to be explained in distinct states, both physical and mental. In the dualist sense, the term “physical” describes all properties and states that aren’t mental or phenomenological.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
In terms of the mind, mental states globally supervene on physical states, meaning that there are no changes in the mental without changes in the physical. Identity theory is a
I will describe the Knowledge Argument and how it aims to prove that physicalism is false. I will go through the plausibility of the arguments two premises and how the conclusion is implied. I will then present an objection to the argument and how it might present a problem to the claims being made by the argument. Finally I will then asses the objection and how well the Knowledge Argument holds up against it.
Materialism theory expresses everything is related to physical properties. Mental states are numerically identical with a physical state. Physical states would be referred to the brain or nervous system. If this theory were to be proven true, parts of the brain would have a segment for feelings, beliefs, etc. Identity theory is another way of expressing such, due to the direct one-to-one correlation. This futuristic thinking hasn’t been developed from scratch, it is mirroring off of older theories.
He suggests that when analyzing colors and their role in brain processes, we are misinterpreting the way it should be understood. When we speak about these sensations that are synonymous with the brain processes, it should be said as “There is something going on which is like what is going on when ____,” (149). In the case of seeing red as mentioned before, the statement would appear as “There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an emission of red cast from an object, that is, when I really see red." Ultimately, I do not believe this response is an adequate answer to the objection. It appears that Smart is merely altering the linguistic nature of the question rather than providing a solution to the problem. This “something” neutralizes the difference between a brain process and a sensation without giving a sound reason as to why or how they would be considered identical rather than
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
There are many criticisms of functionalism and their theories: Ø Functionalist ideas almost portray humans as being autonomous and that only socialisation determines our lives. They do not really see humans as the unpredictable creatures they are, not possible to stray away from the predictable ideas that functionalists have of people. Too much stress is placed on harmony and the potential for conflict and its affects are generally ignored. Ø There is no recognition of difference by class, region or ethnic group. The functionalist picture is simply reflective of happy middle-class American families.