Theaetetus 'False Belief In Socrates'

This essay will primarily focus on the puzzle of false belief, break it down to what the puzzles are and if false belief is possible or impossible. Theaetetus establishes the puzzle of false belief that false belief cannot include misidentifying anything that's unknown, because the unknown does not even occur in the believer's thoughts; however, it cannot include misidentifying anything that is known, based on the reason that the believer cannot be wrong about what he knows (Theaetetus 188a-c). The puzzle of false belief shows that if humans be firm on conceiving the association between thought and its objects on the model of holding or grasping something in our hands, humans can not make up for the possibility of false identity judgement,

After all, Socrates already argues that Theaetetus's first definition of knowledge as reception is insufficient, now the discussion has moved away from non-cognitive accounts of knowledge to the relationship between beliefs or judgment and knowledge. Theaetetus compares this with the idea that all belief counts as knowledge, which he proclaims cannot be right since there are false beliefs. However, Socrates proposes he cannot understand how there can be such a thing as falsity, he then suggests holding on to discuss the problem. Socrates lays out an abrupt and puzzling argument that allegedly displays the impossibility of false belief. The puzzle of false belief relies on the defenseless proposition that one either knows an object or does not. There is also a second proposition that works along with the puzzle of false belief, that is a thing cannot figure in one’s thoughts if one cannot already know the thing. One could take the point of the proposition to be that someone either knows everything about a thing or else one does not know anything about it. Then if this proposition is true, indeed it would be hard to view how we can ever make false identity judgments: however, such principle is not true, or even fascinating. The first proposition, which is that false belief relies on the defenseless proposition that one either knows an object or does not, this proposition has the advantage of being true, however leaving us without a