Trustees are fiduciaries with a trust relationship and confidence towards another, Millet J in Bristol West Building v Mothew states that fiduciary duties would be imposed on a person who holds a position on trust, confidence and influence. While there are established categories of fiduciary e.g. trustee/beneficiary and solicitor/client, the categories are not closed. Thus, Fridman found that an agent is a fiduciary because whether he is paid or acts gratuitously, he has the power to alter the legal relation of the principal. This essay will discuss the duties of a fiduciary, examining case laws and academic arguments.
Apart from the statutory obligations in the Trustees' Act, the court introduced the overarching duty of loyalty as the core
…show more content…
In doing so, the court departed from the previous rulings in Lister and Sinclar which only found a personal claim. FHR has attracted academic debates, not least because the effect on unsecured creditors. In this respect, Goode 2011 finds it hardly justifiable to allow a principal to rank ahead of the unsecured creditors who have given consideration. Furthermore, Rotherham deems that the finding of constructive trust does not reflect the true intention of briber, because the bribe arguably was never intended for the principal. These points have been noted by Lord Neuberger in FHR, who opined that these should be outweighed by the principal’s proprietary claim. Firstly, the bribe money should not be in the fiduciary’s estate in the first place. Secondly, the payment as such had very often reduced the benefit of the principal relevant transaction and thus can be seen as belonging to the
The decision of the House of Lords in City of London Building Society v Flegg marks a key stage in how the balance is drawn between occupiers and creditors in priority disputes; the seeds of which were originally planted in the Law of Property Act 1925. It posed a serious challenge to the conventional understanding of overreaching and the machinery of conveyancing.Ref ?
“Agency relationships are formed by the mutual consent of a principal and an agent.” (Cheeseman, p.487) Our book goes on to cite the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
Though there is no need for either party to use the word trust, the courts must be able to construe some sort of positive intent that the equitable interest was not to reside in the transferee. However Lord Millett later in Twinsectra Ltd denounces the emphasis previously placed on the party’s intent. Twinsectra involved a borrower seeking short term finance for the purchase of land and Lord Millett in this case states that Quistclose trusts are resulting trusts which arise by operation of law. His conclusion is based on the theory that resulting trust emerges when there is a transfer of property in circumstances in which the transferor did not intend to benefit the recipient. Carnworth J, however contends that from Twinsectra it seems that the parties place no real significance to the purpose so even applying Lord Millett’s newly configured resulting trust analysis, there is no real intent on the lenders part to ensure that the recipient does not receive the money at his free disposal. Furthermore, a key aspect of any intent to create a trust always revolves around the funds being held separately and so by devaluing this factor Lord Millett is detracting from traditional trust law principles and in the process is making it much easier to find a Quistclose trust in situations where it was never
The decision in Equuscorp is significant, as it has made clear several principles that were once ambiguous under Australian law. It ratifies that restitutionary remedies are unavailable for a claim for money had and received where recovery would reduce coherence in the law. Furthermore, Equuscorp has confirmed that a bare cause of action can be assigned where the assignee has a genuine commercial interest in its enforcement.
This court decision, shows how in regards to checks, going to the maker to ensure that the check is credible can help to protect the holder or the HDC of such an item. This can help them in the future if the payee is found to be a thief, in terms of recovering lost money from either the payee or the maker. Finally, we are also able to gain our own individual opinions about how HDC works and how fair we may or may not see it, based on cases like this one or simply everyday life.
The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England & Wales. - Counsel [24] See footnote 22 – but page 61 [25] GEOFFREY, Marshall, Constitutional Theory, Clarendon Law Series, Oxford 1971 Chapter1 – the Law and the constitution, part 3. Dicey’s doctrine and its critics. [26] REGINA v HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY, Ex parte SMEDLEY, [COURT OF APPEAL], [1985] Q B 657, 19 December 1984, (c)2001 The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England & Wales [27] MITCHELL, JDB, Constitutional Law, 2nd edition, Edinburgh, W Green & SON LTD, 1968, Convention, page 31 [28] See footnote 22 but page 64
...ncil from reading 1, in this case we see a London council attempting to fulfill an inpractical fee reduction on orders from Government. Both asides are held to account.
The law of contract in many legal systems requires that parties should act in good faith. English law refuses to impose such a general doctrine of good faith in the field of contract law. However, despite not recognizing the principle, English contract law is still influenced by notions of good faith. As Lord Bingham affirmed, the law has developed numerous piecemeal solutions in response to problems of unfairness. This essay will seek to examine the current and future state of good faith in English contract law.
Terence Etherton (2008) – Constructive trusts: a new model for equity and unjust enrichment. Cambridge Law Journal
According to Re Hay’ST, administratively unworkable renders the discretionary trust
As a consequence of the separate legal entity and limited liability doctrines within the UK’s unitary based system, company law had to develop responses to the ‘agency costs’ that arose. The central response is directors’ duties; these are owed by the directors to the company and operate as a counterbalance to the vast scope of powers given to the board. The benefit of the unitary board system is reflected in the efficiency gains it brings, however the disadvantage is clear, the directors may act to further their own interests to the detriment of the company. It is evident within executive remuneration that directors are placed in a stark conflict of interest position in that they may disproportionately reward themselves. The counterbalance to this concern is S175 Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) this acts to prevent certain conflicts arising and punishes directors who find themselves in this position. Furthermore, there are specific provisions within the CA 2006 that empower third parties such as shareholders to influence directors’ remuneration.
An agency relationship is formed between two parties when one party (the agent) agrees to represent another party (the principal). Normally, all employees who deal with third parties are considered agents. Principal-Agent relationships are defined as the understanding that the agent will act for and on behalf of the principal. (Cheeseman) The agent assumes an obligation of loyalty to the principal that he will follow the principal’s instructions and will neither intentionally nor negligently act improperly in the performance of the act. An agent cannot take personal advantage of the business opportunities the agency position uncovers. A principal-agent relationship is fiduciary, meaning these obligations bring forth a fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence. As such, an agency relationship is governed by employment law.
Hird and Blair, ‘Minding your own business – Williams v Roffey revisited: Consideration reconsidered’ [1996] JBL 254
Bribery is wrong, and it would be almost instinctive to point at the benefits of impartially functioning public servants and incorrupt corporations to our democratic society as justification. However, in this imperfect world where bribery is rife in varying degrees, is it possible to express this notion convincingly? Certainly 'because the UK Bribery Act says so' is far less persuasive to a council planning office in Shanghai than in London, and indeed in compliance with section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 which relates to commercial offences, it is essential that this question is engaged with on a corporate scale and without assertion through dogma. Accordingly, this essay will argue that elements wrong with bribery are inclusive of both moral and economic considerations. Moreover, in conjunction with international mandates, advent of aggressive legislation such as that of the UK Bribery Act 2010 is representative of global efforts to eliminate bribery. Hence, it follows that bribery can never be considered a normal part of business because it is economically unsustainable in the long term.
The courts of England and Wales acknowledge that the above must be something of value, in order to amount to consideration. A valuable consideration in the perspective of the English La...