Comparing The Great Italian Wars Of 1494-1559 In Southern And Western Europe

According to the school of realism in international politics, states operate in a type of system which has been dubbed the ‘balance of power.’ There are many definitions for it, but Morgenthau’s description of the theory as “an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality” sums it up well. While the term itself may be of the last few centuries, Hume writes that it “is founded so much on common sense and obvious reasoning, that it is impossible it could altogether have escaped antiquity.” That being said, the target region and period of time to be examined in this paper – the Great Italian Wars of 1494-1559 in Southern and Western Europe – is a prime example of balance of power politics

Prior to the outbreak of the wars in 1494, the Italian city-states were enjoying a time of peace and prosperity thanks mostly to Lorenzo de Medici – the Magnificent – of Florence, who orchestrated peace between Florence, Naples and Milan to “curb the Venetians.” Once it had all begun, outside the Italian city-states (the Papal States, Ferrara and Genoa - amongst others – would have roles throughout), France and Spain were the main kingdoms at each other’s throats, with the Holy Roman Empire , and the Ottoman Empire all making appearances in the many separate wars. The theory applies to this region mainly – as mentioned before – because of the many alliances formed and broken for the 63 years that “turned the Italian peninsula into the battleground of Europe.” The primary motor behind these alliances was one of the foundations of the balance of power theory in what Midlarsky dubbed as “the absence of alliance memory, making all other states potential allies or enemies, regardless of past friendships or

One example has been already mentioned; with Ferdinand the Catholic of Spain turning on France in 1501 right after they worked together to take Naples. Another instance was the formation of the League of Cambrai to oppose Venice’s influence in Italy (much like the pre-1494 balance). However, the coalition was overwhelming, and was indeed not made to simply stop Venice, but to crush it down. The League included the Papal States, France, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, and Ferrara ; it was an overwhelming force even against a formidable foe like the Venetians (who had a force of 29,500 men, a number matched by France on its own), which was the result of good diplomacy by Pope Julius II. The Popes, in general, were very instrumental in making and breaking friendships as they pleased throughout the Italian Wars. There are other examples of this kind and one of them, Suleiman the Magnificent’s role in the Franco-Prussian alliance, is fit for discussion in an entirely separate