This paper will examine the reliability of George Berkeley’s metaphysical theory of Idealism. Berkeley’s Idealism holds that reality is made real by what the mind perceives and that what we perceive to be material is really a collection of immaterial sensations. Idealism is defined as the view “that only mental entities exist, so physical things exist only in the sense that they are perceived” (“Idealism”). Berkeley’s argument of Subjective Idealism is the view that reality consists of one’s mind and its ideas, while Objective Idealism says in addition, a supreme mind produces ideas in the physical world that do not depend on human minds to exist (Velasquez 146). Without Objective Idealism, one can undergo solipsism which is the belief that only one’s self and experiences of the world are real and everything else does not exist (“Solipsism”). Opposing Idealism is the metaphysical view of Materialism which holds that only physical things exist (“Materialism”). This paper will start by examining George Berkeley’s views of Subjective and Objective Idealism and how they apply to reality. Then, the critiques made and supported by Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes against both views of Idealism will be argued. However, these arguments fail to properly examine Berkeley’s Idealism, thus causing the critiques to be based upon misinformation. Although the criticisms pose potential flaws, Berkeley’s Idealism continues to be a major discussion in the metaphysical debate.
Through the view of Subjective Idealism, objects are made real when a mind perceives its qualities. Berkeley claims that when an object is perceived, its qualities are the parts being perceived because qualities are compatible with the senses; sight, smell, touch, taste, and sou...
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...es the ultimate mind and its perceptions to exist if it cannot perceive itself.
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The mind-body problem has kept philosophers busy ever since Descartes proposed it in the sixteenth century. The central question posed by the mind-body problem is the relationship between what we call the body and what we call the mind—one private, abstract, and the origin of all thoughts; the other public, concrete, and the executor of the mind’s commands. Paul Churchland, a proponent of the eliminative materialist view, believes that the solution to the mind-body problem lies in eliminating the single concept that allows this problem to perpetuate—the folk psychological concept of mental states. Churchland argues that the best theory of mind is a materialistic one, not a folk psychological one. Unlike other materialist views such as identity theory, Churchland wants to remove the idea of mental states from our ontology because mental states cannot be matched 1:1 with corresponding physical states. This is why Churchland’s view is called eliminative materialism—it is a materialistic account of the mind that eliminates the necessity for us to concern ourselves with mental events. At first this eliminative materialism appears to be a good solution to the mind-body problem because we need not concern ourselves with that problem if we adopt Churchland’s view. However, there is a basic flaw in his argument that raises the question of whether we should actually give up folk psychology. In this paper, we will first walk through the premises of Churchland’s argument, and then we will explore whether Churchland does a suitable job of justifying our adoption of eliminative materialism.
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There are many ideas about the way things are suppose to be, they guide people in the way humans approach life and how people go about achieving our goals. Unfortunately people do not always accomplish these ideas they have for ourselves but the truth often times is what we really need. In the Shakespearean drama, Macbeth, he writes of a once cherished leader, Macbeth who is approached by supernatural being and acts out erratically to fulfill what prophesies he desires which lead to his eventual demise. Macbeth has difficulty perceiving idealism from the truth, in other words what he thinks should happen and what actually happens. The prophecies are the catalyst for his irrational thinking and from then on Macbeth becomes addicted to knowing what his future could be and taking it to the extreme of needing to create it then and there. Down this path he also has his wife Lady Macbeth who pushes him further to act on these prophecies to achieve the ultimate goal of the crown. She too has an obsession with doing whatever it takes to be Queen and have that authority to her name. These two characters take to the extreme what it means to need truth but desire their idealism and how this leads to their eventual demise.
Kirkpatrick, Larry D., Wheeler, Gerald F. Physics: A World View. Forth ed. Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 2001.
In almost all of his work, Berkeley’s fundamental goal is to logically disprove any thinking that presumes the non-existence of God (Muehlmann 231). In a nutshell, Berkeley argues that matter does not exist outside of human perception. In his Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, he asserts the following:
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The purpose of this essay is to discuss how dualism describes reality more accurate than materialism, idealism, and transcendental idealism. Even though dualism doesn’t describe reality one hundred percent just like the other theories about the nature of reality, it is the most accurate argument out of the four major theories about the nature of reality and substance. Dualism was a concept that was not originated by Rene Descartes but coined by him. The concept was that our mind is more than just our brain. The concept was not originated by Rene Descartes because the Bible explains that we are more than our body and brains. It teaches that we have a separate mind, soul, and spirit. One argument for dualism is that the physical and mental territories have different properties. The mental events have qualities such as what does it feel like, what does it look like, or what it sounds like. Another argument is the lack of any understanding of how any possible reaction can take place between the mind and brain. The essay will include reasons for favoring the Thomistic and Cartesian forms of substance dualism and the counter arguments that are against them.
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Perception is the process by which we grasp useful information about the external world through the senses. Armstrong argues in ‘Perception and Belief’ that perceptual experience is a disposition to form beliefs about the real world. The argument from illusion shows that perceptual knowledge is a misrepresentation of the world because external objects may have qualities they do not really possess. This is due to various experiences that are caused by hallucinations or by the influence of drugs. Given that reality can easily be altered by such cases, perception does not seem to represent a direct window onto the world. To overcome this problem, some philosophers like Russell postulated the sense datum theory as an object that stands in relation between the perceiver and an external object. Moreover, this view asserts that the perceiver is never in direct contact with reality but is in a continuous mental state that prevents him to see the world as it is. Hence, the perceiver is not deceived by the illusory cases because there is no objective world to be derived from. Armstrong rejects this theory by appeal to the indeterminacy principle and raises claims to support the reliability of perception as the acquisition of potential belief. On Armstrong’s view, the number of background inferences justifies the validity of perceptual beliefs with respect to providing knowledge of the external world. In ‘Sensation and Perception’, Dretske argues that perception and belief are not inextricably bound simply because belief requires a cognitive refined process of informational input while perception involves the casual flow of raw data not yet processed by the cognitive mechanisms. On Dretske’s view, a sui generis conception of perception tha...
Kirkpatrick, Larry D. and Gerald F. Wheeler. Physics a World View. Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2001. 171.
George Berkeley taught and supported idealism or the theory that reality and truth are found in minds and their ideas. (Stanford) He critiqued the greats who came before him like Descartes and Locke and, he influenced the renowned philosophers, Hume and Kant. Berkeley's most famous philosophical works came when he was still in his twenties. The first of these works was titled, An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709). Berkeley completely rejected the material world. In his first work, he attempts to provide a theory for depth perception supported by reason. This piece of influential philosophy also created doctrines that pave the way for the "idealist project." (Stanford) Another famous and influential piece of work was A Treatise Concerning
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Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.