Ronald Dworkin The Rules Of Statutory Are There Separate Rules?

The rules of statutory interpretation are a guide for judges to decide what parliament means in statutes. The judge would look towards the rules for assistance when faced with a statute, which is difficult to apply to the given facts . There are three main rules. The literal rule requires that words must be viewed in their plain and ordinary meaning, even if there is some sort of absurdity . The golden rule requires words to be given their natural meaning to the extent where they do not produce absurdity . Finally the mischief rule aims to deduce Parliaments intention by looking at former statute . In addition to these, the purposive approach considers the wider purpose of the legislation . As suggested by Quintin Johnstone, the rules of statutory

There has been some reference by scholars to an interlinked system of rules of which one cannot be pinpointed as the most important, but in fact all may be applicable to a particular case and should be taken into account. It is stated by Ronald Dworkin that “we cannot say that one rule is more important than another within the system of rules” . He argues that though there are several rules, clarity of these rules is still present as they work together and are interlinked so the judge must take them all into account when interpreting a

Principles are not a binding item. As further explained by Ronald Dworkin “All that is meant, when we say that a particular principle is a principle of our law, is that the principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration.” . This demonstrates the limited binding effect, which principles have and suggests that judges are not bound to use or apply either one of the statutory interpretation techniques. The rules of statutory interpretation are “not rules in the ordinary sense of having some binding force. They are our servants not our masters” . They do not make a substantial influence on the existing law and should be merely looked at as aids in judgment. There is thus no pressure to apply a specific rule because there is no right or wrong rule to apply. This suggests that the rules of statutory interpretation are not as important as portrayed. Therefore the question of whether the ‘rules’ of statutory interpretation are clear cannot be answered as they are not in fact rules but are merely to be taken into account by the