Williams’ case for relativism is very different than Schafer’s relativism; this is the main reason why notional confrontation is not just resisting moral disagreement. In every system what is right or wrong differs but one’s own acceptance or rejection of certain propositions does not depend on the system (Williams, Pg. 225). Williams does not explicitly say this, but he must say this in order to assert that one can convert from one system to another, and that systems employ right and wrong to certain propositions. Yet Williams claims that the “more remote [a system] is from being a real option for us, the less substantial [the question] of whether it is ‘true’ or ‘right’, etc.” (Williams, Pg. 255). Therefore, for Williams conversion depends both on the objective truths of a system, and subjective truths of your view of the system. However conversion to a new system being a “real option“ only relies on the objective truths. For example, it is objectively true that we cannot go back in time to experience the Bronze Age (Williams, Pg. 225). Therefore, Bronze Age society is not a “real option” as a system (Williams, Pg. 225).
Notional confrontation cannot be ways of refusing to take part in a conversation. For someone participating in a disagreement, Schafer’s assessor relativism gives two options, either converge upon a belief with your opponent, or refuse to converse with your opponent. Contrarily, Williams’ idea of notional and real confrontation says someone participating in a disagreement can only convert to their opponent’s belief, and they can only do this if and only if conversion is a real option. If there is no real option, then there is no confrontation, or disagreement. Intuitively, there is no other option that one coul...
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...lliams, it would be impossible for either the alien or myself to convert between each other’s systems. It is not the case that the alien refuses to convers with me about my belief because he is confident in his belief. Rather, the alien cannot even assess what my beliefs are. In the terms Schafer provides, our trutho differ so drastically that our truths cannot even be assessed in the same system, let alone same context. The alien case shows that notional confrontations are mistaken to be resisting a conversation because they appear to be conversations towards convergence, yet are actually conversions.
References
(1) Schafer, Karl. "Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.4 (2012): 602-20. Web.
(2) Williams, Bernard. "The Truth in Relativism." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (1975): 215-28. Web.
ABSTRACT: Davidson argues (1) that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" (2) precludes the possibility of their being any type-type identities between mental and physical events. However, there are radically different ways to understand both the nature and content of this "constitutive ideal," and the plausibility of Davidson’s argument depends on blurring the distinction between two of these ways. Indeed, it will be argued here that no consistent understanding of the constitutive ideal will allow it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.
Evans, C. Stephen. Critical Dialog in Philosophy of Religion. 1985. Downers Grove, IL. InterVarsity Press. Taken from Philosophy of Religion - Selected Readings, Fourth Edition. 2010. Oxford University Press, NY.
Class notes from PHIL 330, Moral Theory, by Dr. Richard Lippke, Department of Philosophy, and James Madison University. Spring Semester 2002.
I will prove that notional confrontation is not analogous to refusing to take part in a conversation. First I will summarize both Schafer and Williams’ respective views. I will also explain three differences between the views. I will describe two particular cases where it might seem like notional confrontations are ways of refusing to take part in a conversation. I call them the Amish case and the alien case (Williams, Pg. 225). I will show how notional confrontations, that seem to be like Schafer’s assessor relativist resisting a conversation, are in some cases not actually notional confrontations. In other cases, I will show that notional confrontations are mistaken for resisting a conversation because they appear to be convergence, yet are actually conversions.
Buddhism and Christianity have been increasingly engaging in an inter-faith dialogue in an effort to better inform the respective views of each religious tradition. Those who are engaging in such dialogues are not interested in, or attempting to merge Buddhism and Christianity into one religion. Rather, their aim is to create a conceptual language framework, which promotes a dialogue leading to greater understanding of the value one religion can add to the other. John Makransky and Paul knitter are two pioneers in the new phenomenon known as engaged Buddhism. However, opposing approaches exist in how said dialogue is being done.
Gilbert Harman lays out his moral relativism theory with “inner judgments”, the statements concerned with “ought”, in Moral Relativism Defended. However, he assumes an important premise of his theory to be true, which is the reason that I will prove the missing premise – that moral relativism is true – in this paper. Moreover, his form of moral relativism with his “four-place predicate ‘Ought(A,D,C,M),’ which relates an agent A, a type of action D, considerations C, and motivating attitudes M,” has brought about both meta-ethical and practical concerns. He argues that these inner judgments are only possible if agent A acknowledges considerations of the circumstance C, invokes motivating attitudes M, and supports the action D with C and M. In
Some kinds of utterances which have an indicative grammatical form seem, for different reasons, to be unable to say something true of the world. Logical contradictions are only the prime example of something the author baptizes impossible descriptions. So-called performative contradictions (e.g., "I do not exist") make up another kind, but there are at least two more such kinds: negating affirmations and performatives which cannot be explained within the philosophy of language. Only philosophical anthropology can explain their feature of "impossibleness," and a distinction between unreflective and reflective consciousness is central to the explanation. Particularly important here is G. H. Mead's distinction between two aspects of the self: the "I" and the "me." Each of the four kinds of impossible descriptions distinguished has its own contrary opposite. These are, in turn, logical tautologies, performative tautologies, affirming negations, and omissive performatives. The last three types as types have not received the philosophical recognition that they deserve. All four fit a general characterization which is given as a definition of the concept of superfluous description.
...hal. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2009. Opposing Viewpoints. Rpt. from "Called to Love: Christian Witness Can Be the Best Response to Atheist Polemics." America 198 (2008): 23. Opposing Viewpoints in Context. Web. 8 Dec. 2013.
Bernard Williams explores the concept of relativism in his paper “Interlude: Relativism”. In this paper, Williams explains how the concept of relativism is a wildly unreasonable theory to have existed in philosophy. Relativism is defined as moral reasons depending on a group, culture, or society. Williams opposes to this theory by examining the concept of relativism and stating reasons to support his argument. However, this argument fails to provide every aspect of the theory; therefore, I will provide two reasons resisting Williams argument.
The Web. https://sakai.luc.edu/access/content/group/PHIL_181_014_5296_1142/Readings/ROSS3.pdf>. The "Ethical Relativism" Ethical Relativism. Lander,. Web.
This paper will dispute that scientific beliefs are not the right way to accept a belief and it will question if we should let one accept their rights to their own beliefs. In Williams James article Will to Believe, we accept his perspective on how we set and fix our beliefs. This paper will first outline his overview on the argument that someone does not choose their belief but rather one just has them. Following, it will outline my perspective on how we set our beliefs and agreement with purse. Then it will explain how other methodologies such as science cannot conclude to one’s true beliefs. Science has been seen as a way to perceive life and taken to consideration as the truth. This paper should conclude that humans define ourselves by
Moral relativism is the concept that people’s moral judgement can only goes as far a one person’s standpoint in a matter. Also, one person’s view on a particular subject carries no extra weight than another person. What I hope to prove in my thesis statement are inner judgements, moral disagreements, and science are what defend and define moral relativism.
In Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes editors Rationality and Relativism (Cambridge Press, 1982).
Rachels, J. (1986). The Challenge of Cultural Relativism. The elements of moral philosophy (pp. 20-36). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Gilbert, Allan H. "The Aristotelian Catharsis." The Philosophical Review 35.2 (1926): 301-14. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.