Overview 2-5, about LS§4 ‘The principles of conservation’
1. What are the three principles that Epicurus and Lucretius are arguing for in these passages?
(i) Things do not come to be out of what is not, out of nothing.
(ii) Things do not pass into nothing; things are not literally annihilated.
(iii) The totality of things was and will forever be as it is now; this totality does not change, and there is nothing external to that things might be introduced to change it.
It is evident that things do not come to exist out of just anything; each comes into being out of particular things—fruit from the tree, tree from the seed, seed from the fruit; bird from the egg, egg from the bird. It cannot be, therefore, that things come to exist out of nothing, out of what is not, for were that so, things could come to be out of anything. I am not convinced: yes, it is evident that some kinds of things have again and again come into being out of particular things; so, we might well argue that these things do not come into being out of nothing. But is it evident that all things are alike in this? Perhaps some things do come into existence out of nothing: the possibility still pesters physicists today. It is supposed necessary by the Epicureans that particular conditions of generation correspond with particular kinds of things, and that all things of every kind are alike in this—not a ridiculous supposition, but surely not evident. This, I should want to add, is not an ‘implicit appeal to the principle of sufficient reason’, for that would entail questions about what function corresponds to the conditions of generation—what function has the egg if not the generation of a bird? We might answer that eggs are a function of animal nutrition ...
... middle of paper ...
... permanent attributes of bodies.
‘A fixed attribute is that which can at no point be separated and removed without fatal destruction resulting—as weight is to stones, heat to fire, liquidity to water, tangibility to all bodies, and intangibility to void’.
‘By contrast slavery, poverty, wealth, freedom, war, peace, and all other things whose arrival and departure a thing’s nature survives intact, these it is our practice to call, quite properly, accidents’.
These are Lucretius’ brief definitions of permanent attributes and accidents. Epicurus of course says similar, but he adds some points of interest. First, we ought not to describe permanent attributes as per se existents, as non-existents, nor as ‘incorporeal things accruing to the body’. He includes among the permanent attributes ‘the shapes, colours, sizes, weights and other things...’
In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Aristotle’s argument from Physics Book 2, chapter 8, 199a9. Aristotle in this chapter tries to make an analogy between nature and action to establish that both, nature and action, have an end.
... middle of paper ... ... Everything is basically relative and is what each separate person perceives it to be, just like the answers to the infinite questions posed by The Turn of the Screw. Works Cited Burrows, Stuart.
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
8- McDermid, Douglas. "God's Existence." PHIL 1000H-B Lecture 9. Trent University, Peterborough. 21 Nov. 2013. Lecture.
The locus classicus for Descartes’ consideration on the laws of motion are the articles 36 through 45 of his Principles and the chapter seven of The World. In The World, Descartes introduces a fable about the creation of the world where he exposes the similitude between God’s creative and preservative acts. Descartes begins considering matter as devoid of all its secondary qualities: ‘let us expressly suppose that it [matter] does not have the form of earth, fire, or air, or any other more specific form, like that of wood, stone, or metal’ (AT XI, 33). Hence, Descartes claims that the only quality remaining in bodies is their extension, which is the only one we can conceive clear and distinct. In the beginning, then, God created an indefinite quantity of matter whose substantial quality is its extension.
Locke viewed the identity of living entities in a different light. Above, change in mass constituted a change in identity. But, in living entities a change in mass does not affect the identity of the object. Locke uses the example of the oak tree. It starts off as a sapling and grows into a huge oak tree, with a massive change in mass. That oak tree could be subjected to the cutting of branches, and the winter fall of leaves, however it still remains an oak tree because it continues the life of a tree. It maintains the same functional arrangements of components (Blackburn, 1999: 125-126). An interesting example is raised by Blackburn in assessing “how much change to tolerate while still regarding it as the same ‘thing’” (Blackburn, 1999:127). ‘Theseus’ ship’ is used to illustrate this. The ship goes on a long voyage and is in need of constant repair and maintenance. By the end of the voyage, all the components of the ship have been changed.
...false and that is the reason why these positions have attracted different comments from the inception of the philosophical discipline to the present time.
With their philosophical roots grounded in ancient Greece, Stoicism and Epicureanism had contrary yet significant impacts on Roman society. These two philosophies differed in many of their basic theories. Stoics attempted to reach a moral level where they had freedom from passion, while Epicureans strove for pleasure and avoided all types of pain. Stoics like the Epicureans, emphasized ethics as the main field of knowledge, but they also developed theories of logic and natural science to support their ethical doctrines.
Epicurus. The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994. Translated and Edited by Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson.
This theory is Aristotle’s belief that something can not come out of nothing. Aristotle says, “How will there be movement, if there is no actually existing cause?…The seeds must act on the earth and the semen on the menstrual blood”. What he is saying is that something must be set into motion by something else. There is always a cause to an effect. One relies on the other. Therefore, before origin there must have been an “immovable mover”, that being God.
As a worldview, Stoicism is a philosophical approach to help people to cope with times of great stress and troubles. In order to give comfort to humanity, the Stoics agree with the Pantheistic view that God and nature are not separate. Instead, the two forces are one. By believing that God is nature, humans have a sense of security because nature, like God, is recognized as rational and perfect. The perfection of nature is explained through the Divine, or natural, Law. This law gives everything in nature a predetermined plan that defines the future based on past evens (cause and effect). Because the goal for everything in nature is to fulfill its plan, the reason for all that happens in nature is because it is a part of the plan. It is apparent that, because this law is of God, it must be good. The Divine Law is also universal. Everything on the planet has a plan that has already been determined. There are no exceptions or limitations to the natural law. The world in the Stoics’ eyes is flawless, equal, and rational.
A foundational belief in Christianity is the idea that God is perfectly good. God is unable to do anything evil and all his actions are motives are completely pure. This principle, however, leads to many questions concerning the apparent suffering and wrong-doing that is prevalent in the world that this perfect being created. Where did evil come from? Also, how can evil exist when the only eternal entity is the perfect, sinless, ultimately good God? This question with the principle of God's sovereignty leads to even more difficult problems, including human responsibility and free will. These problems are not limited to our setting, as church fathers and Christian philosophers are the ones who proposed some of the solutions people believe today. As Christianity begins to spread and establish itself across Europe in the centuries after Jesus' resurrection, Augustine and Boethius provide answers, although wordy and complex, to this problem of evil and exactly how humans are responsible in the midst of God's sovereignty and Providence.
Aristotle’s thoughts on ethics conclude that all humans must have a purpose in life in order to be happy. I believe that some of the basics of his ideas still hold true today. This essay points out some of those ideas.
...tion of permanence meaning that anything that appears to be forever and permanent is not inclined to change. Basic change, hence, is not possible. Each and everything have been in existence and will always be in either in one way or other. This notion of Parmenides directs him to the result that due to permanence there is an undivided unanimity within the world. Heraclitus on the other hand took an entirely different stand point and proposed that the world was directed and administered by a divine or spiritual rationale or logos. His assertion that the world has always been a subject to change and it stays in constant change and modification is the chief theme of his argument. He persisted that change prevails within the reality and the unknown and all- pervasive Being is there and commands the universe and all the things will remain subject to change for eternity.
However, it is notoriously difficult to say what an ever-changing universe has to do with an unchanging Reality. Additionally, the contingent world we know is morally and aesthetically imperfect, to say the least. It follows that Reality, by contrast, must be supremely good and beautiful. This strand goes right back to Plato, and the idea that there exists a world that is more ‘real’ and more ‘true’ and the ‘so-called’ real world we inhabit in our embodied state. This is the world of the perfect Forms, but their relation to the particulars of which they are the Forms is difficult to describe adequately. How can two things that have absolutely nothing in common be related to each other in any way