Philosophical Arguments Concerning Canada's Sex Work Law

Canada's sex work law, manifested in Bill C-36, represents a significant departure in Canadian legislation, criminalizing the purchase of sexual services while decriminalizing their sale. This legal maneuver, framed within the discourse on its ethics, grapples with the delicate balance between safeguarding vulnerable individuals (particularly women and girls) from exploitation and violence inherent in the sex industry, and respecting the autonomy and rights of sex workers. Proponents of the law argue that it is crucial for curtailing exploitation and reducing demand for prostitution, thereby protecting the dignity and well-being of the practice. Conversely, critics contend that criminalization perpetuates stigma and marginalization, exacerbating

Her philosophical ontology centers on the holistic development of the self, which she believes occurs through a thoughtful integration of bodily experiences and reflection. In considering Canada's sex work law, Church's viewpoint alludes to the complexities of human agency, vulnerability, and self-ownership. This perspective, deeply rooted in metaphysics, phenomenology, and ethics, informs her analysis of social issues, including the regulation and/or proliferation of sex work laws. In this breadth, we will explore Church's assessment of Canada's sex work law, examining her philosophical arguments on the development of the self and its relevance to the regulation of sex work. Through a critical analysis of Church's perspective, I will contend that, in her view, Canada's sex work law sufficiently prioritizes the protection of vulnerable individuals and addresses the ethical implications of modifying the [human] body. By also engaging with potential objections and grievances, we will aim for a comprehensive understanding of the nuances surrounding sexual work legislation and its implications for the welfare of those

She argues against the notion of automatic ownership (that individuals inherently possess ownership over certain aspects of themselves or their possessions without any explicit action or effort) and the complete separation of the self from the body; instead advocating for a flexible interpretation of ownership, which depends on how extensively psychological states are combined to form a unified self-identity. Church notes this by stating, "A body belongs to a person when and if the psychological states of that body are integrated through reflection in such a way as to constitute a person or a self," (Church, 92). Emphasizing the role of reflective integration in ownership, this challenges traditional views on self-ownership and introduces a more examined life into the mix. More on the self, Church's conception revolves around the integration of psychological states as mentioned prior, which she views as essential for the emergence of a coherent self. She delves into the question of what specific interconnections between psychological states are necessary for this emergence, highlighting two key components. First, the Church emphasizes the formation of an interlocking system of attitudes among psychological states. This interconnectedness creates a cohesive narrative within which the self can develop and thrive. Second, the