Heinz Guderian (1888-1954) was born in Kulm, West Prussia (now Chełmno, Poland). His family, like many Prussian’s, were historically landed gentry and lawyers with his father being the only soldier with whom he was closely related. Guderian, being the son of a soldier, moved around fairly extensively during his youth until he himself joined the military in 1907. During the First World War Guderian served as a signals officer, giving him insight into how technology could be used to facilitate military actions. Post-war Guderian found himself in the reduced 100,000-man German Army (Reichswehr) where he slowly began to develop his ideas of mobile warfare, gathering ideas from fellow military theorists J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, and Charles de Gaulle. This culminated in Guderian’s book Achtung – Panzer! which outlined his ideas on armor and aircraft in modern warfare. Guderian would eventually get to test his theories in action with the onset of the Second World War, making dramatic advances through Poland, France, and Russia. Perhaps because of his place as one of first to espouse both the theoretical and practical implementations of blitzkrieg he is sometimes referred to as the father of blitzkrieg and modern military theory.
Panzer Leader, or Erinnerungen eienes Soldaten (Memoirs of a Soldier) in the original German, is ostensibly Heinz Guderian’s autobiography covering perhaps the most critical and prominent years of his life; his early struggles within the German Army to create and develop Germany’s armored forces, the early German successes from 1939 to 1941 starting with the incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland into the Reich, followed by the campaigns in Poland, France, and the initial invasion of the S...
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...makes to the store of war literature should prove of interest to the student of the specialist mind and of the author’s own personal career. It is of less interest as a study and analysis of German strategy and tactic. ”
and, in general, I concur. But it will forever be a shame that one of the primary forces behind blitzkrieg and modern military theory provided so little direct insight into his life and his ideas.
Works Cited
Addington, Larry H., The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-1941 (New Jersey, 1971)
Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader (Toronto, 2000)
Macksey, Kenneth, Guderian: Panzer General (London, 1975)
Norman, Albert, ‘Review: Panzer Leader’, The American Historical Review 58, no. 4 (1953), pp. 918-920.
Rothbrust, Florian K., Guderian's XIXth Panzer Corps and the Battle of France: Breakthrough in the Adennes, May 1940 (New York, 1990)
Weigley, Russel F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1st Edition, 1984.
Cameron, R. S. (2003). The army vision: The 4th AD in world war II. Military Review, 83(6), 59-68
war went on, was that of encouraging at least some degree L&LL. At the same time they stoically maintained a toecap-to-toecap confrontation with the German Army whilst periodically energetically pursuing the High Command’s policy of continuous offensive action. This meant that when the German High Command in 1918 finally felt obliged by external factors to take the great gamble of their last great offensive on the Western Front, the German Army suffered increasingly unsustainable levels of attrition to their armies. Secondly, by thus steadfastly holding the Germans and their allies at bay in the trenches, the trench fighters enabled the twin pressures of the Allied land and sea blockade, and the failure of German State’s domestic production, to squeeze the fighting heart out the German nation and its autocratic rulers.
5. Margiotta, Franklin D., Ed. “Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography”, Washington: Brassey’s, Inc. 1994
The Web. Blumenson, Martine, and the Patton Papers, (14 March 2014) 2-13-2014) “George S. Patton Jr.” U-s-history.com. Web. The Web. The Web.
O'Neill, William L. World War II: A Student Companion. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.
Field, Frank. British and French Operations of the First World War. Cambridge (England); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
...ings by then, whose memories, fears, and enthusiasms should not be remembered." Thus, unlike the title suggests, this remarkable war memoir is not about one soldier. Instead it refers to the entire German army who were defeated by the Allies. Although the German cause was very controversial, these gentlemen bravely fought for their country. Many men died, many were mutilated, and many more had to forever live with the atrocities they encountered. At war's end, however, they were merely "forgotten" for their failure of success. And although The Forgotten Soldier is an astonishing account of the horrors of infantry warfare, it serves a much greater purpose. It allows the historian to glance into the German experience and realize they too were young men fighting because their nation called upon them, and they deserve to be remembered for such a courageous act.
Works Cited Horne, Alistair. A.S.A. & Co. To Lose a Battle: France, 1940. New York: Penguin, 1990. Jackson, Julian.
However, a notable difference that Horne establishes while describing the German General Erich von Falkenhayn as “ruthless [he] lacked the tenacious purpose” (32) will reflect heavily on the German’s tactical doctrine. An agreeable assumption as to Horne’s lack of detail in Germany’s tactical doctrine, as compared to the French, is in fact the lack of purpose, because there is not much to be said about an army fighting for the sake of fighting. In the third chapter, Horne is in no way reserved in his portrayal of Germany’s General Falkenhayn. Horne paints General Falkenhayn as a commander with a weak vision for strategic warfare and a man crippled by an indecisive demeanor. Naturally, the third chapter gives a great deal of attention to Falkenhayn’s infamous memorandum to his Kaiser. The point taken from Falkenhayn’s lengthy memorandum is of course his proposal of an attack on Verdun, in order to “bleed them to death” (36). However, the memorandum does more than simply voice an objective, the context of the letter can be read as a demonstration of Falkenhayn’s senseless vision for strategy. Falkenhayn had some elusive scenarios for what he wished to achieve, yet no clear strategic objective, which would come back to haunt the German
According to Duffy, “The famous “oblique” attack of Frederick was therefore, no innovation, but what Old Fritz succeeded in doing was to translate the hoary old idea into an instrument of war.” This was a continues process of evolution of applying tactics to the current battlefield. Notably a skilled tactician, Frederick understood the importance of a disciplined military. This style of discipline desired was nothing short of obedience. Duffy also mentioned, “the common soldier much fear his officer more than the enemy.” Officer was to lead from the front of the formations and ensure to instill fear in soldiers, so in the time of danger, soldiers would obey the officer in charge of the
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(2001): n. a. page. Print. The. http://www.historyworld.net/about/sources.asp?gtrack=pthc>. Gascoigne, Bamber. The "World War II - The Blitz.