The Special Operations Aviation Regiment (S.O.A.R)
Introduction
Operation Eagle Claw saw the attempted use of aircraft to perform a highly sophisticated, joint force, nighttime hostage rescue in a hostile country. The mission was a failure, with only 5 of the eight RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters arriving to the forward staging area. Further exasperating the mission failure was the collision of an RH-53D and a C-130 cargo plane while conducting refueling operations for the mission, resulting in 8 casualties. Following the April 1980 failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the attempted U.S. hostage rescue in Iran, President Carter appointed Admiral James L. Holloway III, the former Chief of Naval Operations to head a commission to study
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Among the numerous findings of the report was the fact that the US Military lacked the specialized aircraft and air crewman to successfully perform these precarious types of missions. The Holloway Commission also identified the fact that there was no unified command structure, which breached the principle of unity of command. There were separate commanders for site security, ground force, landing support, C-130’s and the helicopter force (Pushies, 2005). Moreover, there was also contention over the replacement of Navy pilots with their Marine counterparts, who were more skilled in over land assault operations, but not night flying. Furthermore, questions were raised regarding the fact that there were over 100 qualified Air Force pilots that could have been chosen but were not. All of these aforementioned concerns would bring about a shift in strategy and pave the way for the creation of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, or S.O.A.R as we know them today. This concept would be tested while planning and training for the …show more content…
Only a month after the failed rescue attempt, the pilots and crews began an extremely detailed and intense training regimen which covered all aspects of what would, or could, be encountered. Pilots who flew in the early 80’s were not all proficient with night vision goggles, as they were a relatively new technology. Moreover, none of the selected pilots had any NVG experience in the UH60, which was also a new piece of equipment. Training for the selected aircrews revolved around night missions, close quarter formation flying, long range navigation, Nap of the Earth (NOE) flying and developing the art and science of NVG operations. Special emphasis was placed on long range precision navigation over desert environments. The training course an aviator had to complete was nicknamed the “Black Route” and consisted of a 10 hour long range navigation exercise and flying nearly 8 hours of it with NVG’s (Pushies, 2005). The pilot had to successfully navigate the course 3 times to be considered “qualified.” As the aviators were flying predominantly during the night, while utilizing the AN/PVS-5 NVG’s, the unit aircraft had to be up to the task as well which required extensive modifications. Some of the
The war in Afghanistan sparked numerous operations conducted by the U.S. military and its coalition forces. One of the most influential operation until today was Operation Anaconda. Fought in the Shahi-Kot Valley during early march 2002, it was the largest American battle since the Gulf War, and their first high altitude battle ever encounter. The goal of the Operation Anaconda was to eradicate the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda foothold within the eastern region of Afghanistan. Although, originally intended to last three days, Operation Anaconda lasted seventeen days instead, with seven days of intense battle. The U.S. operation Commander, Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, schemed the “hammer and anvil” plan in order to achieve his objective. However, this plan
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
The Battle of Antietam could have been a devastating and fatal blow to the Confederate Army if Gen. McClellan acted decisively, took calculated risks, and veered away from his cautious approach to war. There are many instances leading up to the battle and during the battle in which he lacks the necessary offensive initiative to effectively cripple and ultimately win the war. This paper is intended to articulate the failure of Mission Command by GEN McClellan by pointing out how he failed to understand, visualize, describe and direct the battlefield to his benefit.
Introduction Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations including Afghanistan.2 With so many different nations fighting along with our own branches of military, it would test our ability to conduct joint operations on multiple levels. History On September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden decided to “wake the sleeping giant.”
While there are several incidents of successful personnel recovery recorded throughout history, the recovery of Air Force Captain (CPT) Scott O’Grady during the Bosnian War presents an interesting study. CPT O’Grady’s personal conduct as a result of his training greatly increased his chances of being recovered. Additionally, the units involved in removing CPT O’Grady from the battlefield operated in an almost textbook fashion.
The United States launched an operation known as Operation Desert Shield, also known as the Persian Gulf War, in August of 1990 in response to Saddam Hussein’s order to the Iraqi forces to take over Kuwait. President George Herbert Walker Bush made the decision to send American troops to Saudi Arabia to form an international coalition that would eventually turn into an operation known as Operation Desert Storm. The United States Army had not witnessed an event of such international and Homefront importation since the Cold War.
The original name of “the Battle of Dieppe” was “Operation Jubilee.” By the time that the raid took place, the allies were hugely depressed because Germany took over the entire Europe; in addition, Britain failed at the battle in Africa, and the German combat planes threatened the British land. Further, Moscow, the capital of the eastern USSR, was taken over by the German army and so the USSR encountered a total collapse. As the condition became so bad, Britain came up with an idea: in order to threat Germany and to help USSR, they planned to create “the Second Front.” Hence, Britain decided to attack at Dieppe coast, which was close to the Straits of Dover, to destroy the German defensive position with the support of the combat planes. However, as Britain had never done such operation and thought that it was such an easy operation, the plan categorically failed. It is not strange to say that it, the Battle of Dieppe, was an expected failure since the German army had already known that the British Army was going to attack. In this regard, some may contend that the Battle of Dieppe was useless: “The raid was a disaster: More than 900 Canadian soldiers were killed, and thousands more were wounded and taken prisoner” (Alex Herd, 2013, para. 1). Nonetheless, it is inaccurate to say that the Operation Jubilee brought negative outcomes to British. In the long run, the failure in the Dieppe provided Britain with invaluable lessons. First, Britain realized that it was too risky to attack without the preliminary support of artillery corps. Additionally, even if it was a raid, it was not so surprising so that the German armies could easily cope with. Lastly, the British commanders should have had a proper strategy to deal with the fortifica...
The Northwest Regular Crew number six was the first to be on the scene, there objective was
...all the mistakes that took place during Operation Urgent Fury, it showed that we need to continue to conduct joint training with all the other branches. The US won the battle in Grenada and showed the world that we can be ready within just hours and assault any needed target very fast. The American people gained a sense of confidence from this conflict and I’m sure that it was a big morale booster for the American Soldiers. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General John W Vessey, said “We planned the operation in a very short period of time--in about 48 hours. We planned it with insufficient intelligence for the type of operation we wanted to conduct. As a result we probably used more force than we needed to do the job, but the operation went reasonably well....Things did go wrong, but generally the operation was a success. The troops did very well”
The operation still goes forward, and the advisors are captured by Delta Force. The Rangers and escort helicopters come under very heavy fire though One of the Ranger chalks is dropped over a block away by mistake. PFC Blackburn is heavily injured when he falls from a Blackhawk and three Humvees are used to escort him back. Blackhawk Super-Six-One is shot down by a RPG and crashes in the city. The pilot and co-pilot die on impact, two men survive, and one is mortally wounded but makes it out on another helicopter. The ground forces are told to change course and converge on the crash site but are stopped by the militia and end up getting lost within the city while taking heavy casualties. During this time two Ranger chalks reach the crash site and set up a perimeter. Another Blackhawk, Super-Six-Four, is shot down, but since the other chalk of Rangers is pinned down taking heavy casualties ground forces are unable to reach it. Four soldiers are inserted at the crash site where they discover the pilot is still alive. This other site is quickly overrun though and only one soldier is captured and taken to
September 11, 2001, was the day Islamic terrorists from Saudi Arabia and several other Arab nations carried out planned attacks in the United States on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, and the Pentagon just outside Washington, D.C. This prompted the United States to launch a war on the terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. The United States Marine Corps TF 58 fought the first battles of the war. In February 2002, the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) developed a plan to launch a major attack in a 45 square kilometer section of the Shahi Kot Valley, where there was a large concentration of enemy forces known to be (Fleri, Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003). The absence of Unity of Command made Operation Anaconda a strategic level failure due to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) not having appropriate Command and Control (C2), lack of joint planning, and inadequate staffing of the Joint Command Headquarters.
SEAL Team 6 was initially formed in reaction to the disastrous results of Operation Eagle Claw on April 24, 1980. The purpose of the mission was to rescue fifty-two hostages held captive in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran (DEVGRU/SEAL TEAM 6). The operation was very complex which was one of the reasons as to why it failed. The original plan was for Delta Force to pilot eight helicopters to Desert One, where they would refuel; after Desert One, they would all fly to Desert Two and drive to Tehran in trucks supplied by CIA agents that had already infiltrated Iranian territory. To slow down the Iranian Military’s reaction, the United States Military would disable the electricity in the area so the hostages could be rescued by additional U.S. troops (International Counter-Terrorism). Alas, to the military’s dismay, the operation was an utter failure. One of the eight planes was forced t...
In 1968, the United States Army activated the 123rd Aviation Battalion, creating a remarkable unit that was comprised of several Army assets. The design of the battalion revolutionized how assets could be combined to complete many missions by mixing infantry, signal, aviation, and support units. The 123rd’s mission ranged from was to collect intelligence, deliver supplies, insert and extract infantrymen, and provide air support. In addition to their primary mission they also participated in medical evacuation, an invaluable asset on the battlefields of Vietnam.
As a Marine, it is imperative to have leadership skills along with being capable of working with others. This book was written to enhance the reader’s mentality of how the Marines operate. It informs those who are looking into the service, and provides an in depth look into the trials and tribulations it has been through—as well as conquered. This book substantially explains the vigorous training platoon 3086 went through in order to earn the title of being a Marine.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.