On the Temporal Boundaries of Simple Experiences
ABSTRACT: I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences — those I call ‘simple experiential events’ (SEEs) — have a different character than the temporal boundaries of the events most frequently associated with experience: neural events. In particular, I argue that the temporal boundaries of SEEs are more sharply defined than those of neural events. Indeed, they are sharper than the boundaries of all physical events at levels of complexity higher than that of elementary particle physics. If correct, it follows that the most common forms of identity theory-functionalism and dualism (according to which neurophysiological (or other complex) events play key roles through identification or correlation) — are mistaken. More positively, the conclusion supports recent approaches that attempt to explain conciousness by appeal to quantum physics.
I. Introduction
A methodology that I believe has some chance of providing us with a better understanding of the nature of consciousness – or of how it could be that consciousness does not exist, if the eliminativists are right – is one in which we study our conception or picture of consciousness. Specifically, I am referring to our conception or picture of phenomenal consciousness – what one has in mind who, e.g., "gets" the mind-body problem, understands the inverted spectrum or absent qualia examples, or Nagel’s phrase that it is like something to be conscious, and so on. Such individuals, arguably, are thinking about consciousness in a more or less similar way, exploiting a similar conception or picture, similar conceptual structures. Studying such a conception should be, to a reasonable degree at least, just like studying any other conception in cognitive science. And, as with other conceptions, the effort can be a multidisciplinary one, one to which philosophers can contribute. As I said, I think following this route might lead to progress in our understanding of consciousness itself; but even if it does not, characterizing our conception of phenomenal consciousness has importance at least as a piece of psychology. In any event, it is how I am inclined to pursue the study of consciousness these days. This talk describes a small study within that broader project.
In another paper (1) I have argued that our conception of phenomenal consciousness commits us to the idea that there are simple components or elements that in some sense make up our complex phenomenal experience. Actually, it commits us to holding that either there are simples or that our complex phenomenal experience is such that – roughly put – analysis will always continue ad infinitum, no matter how a complex phenomenal experience gets carved up.
"NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2010 Edition." National Fire Protection Association. N.p., 1 Jan. 2010. Web. .
Critchley, Simon. Happy Like God. 12. Santa Barbara: University of California and Bentley University, 2012. 448-450. Print.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
[4] Guven Guzeldere (1995) 'Consciousness: What it is & how to study it' Journal of Consciousness Studies vol.2, no.1; pp. 30-51
Lyubomirsky, Sonja. The How of Happiness: A New Approach to Getting the Life You Want.
This leaves a particularly large hole in identity theory. From neural dependence and the causal problem, it is almost impractical to endorse any type of dualism. But multiple realizability makes identity theory suspect as well. Also emotional additives, and the fact that epiphenomenalism is self undermining but not impossible, lead to slight suspicion of physicalism in general. Basically, this paper set out to endorse and defend identity theory but has concluded nothing definitively.
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There are numerous altercations due to the characters utilization of disguises to deceive one another; through the interchanging role of gender, disguise and the deception of characters, Shakespeare explores gender and sexuality which ultimately result in conflict, confusion and cases of mistaken identity. T...
Have you ever wondered what it would be like to teach in a classroom full of deaf students? How would you communicate? What would you teach? This is something you would have to think about when considering a career choice in teaching. As future or current educators, it is important to think about the history of deaf education. Where did it come from? How did it start? It’s also important to know the current issues revolving deaf education and how we, as educators, may be able to help correct those issues.
The consciousness is an integrated group of experiences that require unity of two kinds, the experiences must have the characteristic of a singular subject and the consciousness that the said subject possesses regarding represented objects must be unified. The first requirement regarding experiences and consciousness seems trivial but according to Hume, for instance, what singles out a group’s experiences into an individual’s is the association with one another in a rather appropriate way, what he referred to as the bundle theory, not the presence of a common subject. The need for a subject however is derived from straight forward considerations like: representations not only mean something but they mean it to someone, and representations are nit handed down to people but to be considered so, sensory inputs have to be processed by a rather integrated cognitive system. Kant was exceedingly conscious of both points. He however called unity of consciousness both the consciousness and apperception unity. Regarding the unity of consciousness, Kant asserts that people are no conscious of single but of a great many experiences at a particular
... Critical Interpretations, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1987) 43. For further discussion on renaissance gender performance and identity politics among Shakespeare's cross-dressed heroines, see Michael Shapiro's Gender in Play on the Shakespearean Stage: Boy Heroines and Female Pages (Ann Arbor: The University of MIchigan Press, 1994).
The relationship between performance and gender is even more complex in both ‘Twelfth Night’ and ‘As You Like It’, more so than most of Shakespeare’s other plays. These complications are expressed well by Andrew Normington, the director of a recent production of ‘As You Like It’ by The Lord Chamberlain’s Men, who continue to perform Shakespeare’s works as they were originally presented, with all the characters represented by men. He writes, “A boy plays a girl, who disguises herself as a boy, and pretends to be a girl in order to woo a boy, who doesn’t k...
Stockley, Derek. “Positive Psychology and the Three Types of Happiness.” High Performance Newsletter. 3 November 2006. Web. 29 June 2010.
They suggest that Freud’s observational data consisted of a patient’s disorders and the absence of conscious contents which would appear during the psychoanalytic talking-cure. With this fundamental basis Freud formulated a theory which leads to the belief that the repressed unconscious thoughts in essence caused the disorders. (Talvitie & Tiitinen, 2006) Talvitie and Tiitinen modify the historical realm of psychoanalytic terms of repressed contents and the meta-psychology towards the present era using neurophysiological and empirical studies of consciousness, which focus more on the dynamic systems approach and one’s consciousness, memory, attention, and self. (Talvitie & Tiitinen,
Shapiro, Michael. Gender in Play on the Shakespearean Stage: Boy Heroines and Female Pages. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 1994. Print.