In our readings of Anarchy, State, and Utopia we learned of Nozick’s account of the minimal state. The minimal state is one whose only function is to protect its citizens from being hurt by force as well as protecting it from fraud and the breaking of any contracts it makes with other citizens in the state. Nozick believes that this is the only state that is justified. Any state that does more in its actions than the minimal state that Nozick describes invariably violates the rights of the people. In this paper I will first briefly explain how Nozick derives the minimal state from the original Lockean state of nature before I examine a few of the difficulties and problems that I believe arise from how Nozick forms his argument for the minimal state. These problems include non-clients to the dominant protection agency possibly having their natural rights infringed upon; non-clients abusing the system paying clients of the dominant protection agency into gaining more than just protection, and the dominant protection agency automatically having rights over other smaller agencies.
Nozick describes several different stages that come between the original Lockean state of nature and his own idea of the minimal state. The only stage that is important here however is the stage between the ultra-minimal state and the minimal state. Once people leave the original Lockean state of nature they begin the formation of protection agencies. After a while, one agency becomes dominant and, with the consent of the people that are governed, it becomes a state. Nozick states that a dominant protection agency can only be a state if it fulfills two conditions: (1) it operates a monopoly of force in its territory, not allowing any individuals to take c...
... middle of paper ...
... multiple protection agencies who have no legal or peaceful obligation to follow the larger protection agency all in the same area there can be a high chance of internal fighting and anarchy which is exactly what Nozick is trying to get away from with the creation of his Libertarian paradise.
In conclusion, even though the arguments make sense on the surface, they fail to take into account for how unpredictable the non-clients of the protection agency can be. In Nozick’s perfect Libertarian world, everyone would subscribe to one protection agency that would protect the rights of everyone. Unfortunately with everyone being free to do as they please in the state of nature, conflict is almost sure to arise. This isn’t necessarily a problem in the current state that we live in but for Nozick’s overall idea of a dominant protection agency these problems seem significant.
Ideally, all through Occidental account, lawless types of administration, for instance totalitarianism, have been deemed as tainted by description. Therefore, in case the government essence is described as justice, and in case it is appreciated that regulations are the calming energies in the public matters of men (as certainly it at all times has been from the time of Plato called upon Zeus, the boundaries god), at that moment, the trouble of the body politic movement along with the acts of its residents occurs (Arendt 366-7). Actually, this dehumanizes them to some degree. This is for the fact that as a consequence of constitutional government ‘Lawfulness’ remains a unconstructive decisive factor in to the extent that it sets the boundaries to other than not capable of explaining the human’s actions’ intention force: the enormity, except as well the confound of rules in sovereign communities is that they merely notify what one is not supposed to, other than by no means what one is supposed to do (Arendt 367). For that reason, Arendt puts downs an immense store by Montesquieu breakthrough of the code of act ruling the deeds of both administration and the individuals under it: in a democracy-virtue, in monarchy-honor, and in totalitarian government-fear (Arendt
2. Locke is a bit confused for himself about this question. Then he backs it up simply by using the results that the state of Nature brings. Locke says, “man in the state of nature is an absolute lord of his own person and possessions, though he has such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure.” This is the reason why man quits from such an idea and goes on finding a more compatible political society. The ability for the man to create such commonwealths that benefit everyone is a secure road for them to preserve their property, Locke explains.
Forward thinking John Locke described the government’s purpose in his Second Treatise on government. To this great thinker, political power is “a right of making laws…only for the public good” (Locke). This idea of organization is key to liberty. Government is made to protect the rights of a free person, not to remove or tarnish them. Thus, it is the type...
Therefore, legislation as deliberate law-making and the voice of the state of the sovereign body calls the common good of the life of man to the forefront of this question, both when democracy rules but primarily when totalitarian despots reign. The politicization of bare life as such legitimates the power of the sovereign state. But as repetitive instances of state-sponsored genocide have shown multiple times throughout the 20th century, state power can and does abuse the life of the citizen, whose life is paradoxically the force of the nation-state itself. It is through this e...
Locke states that the correct form of civil government should be committed to the common good of the people, and defend its citizens’ rights to life, health, liberty, and personal possessions. He expects that a civil government’s legislative branch will create laws which benefit the wellbeing of its citizens, and that the executive branch will enforce laws under a social contract with the citizenry. “The first and fundamental positive law of all common-wealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it.”1 Locke believes that humans inherently possess complete and i...
John Locke explains the state of nature as a state of equality in which no one has power over another, and all are free to do as they please. He notes, however, that this liberty does not equal license to abuse others, and that natural law exists even in the state of nature. Each individual in the state of nature has the power to execute natural laws, which are universal.
Locke and Rousseau present themselves as two very distinct thinkers. They both use similar terms, but conceptualize them differently to fulfill very different purposes. As such, one ought not be surprised that the two theorists do not understand liberty in the same way. Locke discusses liberty on an individual scale, with personal freedom being guaranteed by laws and institutions created in civil society. By comparison, Rousseau’s conception portrays liberty as an affair of the entire political community, and is best captured by the notion of self-rule. The distinctions, but also the similarities between Locke and Rousseau’s conceptions can be clarified by examining the role of liberty in each theorist’s proposed state of nature and civil society, the concepts with which each theorist associates liberty, and the means of ensuring and safeguarding liberty that each theorist devises.
Today’s society is reluctant to see that there must be a balance between individual rights and public order. In this paper, there are going to be several reasons on why public order is necessary and how individual rights are needed. It will explain the many elements that allow us to live in a society that has both individual rights and public order.
The writings of Locke on the subject of revolution in his second treatise of government were one of the founding and seminal texts on the “right” of a populace to resist the power of the state if a government was to overstep its defined power and become an unjust tyranny. Kant, however, took what could be labelled a surprising view for a republican and made the denial of the logical and legal coherence of this “right”, as well as the potential harm caused by the rejection of what Kant saw as an individual's moral duty in maintaining the rule of law by the preservation of a government. This essay aims to examine the arguments put forward by both thinkers, draw out their key foundations and assess their coherence with the component parts of their arguments, as well as their wider philosophy. It is my conclusion that whilst Locke's stance on the matter clearly stems from his key ideological tenets of inalienable individual rights and the duty of self preservation, Kant's argument sits uneasily with his stance on moral autonomy, as well as leaving certain areas (such as the right to resist on the grounds of injustice) untouched, and thus is lacking in both scope and coherence when placed in comparison to the writings of Locke.
Throughout history, the effects of the unequal distribution of power and justice within societies have become apparent through the failure of governments, resulting in the creation of theories regarding ways to balance the amount of power given and the way in which justice is enforced. Due to this need for change, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke created two separate theories in which the concept of a social contract is used to determine the ways in which a government can govern without forfeiting justice. In this essay, the relationship between force, morality, and rights within both theories will be investigated in order to determine the most beneficial format for society based on the ideas of the natural condition of mankind, the rights of the government, and the rights of the governed. Through this examination of ideas, a conclusion may be made concerning the ideal form of government to preside over society today.
The focus of this paper will be on criticizing the argument. He effectively explains what justifies the authority of the state by giving reasons that anarchy is better for autonomous nature of man. One might agree that the state can command an individual to obey the rule even if it is against the person’s moral beliefs. His argument, however, seems to undermine the
Nozick agrees with the liberty principle proposed by Rawls, but he disagrees with the equality principle and the fashion in which resources are distributed. I believe the historical principle of distribution is one strength of Nozick’s ideas. The historical principle of distribution states that the justice of any distribution does not depend on how closely it resembles any form of an equality pattern but how the distribution came about (959). I also agree with the theory that people are entitled to anything they acquired voluntarily and anything that is transferred to them voluntarily (958). Nozick does not agree with redistribution of wealth because taking resources from one person to benefit others is not necessarily voluntary. The biggest weaknesses of Nozick’s idea of equality comes from the idea that taxation and federally funded programs would be unjust forcing everything to be owned privately. This creates the most issues because people are self-interested and the virtue of market may not create the balance which Nozick proposed. Public school systems and public roads being deemed illegitimate would create issues with access. Also, making taxation illegal would make it difficult to have services like a police force, fire department, court system, or penal system because they would have to be paid by the individual directly. The police and court systems could become corrupt
Nozick’s central claim is that any sort of patterned distribution will have a significant effect on liberty. First, Nozick’s idea of a “patterned distribution” needs to be separated from the notion of “unpatterned distribution”. Obviously, patterned distribution adheres to an unspecific pattern. Nozick’s own theory in itself is unpatterned, a theory that suggests that each person acquisition of goods have been acquired through legitimate means. Nozick’s conception of “legitimate means” is manifested through his Entitlement Theory. The Entitlement Theory ...
Nonetheless, negative freedom does not mean that individuals should have absolute and unrestricted freedom. Classical liberals, such as J.S. Mill, believe that if freedom is unlimited it can lead to “license”, namely the right to harm others or to infringe their “natural” rights to “life, liberty and property”. In this way, Classical Liberals often support minimal restrictions on the individual so as to prevent individuals from inflicting harm upon each other. However, it should be borne in mind that Classical Liberals do not accept any constraints upon the individual that prevent him from damaging himself, physically or mentally, since the individual still remains sovereign. Such a view of freedom means that classical liberals generally advocate the establishment of a minimal or “nightwatch” state, whose role is limited to the protection of individuals from other individuals.
...nturies. Mill presents a clear and insightful argument, claiming that the government should not be concerned with the free will of the people unless explicit harm has been done to an individual. However, such ideals do not build a strong and lasting community. It is the role of the government to act in the best interests at all times through the prevention of harm and the encouragement of free thought.