In the realm of international relations, war is generally thought of as irrational, especially if two countries have perfect information of each other. Having this information allows a country to assess the distribution of power and the potential costs of war for both sides if it did indeed happen. Thus, an explanation of why war do happen between two countries is that the two countries have incomplete information of each other. The U.S.-Soviet relationship in the late 1940s are a particular case of the concept of incomplete information. This concept provides another explanation to how these two superpowers came to conflict, albeit indirectly through proxies, starting with the Korean War. An inaccurate view of another country’s objectives can fuel the potential for disputes and even war.
One example of the issue of information is the misunderstandings by the U.S. of Soviet’s intentions and vice versa. One can clearly see this divergence through a reading of America’s “Long Telegram” and the Soviet’s “Novikov Telegram.” George Kennan’s telegram’s main explanation of Soviet’s “aggressive” actions is attributed to the latter’s history of insecurity. He argued that throughout Russia’s existence, the country has been invaded and treated unfairly, especially by
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One must remember the high cost that the Soviet Union suffered in World War II, particularly by the hands of Nazi Germany. Therefore, it is understandable why Stalin would try to prevent the formation of another powerful and aggressive German state. Since the U.S. did not value the German state as threatening as the Soviet Union and valued a strong Germany as beneficial to fixing the economies of Western Europe, it pushed forward with its plan of reconstructing the country. The Americans did not take into account of its plans’ impact on the Soviet
Crockatt, Richard. The fifty years war : the United States and the Soviet Union in world politics, 1941-1991. London; New York; Routledge, 1995.
The United States and The Soviet Union were originally joined together by the want to defeat The Nazi army, in 1941-1945. The alliance remained, and strengthened, among the two until the end of World War II. At the end of World War II, a rupture between the two occurred. The differences began earlier, but there was a straw that broke the camels back. The reason The United States and The Soviet Union’s alliance did not work out is because The Soviet Union and The United States were complete opposites, The Soviet Union proved to be faulty, and they were never truly allies.
War termination and the decision of when to negotiate peace are rarely effectively planned before a war. The Russo-Japanese War is one of a few historical exceptions. The Russo-Japanese War provides three enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims. First, the most effective war termination plans are created before the war. Second, continued military and political pressure can effectively improve your position to negotiate peace. Third, common interests and compromise are required for durable peace.
After the war, the United States and the Soviet Union had very different ideas on how to rebuild. The United States, led by President Truman, wanted to form democracies in Europe and create a capitalistic society to build economically strong nations that would compliment the American economy through trade. In contrast, the Soviet Union, led by Joseph Stalin, wanted to rebuild itself and spread communism through Europe and Asia. In a desperate attempt to rebuild, many countries devastated by war fell under soviet influence and resorted to communism. The Soviet Union called these nations Satellite nations and hoped that they would serve as ?buffer? nations, preventing invasion from the west .In its efforts to defend democracy, the U.S. created the policy of containment. In this new policy, the United States would try to block Soviet influence by making alliances and supporting weaker nations. Winston Churchill described this strategy as an ?iron curtain?, which became and invisible line separating the communist from the capitalist countries in Europe. To help enforce the ideas of containment, President Truman create...
On January 9th, 1917 a message was sent from Germany to the German minister in Mexico. This message, later to be known as the Zimmermann Telegram was the final piece to a German plot to embroil the United States into a war with Mexico, Japan or both in order to cripple Allied supply lines fueling Allied operations in Europe.
Therefore, establishing anti-Bolshevism in the United States was Robert F. Kelley’s mission. Kelley an Irish Catholic trained by Russian refugees ran the Eastern European Affairs division in the State Department (Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 19). Kelley’s intense dislike for the Bolsheviks demands that his aides join actively in his views. One of his service officers is George F. Kennan who joins in the close observation of Bolshevik destabilizing and expansionist activities that cause unrest in Mexico, Nicaragua, Cuba, Spain and Greece (Leffler, The Specter of Communism, 19). Was Kennan’s containment strategy thinking set off with Kelley’s training? Was Kennan’s awareness of the ongoing Russian Communist activities the basis for his ideas? History proves that George Kennan’s ideas on containment were the basis of NSC-68 and...
Despite the appearance of goodwill exhibited in Khrushchev’s speeches, a Western leader would be inherently skeptical of the Stalin crony as he attempts to gain and maintain power over the Soviet Union and his own party. An obvious politician, Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence” and “Secret Speech” in February 1956 served to distance him from the unpopular and failing Stalinist approach of communist control. His rhetoric, however, remains no less expansionist than his predecessor. Specifically, in his comments on “peaceful coexistence”, Khrushchev emphasized the ultimate triumph of the socialist system, but concedes that military intervention alone will not achieve such a victory (Judge & Langdon, 339). Rhetoric aside, one must consider Khrushchev’s
However, evidence that is presented may indicate otherwise, as Joseph Stalin provides adequate counter claims for discrediting the “simplicity” of “yes”. Within this controversial topic, two authors provide their sides of the story to whom is to blame and/or responsible for the “Cold War.” Authors Arnold A. Offner and John Lewis Gaddis duck it out in this controversial situation as each individual leads the readers to believe a certain aspect by divulging certain persuading information. However, although both sides have given historical data as substance for their claim, it is nothing more than a single sided personal perception of that particular piece of information; thus, leaving much room for interpretations by the reader/s. Finding the truth to either claim is the obligation of the reader and outside research would accommodate the authors potential inadequacies and personal fallacies.... ...
During the late 1940's and the 1950's, the Cold War became increasingly tense. Each side accused the other of wanting to rule the world (Walker 388). Each side believed its political and economic systems were better than the other's. Each strengthened its armed forces. Both sides viewed the Cold War as a dispute between right and wron...
As long as Soviet leaders clung to their dream of imposing Communism on the world, the West had no way (other than surrender) of ending the conflict.”. In fact, one could argue that the first interpretation of the origins of the Cold War was made by policy maker George Kennan. In 1947, under the pseudonym Mr. X, he published the article ‘Sources of Soviet Conduct’.... ... middle of paper ...
The realism that will be the focus of this paper is that of Kenneth Waltz. Kenneth Waltz presents his theory of realism, within an international system, by offering his central myth that, “Anarchy is the permissive cause of war”. Kenneth Waltz’s central myth helps answer the question as to why war happens in the first place. During the cold war, there was a heightened sense of insecurity between Russia and the United States due to presence of nuclear weapons. The Movie Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb used cold war tension between the two countries to tell the story of a general who went crazy and decided to unleash his fleet of nuclear bombers onto Russian military bases.
The cold war was failed by the Soviet Union for many reasons, including the sudden collapse of communism (Baylis & Smith, 2001.) This sudden collapse of communism was brought on ultimately by internal factors. The soviet unions president Gorbachev’s reforms: glasnost (openness) and perestroika (political reconstructering) ultimately caused the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Gorbachev’s basics for glasnost were the promotion of principles of freedom to criticize; the loosening of controls on media and publishing; and the freedom of worship. His essentials of perestroika were, a new legislature; creation of an executive presidency; ending of the ‘leading role’ of the communist party; allowing state enterprises to sell part of their product on the open market; lastly, allowing foreign companies to own Soviet enterprises (Baylis & Smith, 2001.) Gorbachev believed his reforms would benefit his country, but the Soviet Union was ultimately held together by the soviet tradition he was trying to change. The Soviet Union was none the less held together by “…powerful central institutions, pressure for ideological conformity, and the threat of force.
The Cuban Missile Crisis exhibits the struggle for power between the two dominant powers of the time. The realist theory believes that world politics is a repetitive struggle for power and or influence. Power, in politics is largely perceived as influence and military capability. Power in mass amounts are located in objects such as nuclear missiles that have an immense influence on others. (Schmidt, 2007; Sterling-Folker & Shinko, 2007). This is clearly depicted through the actions taken by both leaders, as the simple placement of a missile had such a tremendous effect.
Taubman, William. Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War. New York: Norton, 1982. Print.
In the real world, the threat of nuclear war gave the people of both America and the Soviet Union a raw realization of the possibility of a barren and dead world, such as the world in Endgame. In Russia in 1957, it was noted that the “big guns” were as equally belonging to the Communist East, as to the Democratic West. Regarding Soviet Communism, a reporter for the New York Times commented, “Since 1945 United States foreign policy has been forced to concern itself with one major threat to the peaceful and orderly development of the kind of international community the American people desire” (Cold War). America was seen worldwide as having the main responsibility of facilitating an ...