Limits of the Prime Minister

Limits of the Prime Minister

The formal constitutional powers listed in the previous answer 'The

powers of the Prime Minister' are subject to a number of restraints in

practice, which means that the British PM is not as powerful as often

assumed, or as commonly alleged by critics. The large number of main

constraints are as follows:

Constraints on the power of patronage

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Ø If the party has been in opposition, then the first Cabinet

appointed after a general election victory is usually the shadow

cabinet.

Ø Some MPs will have such extensive experience or authority that they

can hardly be omitted

Ø Some MPs have sizeable backbench followings. Omitting them from the

cabinet might lead to dissatisfaction on the backbenches, possibly in

the form of 'cabals' or factions which might eventually lead to a

leadership challenge. At the very least, disgruntled MPs might

withhold their support in parliamentary votes ('divisions') on the

government policies and Bills.

Ø The cabinet needs to be reasonably 'balanced', meaning that it must

include ministers from the different ideological sections of the

parliamentary party

Ø Some MPs are too young and inexperienced to include while others may

be approaching the end of their parliamentary careers or they might

indicate that they no longer wish to hold ministerial office.

Ø Frequent ministerial reshuffles are also likely to reflect poorly on

the Prime Minister, suggesting either a sense of panic or rising

doubts about their political judgement in appointing ministers who are

then rapidly (re)moved

Constraints on dealing with...

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...ave to be appointed to the Cabinet by virtue of their popularity and

stature in the wider party. Prescott is an example, again. So too is

Tony Benn who served in the cabinet in the late 1970s. Prime Ministers

Wilson and Callahan felt obliged to appoint him because of his

widespread popularity, even though they did not agree with his view.

Third, PMs sometimes decide that it is wise to offer a backbench rebel

a ministerial appointment in order to muzzle them. And fourth, on

occasion, an attempt to 'punish' an MP by refusing to allocate them a

ministerial post can ultimately prove counter-productive. Realising

this, a PM may be reluctant to take such a step.

So, however formidable the Prime Ministers formal constitutional

powers appear to be, they are, in practice, subject to a variety of

constraints and circumstances.