Juvenile Death Penalty Case Study

The punishment of juveniles by execution is a longstanding practice in our nation’s history. Throughout the last few decades, the U.S. Supreme court has been asked to determine if the execution of a juvenile, sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of the offense, represents cruel and unusual punishment. In various rulings, the U.S. Supreme court has interpreted cruel and unusual punishment to include penalties that are excessive, not proportioned to the offense, and those that do not consider the defendant’s degree of criminal culpability. One case in particular that addresses the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment for juveniles is the landmark court case Roper v. Simmons.

The background facts of the case began in 1993, when

Crook to prevent his arrest, combined with the brutal, inhumane nature of the killing that followed a botched burglary. In response, Simmons defense counsel emphasized his lack of any prior charges or convictions and his close, loving relationship with family members (Scott, 2005). His defense counsel also asked the jury to consider Simmons age as a mitigating factor, noting that juveniles were not legally allowed to drink, serve on a jury, or see certain movies because they were not considered old enough to assume those responsibilities. With all things considered, the jury recommended the death sentence, which was imposed by the judge (Scott, 2005). Unhappy with the ruling in his case, Simmons appealed his conviction, arguing that he had received inadequate assistance of counsel because additional information regarding his difficult home background, impulsivity, and susceptibility to being easily influenced by others were not adequately presented at the sentencing hearing. Simmons petition for postconviction relief was denied by the trial court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri (Scott, 2005). In 2001, Simmons petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, which was also denied by the federal courts. In the following year, Simmons submitted a new petition for postconviction relief arguing that the Supreme Court’s reasoning for prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on those declared with mental retardation should also be applied to juveniles (Scott, 2005). Simmons argued this because the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia, that the execution of a person with mental retardation was prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with Simmons based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior ruling in Stanford, which lead to the development of a national consensus against