Introduction
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
Joint Sustainment, Principles, and Imperatives
Joint Publication 3.0 entitled Joint Operations, defines Joint Sustainment as the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint Publication 4-0 further states, “Effective joint logistics planning identify future requirements and proposes solutions; it requires joint logisticians to understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS).” Logisticians use seven principles in their planning at the strategic, operational, or tactical level of war to ensure operations are logistically supportable. These principles are responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability,...
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...ttp://www.war44.com/misc/images/5/ WWII_Mulberry_harbour.jpg. Accessed March 25, 2014.
. JP 4-0, xvi
. F.A. Osmanski, The Logistical Planning of Operation OVERLORD.” Military Review Vol. XXIX No. 8, (November 1949) accessed at http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p124201coll1/id903 (accessed 23 Oct 2013) p.41
. Krysa, John C., Operational Planning in the Normandy Campaign, 1944, p.25-26. Vessels were used as sorties dropping forces at the beach and returning to England for additional forces, supplies, and equipment.
. Bowden, Mark, D-Day: June 6, 1944, 2002, p.5. The aircraft industry built 800 planes in 1939 and reached 8000 per month in 1943.
. Ibid., 21
. Matthew D. Cox, “Virtual Library Logistics: Logistics Quotations,” “Logistics World”, September 4, 1999. Accessed February 21, 2014), http://www.logisticsworld.com/logistics/ quotations.htm.
Strategy depends on numerous analytical factors and some of these present challenges to planners. This essay will identify some of these challenges that strategists encountered during WWII. Moreover, it will present strategy as a fluid process requiring refinement throughout.
All solution chosen is essential to addressing the issues unit’s faces with their phrase maintenance program while deployed in a combat theater. The proposed solutions must be implemented simultaneously in order to be effective.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Cameron, R. S. (2003). The army vision: The 4th AD in world war II. Military Review, 83(6), 59-68
The 1944 Allied landing at Normandy met a strong, networked German defense that initially disrupted the timing of the invasion, slowed down the Allied advance, and inflicted extensive casualties. The German shore defenses were a result of extensive preparations that began when the German High Command appointed Field Marshal Rommel to defend the western European coast. Rommel believed the best strategy against an Allied inv...
Although Operation Overlord was a successful invasion, the leaders did a poor job in planning and losses were heavier than they needed to be. In the combining of strong American, British, and Canadian armies, the control of leadership became a problem at D-Day and affected the major decisions made for battles. One of the reasons for so many fatalities of Americans during D-Day was due to the lack of preparations and planning while using new boats and tanks in the treacherous waters. Another problem occurred during the use of the airplane bombings, and the affects that it has on the rest of the battle. The execution of Operation Overlord demonstrates poor planning through the struggles of the leadership control, through lack of preparation for the tides of the seas, and the allied forces’ poorly planned aerial attacks.
Another term associated with D-Day is landing craft. There were six different types of landing craft used on D-Day, including the LCVP, which stands for Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel and carried thirty-two men ashore; the LCA, which was an armored wooden craft that delivered troops; and the LCI, which carried one hundred fifty-eight small landing craft, each delivering two hundred troops.
Allied war planners with the vital information about the enemy preparedness for the Russians to
Farrell, Kevin W. "The Battle Of The Bulge." Army Magazine 63.12 (2013): 34-38. Military & Government Collection. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
In late November 2001 Task Force 58 launched from ships off the coast of Pakistan to conduct the longest ranged amphibious assault in history with 403 Marines and Sailors, 4 fast-attack vehicles, and a variety of supporting equipment,. General James N. Mattis successfully accomplished this in large part to the effective execution of mission command. Commanders can utilize mission command as a philosophy or a warfighting function. Mission command as a philosophy is the use of commander's intent and mission orders to empower agile and adaptive leaders. It enables commanders to counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty required to act in a given situation. Commanders build cohesive teams, provide a clear commander's intent and guidance, encourage the use of disciplined initiative, and use mission orders through the operations process to effectively use mission command as a philosophy. Commanders drive this operations process using mission command through six steps. First, they must understand the operational environment and the problem. Second, a commander must visualize his desired end state and operational approach. Third, he must describe that visualization to subordinates using time, space, purpose, and resources. Fourth, commanders must direct forces throughout preparation and execution. Finally, through each of the first four steps, commanders need to lead through purpose and motivation and assess through continuous monitoring and evaluation. General Mattis successfully utilized mission command as a philosophy by understanding, visualizing, leading, describing, and assessing through the operations process as the commander of Naval Task Force 58.
Lawson, Robert L., and Barrett Tillman. U.S. Navy Air Combat: 1939-1946. Osceola, WI: MBI Pub., 2000. Print.
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
For me, using Ruppenthal’s paper as the primary source for answering this question, I find it interesting that logistics were the primary factor behind Eisenhower’s decision to develop the “broad front strategy”. My preconceived notions, or bias’s, going into this argument were that spreading things out, or making your fronts “broader”, would create a greater strain on logistics vice make this easier. Also, I did not factor in planning criteria that would have been specific to WWII and the European theatre. To better understand the situation, I wanted to see how this dilemma came to fruition: “direct outcome of the earlier decisions by which logistic considerations had been subordinated repeatedly to the enticing prospects which beckoned
Coyle, J., Langley, C., Gibson, B., Novack, R. and Bardi, E. (2008).Supply Chain Management: A Logistics Perspective. 8th ed. Cengage Learning, p.366.