Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy In Nicaragua

Jimmy Carter’s administration took a very different approach, in regards to foreign policy, then that of his predecessors. As president, Carter displayed his southern gentleman roots by valuing human and civil rights over American interests. He conducted several missteps in third world countries at a point in time when the threat of the Soviet Union was always looming. Carter’s moral approach both damaged and weakened credibility to our foreign policy in Latin America.
An example of Carter’s foreign policy failure in Latin America is Nicaragua and the Somoza regime. Nicaragua was a small nation led by a man who had not been selected by free elections, and was confronted by radical, violent opponents bent on social and political revolution.

He foolishly held the belief that it was possible for the United States to democratize autocratic governments, anytime and under any circumstances. As violence spread throughout Nicaragua, American officials began to wonder about the viability of a government that lacks the support of its own people. Because of the absence of an opposition party and numerous civil-rights violations, there was a question of the morality of continuing aid to a dictatorship. The President proclaimed to the world that the United States desired only for the people to choose their own form of government. He blocked all delivery of arms to the Somoza government and undertook negotiations to establish a coalition headed by a moderate critic of the regime who would seek an end to the conflict. The price of resisting American demands would include dealing with the strength of opponents, who continued to receive support long after the United States cut off Somoza military

During this time period, the United States remained stagnant and witnessed a dramatic Soviet Union military buildup, and extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean. By not supporting the Somoza regime, the United States failed to protect its many long term interests including the Cold War strategy of containment. Unlike the anti-communist and American friendly government, the insurgent leaders had long ties to the Communist movement, and most of their arms were of Soviet, Chinese, or Czechoslovak origin. Nicaragua had the potential to turn into a second Cuba as even the State Department knew that the top Sandinista leaders had close personal ties and continuing contact with Havana. It was widely acknowledged that a Cuban secret-police official, Julian Lopez, was frequently present in the Sandinista headquarters and that Cuban military advisers were present in Sandinista ranks. The removal of the Somoza regime equated to the drastic increase in the likelihood of the spread of communism in Latin