Inherent Jurisdiction Case Study

QUESTION 1

Section 173 states The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests of justice. Civil procedure as applied in the superior courts does not depend solely on statutory provisions and the rules of court. Because of this, the superior courts are sometimes said to exercise an ''inherent jurisdiction''. This refers to the superior courts may do anything that the law does not forbid section of the statement. When it is said that a court exercises ''inherent jurisdiction'', this simply means that its jurisdiction is derived from common law and not from statute (although statute, in certain cases, may limit or increase this jurisdiction). One of the implications of a superior court exercising its inherent jurisdiction is that it has a discretion in regard to its own procedure. In other words, a court may condone any procedural mistakes or determine any point of procedure.

On the other hand we have the inferior courts, Magistrates' courts, Small claims courts and Other bodies vested with judicial or quasi-judicial powers. ‘whereas inferior courts may do nothing which the law does not permit’. The lower courts do not have inherent jurisdiction. The reason for this is that they derive their powers from the particular statute which created them such as Magistrates' courts that have been established in terms of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944, Small claims courts that have limited jurisdiction and are conducted according to simplified procedures to hear minor civil claims in terms of the Small Claims Courts Act of 61 of 1984, Because of this, lower courts are sometimes c...

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...uires the partnership to state who all the partners were at the time the cause of action arose. S28(1)(b). It provides that a partnership can be sued in any area where it has business premises or where one of the partners resides

d) although s30 specifically empowers a magistrate’s court to grant interdicts, It is clear that a mandatory interdict could be viewed as a form of specific performance and so prohibited by section 46(2)(c), because an order to perform an act is frequently very similar to an order for specific performance. However, in Badenhorst v Theophanous 1988 (1) SA 793 (C), it was held that magistrates’ courts may nevertheless grant mandatory interdicts, provided that such orders do not amount to “orders ad factum praestandum in terms of a contractual obligation”. In terms of this V’s the magistrate’s court is competent to exercise jurisdiction.