Hilary Putnam And Putnam's Theory Of The Nature Of Mind

In this essay, the main focus will be on functionalism and its theory from the philosopher Hilary Putnam. This essay will explain what functionalism is and will show examples of functionalism, and how it is used daily in people’s lifestyles. Putnam’s theory is ingenious, but has its flaws, which will be explained in more detail down below. The philosopher Frank Jackson has an objection towards functionalism and theory of the mind as a whole. I do believe that functionalism can provide a complete account of the nature of mind, but Putnam has minor flaws in his theory and my reasoning’s come from Jackson’s theory. My objection towards Putnam’s theory is towards the lack of experience; if there is a lack of experience then, there is no functionalism,

The way people feel and act towards something or someone is from their previous experiences and their mental states. The definition of functionalism is what makes something a desire, pain, and a thought, but you cannot think, desire, or feel pain without a physical experience with it. In conclusion, my objection is lack of experience towards Putnam’s theory of functionalism. Putnam and Jackson’s theory, both have great arguments, but Jackson’s objection towards Putnam’s theory raises questions about his theory. The questions that it raises are, “How can experience not change a person? Did Putnam think that people's mental state never change through their experiences?” I do believe that functionalism can provide a complete account of the nature of mind, but Putnam has minor flaws in his theory that has to do with experience. I agree with Putnam that all functional states are mental states and if you're in pain, it does not mean that your brain is in pain, but I also believe that our experiences lead us to our thoughts, desires, and pains and that are what makes people behave the way that they do. I have proved my thesis by showing the reader both sides of the argument and showing where their theories clash together. My objection was to show that experience and functionalism are somehow connected, and without experience it will be difficult to understand what functionalism