Gorgias Analysis

The underlying explanation for the apparent discrepancy between the character Socrates’ stance on politics in the Gorgias – that he is amongst the few that practice true politics (Gorg. 521 D) – and in the Apology – that he does not practice what is often viewed as politics (Ap. 31 E) – is reliant upon the subtle distinction that Socrates makes between those two fields; between what politics truly is and the art of politics as it is commonly practiced. Further, this distinction itself is heavily reliant upon the role of ῥητορικός, or lack thereof, in the art of common politics and in the practicing of politics itself. This is made quite clear in the Gorgias.

Throughout the διάλογος, Socrates repeatedly questions Gorgias on the usage ῥητορικός. Specifically, Socrates inquires of Gorgias both to clarify what ῥητορικός is concerned with (Gorg. 451 D-453 A), and with what ῥητορικός can be used for (Gorg. 456 A-C). With regards to the former, the interrogation results in a declaration that ῥητορικός is concerned with persuasion, an example of this being

463 C-E) – much in the same way that cookery creates a semblance of the τέχνη of medicine and that self-adornment creates a semblance of the τέχνη of gymnastics (Gorg. 464 B-E). He defines all of these semblances as deviating from their truer forms – that is, that cookery deviates from medicine and self-adornment deviates from gymnastics as common politics deviates from true politics – in that they take part in flattery, rather than addressing the matters themselves (Gorg. 463 B). To Socrates, true politics – similarly to medicine and gymnastics – concerns attending to the actual issues of the matters at hand, rather than discussing semblances of them. This is further emphasized through Socrates’ discussion with Callicles on the power of rhetoric and