Ford Pinto Case Study

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In the summer of 1967, Ford Motor Company began the development of a new car that would place it in the small-car market (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 1). This automobile was named the Ford Pinto and would grow to become its biggest-selling subcompact vehicle (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 2). Back in the mid-1960s, Ford’s then president had been involved in a collision that resulted in his car’s fuel tank bursting into flames (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 1). With this occurrence, one would have imagined that the company would become aware of the fuel tank danger associated with collisions, however the reverse was the case. The new Pinto had been fitted with a fuel tank that was just 9 inches from its rear axle (Gary T. Schwartz, 1990, p. 1013) and in the event of
At the time, German car manufacturer, Volkswagen, held the largest share in the American subcompact car market therefore; Lee Iacocca insisted that Ford put out its own alternative to the Volkswagen Beetle (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 4). Lee Iacocca was the instigator of the Pinto’s production, and later became the president of Ford Motor Company. He wanted the Pinto out in the market and he wanted it done quickly. This gave rise to the value of time in the production of the car. The Mother Jones article written by Mark Dowie reported that the production-planning period of the Pinto was probably the shortest in modern automotive history (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 4). The Pinto had a period of just twenty-five months compared to the traditional forty-three months period (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 4). The value of profit was also at play and perhaps Ford’s strongest one. It would have been a taboo to do anything that potentially compromised this financial value, and this led to the company prioritizing cost over the safety of its customers. In the Mother Jones article, the writer stated that if the benefit of a modification such as one that would promote safety, cost greater than such benefit, the project was not worth it to Ford — no matter the benefit (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 8). This gave rise to the cost-benefit analysis Ford abided by. Iacocca was popularly known for saying “Safety doesn’t
5). He should have decided to give this limit adequate flexibility to make room for design alterations such as the rubber bladder for the gas tank that could potentially exceed the two thousand limits. That way, not only would the vehicle effectively compete against cars that had similar safeties in place, he would have promoted a value for safety, which in turn would promote the vehicle’s reliability. Iacocca and other top officials should have also decided to own up to the fuel tank’s design error in the wake of the casualties it caused. It was wrong of them to blame it on the drivers and highway conditions (Mark Dowie, 1977, p. 8), rather than take full responsibilities for the rupture-prone tanks. Iacocca should have decided to recall the fire prone Pintos that were in service, and had the rubber bladders installed to remedy the dangers it presented. This would have promoted values of accountability and integrity for the vehicles Ford put out in the

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