Factors Affecting Congressional Oversight

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Variables Impacting Congressional Oversight As the oversight literature covers a broad expanse of topics in regards to it, it is best to start with one of the earliest articles on congressional oversight written in 1966. John Bibby in his observational study of Congress tries to find when a committee will engage in oversight and when they will shirk those duties and why? Bibby lays the groundwork for an analysis of congressional oversight specifically the features and degree of oversight activity. Bibby finds that these factors will determine Congresses engagement in oversight. The methods that Bibby uses are different than those that come later in the study of congressional oversight in that he does not use any type of model but uses observations …show more content…

Even though fire-alarm oversight most likely ends in a hearing that does not mean that the hearing will not get the proper responsiveness from executive branch officials. As mentioned in the previous section this lessons the deterrent effect of fire-alarm oversight (Feinstein 2011). This leads to the conclusion that fire-alarm oversight should not check the box of congress actually performing their oversight duties. McCubbins, Noll and Weingast come to similar conclusion about how effective congress actually is in their oversight. Their work is based on the premise that members of congress, bureaucrats, and the president all have personal policy preferences that more than likely will conflict with each other. If there is not effective control than the bureaucracies will project their own preferences that are not aligned with congresses, which is when oversight needs to happen, if it has failed to this point. The deterrence effect of oversight is determined by the likelihood of punishment. A system of reward and punishment they say is also unlikely to deter noncompliance because of the information gap inherent in the system. If the agent who is specializing in an issue has more complete information on the policy it makes agency discretion harder to detect (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast …show more content…

Monitoring and sanctions are the more costly of oversight functions and the least likely to be used; they also do not ensure that the noncompliance problem will end. (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987) This follows with McCubbins and Schwartz who theorize that members of congress do not neglect monitoring and their oversight functions but that they prefer the fire-alarm policing in which citizens tend to alert them to problems because it allows them to also do their legislative work (1984). Monitoring along with its economic costs also has political costs if an action that an agency takes in its noncompliance creates a new political interest then by sanctioning them members can incur political costs that would not have otherwise been present with proper anticipation and prevention. (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987) Anticipatory prevention of noncompliance is a form of latent control that congress can exercise that is more effective; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast develop a theory that includes this finding, “Latent oversight is, by definition, never observed; but its role in implementing political control over the agency is in principle just as important as that of active control (Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast, 1989).” This often occurs when the agent fears sanction in the case of this theory developed the veto, this point would

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