McCaulley v. Nebraska Furniture Mart, Inc. Court of Appeals of Nebraska 21 Neb.App. 125, 838 N.W.2d 38 (2013) Facts: In April 2008, Richard and Michelle McCaulley went to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Inc. (NFM) to buy some furniture. The items selected were to be special ordered by NFM and the total price was quoted at $10,770.70 through the phone by a sales associate. The McCaulleys accepted the price and paid a deposit of $3,500 by credit card. However, no documents were signed to finalize the deal and the salesperson did not mention any additional terms of conditions regarding pricing errors. Later, the McCaulleys received an invoice of $13,240.70 for an order on May 6th 2008. Michelle called NFM to complain and was sent a revised invoice of $10,840.70 which was still more expensive, but she accepted it. In August 2008, NFM sent the McCaulleys another invoice of $14,550 and told them that NFM did not have to honor the agreement, because of the pricing error and a provision concerning this error printed in the back of the invoices the McCaulleys received. NFM eventually refunded the deposit to the McCaulleys’ credit card without informing them. On September 26th 2008, the McCaulleys filed a complained to seek declaratory relief and damages on the basis that NFM breached the sales contract. On October 24th 2008, NFM answered that the pricing error clause on the invoices invalidated the complaint and the fact that Richard and Michelle took no action to retender the deposit led to the rescission of the contract. In April 27th 2012, the district court ruled in favor of NFM. The McCaulleys appealed, alleging that there were several errors in the trial court’s judgment regarding the terms and conditions in the parties’ sales contract. ... ... middle of paper ... ...e a loss otherwise. The management’s lack of legal knowledge might have led them to assume that it was the McCaulleys’ responsibility to read all the terms and conditions, and simply refunding the deposit would satisfy these terms. In my opinion, NFM, like many other businesses, may have believed in consumers’ naivety. NFM did not foresee that the McCaulleys would bring the issue to court and appeal the trial court’s decision. The company managers did not follow the golden rule of treating others like they would like to be treated, and failed to consider the public disclosure test and the universalization test. As a result, the McCaulleys received only frustration in return for their patience in doing business with NFM. Had NFM had a clear formal policy about representing the contract terms to customers prior to billing them, the situation would have been different.
This case study examines various real estate contracts – the Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) and two addendums labeled Addendum No. 1 and Addendum No. 2 – pertaining to the sale of 1234 Cul-de-sac Lane in Orem, Utah. The buyers in this contract are 17 year old Jon D’Man and 21 year old Marsha Mello; the seller is Boren T. Deal. The first contract created was Jon and Marsha’s offer to purchase Boren’s house. This contract was created using the RESC form, which was likely provided by their real estate agent as it is the required form for real estate transactions according to Utah state law. The seller originally listed the house on a Multiple Listing Service (MLS); Jon and Marsha agreed that the asking price was too high for the neighborhood (although we are not given the actual listing price), and agreed to offer two-hundred and seven-thousand dollars ($207,000) and an Earnest Money Deposit of five-thousand dollars ($5,000). Additionally, the buyers requested that the seller pay 3% which includes the title insurance and property taxes. After the REPC form was drafted, the two addendums were created. Addendum No. 1 is from the seller back to the buyer, and Addendum No. 2 is the buyer’s counteroffer to the seller.
In my opinion, if the jury in this case subtracted the contractual claims against the profits, they would have arrived at different damage/entitlement amounts. My guess is Main Line would have been entitled to much less than what was awarded in this case.
This case arose when I went out of town on my first business trip. I have been a sales trainee for the last six weeks, and my supervisor felt it was time to send me out. I was lucky enough to get sent with the number one sales rep for the company, Vince Collier. I was excited because I knew that if I was going to learn the best ways to make a sale, it would be with Vince.
Plaintiff alleged that Green Tree violated the Truth in Lending Act, by failing to disclose as a finance charge the vendor’s single interest insurance requirement. Also she alleged that Green Tree Financial violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, by requiring her to arbitrate her statutory causes for action.
I, Marshall Peterson, am seeking resolution and restitution of damages for breach of contract by the producers of the Muscadine product line. Such contracts that have been violated have been the Good Faith and Fair Dealings relationship developed over the years and also the Requirement Contract said company and I signed quite some time ago stating a guaranteed price schedule that has stayed consistent since the beginning of the business relationship.
Instead of executing the release, Andrew Ross, a construction manager with Bent Tree, responded with a request for $124,191.29. In this request, Mr. Ross stated that their cost for the damages was greater than what was currently being offered. The claimant provided additional invoices that were later reviewed by the independent adjuster. Mr. Rushziky’s review of the estimates found that there is an $8,364.87 difference at Replacement Cost.
11. The Plaintiffs received no notice of the alleged sale of our loan from MSIII to Allquest. Other than the Allonge that is not affixed to the loan docs, there is
He remained an undischarged bankrupt when the proceedings were commenced against the respondent. The judge of the original trial struck out the appellant’s claims for damages, declaring it a nullity from the outset as the relief sought was vested in the appellant’s trustee in bankruptcy. The appellant made an appeal to the Court of Appeal, who stayed the decision, pending the completion of the trial. The trial resumed, subject to the outcome of the appeal regarding the appellant’s bankruptcy. The trial court found that the appellant was entitled to a 24-month notice period for termination, and the appellant was awarded damages for wrongful dismissal and aggravated damages in the amount of $15,000 for mental distress, for both tort and contract. However, the appellant was not awarded punitive damages. With regard to the bankruptcy issue, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, concluding that the appellant was within his legal rights to continue the action without a trustee. The Court of Appeal also allowed a cross-appeal by the respondent, which saw the reasonable notice period reduced from 24 months to 15 months. The appeal court also overturned the trial court’s award of aggravated
Bernard had intended to buy the materials at a lower cost by presenting a counter offer of $150.00 which voids the initial offer Alan made. Even after Alan reverted on Bernard’s reply by rejecting the counter offer, he mailed out $200.00 cash to Alan which was received on November 5, 2015. Alan then provided the textbook on November
In this case a purchaser of an electric clothes dryer brings a law suit against Whirlpool (the manufacturer of the dryer) and Sears (the seller of the dryer) for fire damages that caused the purchasers home and possessions to burn down. The purchaser sued Whirlpool for negligence in the manufacturing of the dryer, and Sears for breach of implied warranty for merchantability. The case then moved to trial, and Whirlpool and Sears both motioned for a directed verdict. The motion was granted to Whirlpool, but not to Sears.
I have been given full authority to resolve this matter with Mr. Napier. After agreeing to the above chain of events, Mr. Napier still contends that he is entitled to full compensation as his contractual obligations were fulfilled. PADD is willing to compromise and pay a portion of the fee. However, because of the nightmare that Mr. Napier’s misconduct caused, is not willing to pay the contract in full. The compromise set forth in the negotiations are: PADD will pay Mr. Napier $5,000 and Mr. Napier will release a statement saying in part that he is not in any way affiliated with the non- profit
In the Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. case the contract should remain enforceable because the financial responsibility of the consumer should fall on the consumer alone. Williams should not have purchased more items than Williams could afford. The contract was not overly bias favoring Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., and a reasonable consumer would agree to the terms and conditions of the contract, therefore the contract was not unconscionable. The contract between Williams and Walker-Thomas Furniture should be enforceable, the defense of unconscionability is not applicable.
Since the Court found that Jacob & Youngs had substantially preformed the contract, and that the cost to remedy to damages unreasonable, Kent is entitled to be compensated the difference in value between the reading manufacture pipe specified in the contract and the pipe that was actually installed.
Handy Andy, Inc., a maker of trash compactors, had a problem with how the distribution of their products was being done by distributors and retailers alike. The company made two models of trash compactors the standard and the deluxe, the latter having more capacity thus a higher price. The distribution of the trash compactor to the end user worked like this, a customer makes an order for a trash compactor through a licensed retailer, once the order is made the retailer buys from the distributor to fulfil that order and then delivers it to the customer. The initial agreement between Handy Andy Inc. and the distributors was based on delivering and installing all units in a period of 5 days after an order was made by a retailer, as compensation
Smith and Jones may have recorded transactions in the books and records to make payments appear to be for approved vendors when the checks were actually made payable to their personal creditors. While there was an internal control policy in place regarding invoice payments greater than $5,000, Jones and Smith appear to bypass or ignore this policy. Smith and Jones may have created fictitious invoices in the names of approved vendors for Moss’ review before issuing checks in a different name, such as Neiman Marcus or Saks Fifth Avenue. Smith and Jones may have created fictitious vendors in the books and records to receive payments and then opened bank accounts in these vendors’ names to receive checks.