Essay On Personal Identity

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A person can be physically identifiable based on the matter they are composed of but their Personal Identity is far more than that. Despite any changes such as mentality and physical change, referred to as qualitatively changes, a person remains who they are. The philosophical question is, What it is to have a personal Identity? There are different theories discussing what is necessary and sufficient to define an individual's personal identity. So is there any theory that has truly capture the essence of what it is like to have a personal identity? The problem with personal identity is not knowing what makes a person themself. Matter cannot be what makes a person completely them. What makes a person thierself goes beyond a physical A cobbler and a prince wonder what it would be like to live the other's life. Their psychologies are swapped by altering their brain states. After the swap, they both think of themselves as being who they previously were. Being that they have their previous memories and character traits. According to Spatiotemporal Continuity, they are not who they previously were. Although, the prince now in the cobbler's body retained his psychology after the swap, he is still consider the cobbler. If the prince had committed a crime, knowing the swap would occur, then prince would get away with the crime once in the cobbler's body and the cobbler now in the prince's body would be prosecuted of a crime he had no knowledge about. Locke presents Psychological Continuity as an alternative to the problem . Locke says that that the person in the cobbler's body is to be prosecute since he sustains the prince’s psychology. Bernard Williams argues that since it is simple to alter the brain to change psychology, than psychology could be easily duplicated. If psychology continuity is personal identity, then there could be two numerically same persons. Now, duplication problem has to be considered, for there can not be two numerically same people. Psychological sameness would make two individuals qualitatively alike but they would still remain numerically

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