Descartes Antecedent's Scepticism

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Hume defines ‘antecedent’ scepticism from another version of scepticism, which is ‘consequent’ to science and enquiry . Proper doubts, according to Hume, are consequent on enquiry, not antecedent to it; such doubts are what sceptics attempt to generate. Hume is right that consequent scepticism is a threat to belief, however, fails to see Cartesian scepticism as consequent: Descartes never claims blindly that our beliefs might be false, that our belief formation processes might lead us astray – he always tells a story. These stories are based on what he thinks himself to have learnt of the external world by using said methods, about how reasoning that involves them might actually lead one astray. The evil demon works as a sceptical device for Descartes, because he takes himself to know of powerful, supernatural beings; just as the more contemporary example of a brain in a vat works for us, as experience has given us information about the ‘physical basis of our mental lives’ .
In addition to this, Descartes’ response to scepticism only makes sense if his scepticism is of the consequent nature. In the Second Replies, Descartes reject the claim that he was 'guilty of circularity when I …show more content…

Hume looks down upon the idea that we ‘have recourse to the veracity of the Supreme Being in order to prove the veracity of our senses’ . Here, Hume thinks that Descartes’ reasoning concerning theology cannot deal with the antecedent or the consequent sceptic, and, when looking at Hume’s arguments, it’s hard to argue with him on this. Hume develops sceptical arguments which attempt to demonstrate that our belief formation processes are, in fact, self-undermining – these arguments are what come together to form Humean Scepticism. Hume, similar to Descartes, is not a sceptic himself, however, it is his method which condones scepticism; Hume utilises this to teach the reader that belief is not lead by

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