Daniel Dennett attempts to answer where the self is located within the body in his essay “Where Am I?” Dennett is approached by the government whose intent it is to have him deactivate a nuclear warhead that was stuck underground. The procedure is mentioned to be dangerous, as the nuclear activity has severe detrimental effects on brain tissue, but appears harmless to other body tissues. The precautionary method to avoid this damage was to remove the brain entirely then remotely operate the body sent to deactivate the device a mile under Tulsa, Oklahoma. Dennett had decided he will attempt the mission once he was assured no information (past experiences, favorite things, etc.) would be lost. The Houston brain surgeons had suggested he should think of it as stretching the neural connections, all connectivity would remain intact. Dennett had consented to conduct the mission, thus multitudes of information was gathered by interviewers: a recorded autobiography, tedious lists of tastes, fears, hopes, even musical preferences. The brain removal surgery resulted in success and as Dennett awakened he was shown to his brain in a vat within the Houston lab. Methods of communication between the brain and the body were by radio link and was controlled by an on/off switch. So there Dennett stands, reasoning with himself about his position. He asserts himself as a physicalist but encounters the problem of where “here” is, as he stares from his body at his brain. To ease his self-inflicted confusion, Dennett names his brain Yorick and his body Hamlet, together they are Dennett. So the question he asks himself again is where is Dennett? Where are Dennett’s thoughts tokened? He concludes three possibilities: Dennett is wherever Haml...
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...ught experimental essay, “Where Am I?” Each approach he touches on has viability but also is subject to criticism depending on the lens the audience can interpret the approach under. Functionalism is an approach through physicalism that would glaze over the more mental priorities of identity, since the body functions are what is relevant to this lens. The body view falls under the functionalist and physicalist argument. There is a touch of soul view in interpretation of the mind-body relationship, but it held little evidence for foundation and under scrutiny the soul view does not hold up as strongly as the mind-body pair view does for interpretation of Dennett’s essay. It is not easy to decipher the meaning of identity and mind-body relationships, but using this thought experiment one could iron through some creases to clear up an argument for either position.
The only logical conclusion to derive from this observation is that what we consider to be ourselves is not our bodies. As a result, an individual’s personal identity cannot be rooted in just his or her body, unlike what body theorists would like to
location of the story in the inner world is the claustrum - a space inside the psychic anus, at the bottom of the psychic digestive tract, where everyone lives
Ned Block in Troubles with Functionalism offers his Absent Qualia Argument. The argument provides a counter example to functionalism. The essential aspect to the functional theory of mind defines mentality in terms of its functional states of a system. The functional states of a system match states according to their inputs, outputs, and internal states. Block’s counter example argues for the possibility of two systems to have the same functional states which determines their functional equivalence. In addition to functional equivalence, the two systems have distinguishable mental states. If functionalism is as adequate account of mentality, then functional equivalence entails mental state equivalence. Block argues against the consequent of
There are many theories about the mind and body. Many philosophers argue whether the mind and body are two separate entities or are in fact one thing. There are five main arguments for this accounts they are, dualism, logical behaviorism, methodological behaviorism, identity-theory, and lastly functualism. There are many similarities and differences between these five theories. Dualism is the main focus that I will be recounting, then comparing and contrasting it against identity-theory and logical behaviorism.
Despite having contrary qualities and fundamentally opposing natures, the mind and body are intertwined and interact with one another. Interactive dualism hold the idea that the mind is eternal and has the ability to exist apart from the body. Descartes holds the idea that if the physical realm in which the body material body exists ceased to exist, the mind would still be. However, if a circumstance arose which annihilated his ability to think, he would cease to exist. Interactive dualism explores the idea that the body is simply an extension of the forms of the individual in the physical world, that the demise of the material body does not render its fundamental nature to be obsolete. Interactive dualism can seem to diminish the importance of the material body, but it does not. Descartes states that the mind and body are united and interact so closely that it seems to create one whole. This unity is expressed by when the physical body experiences pain. If the mind simply related to the body in the manner a sailor relates to a ship, the mind would simply perceive pain through
Self could be defined in different ways. In John Perry’s “dialogue on personal identity and immorality”, both characters Weirob and Cohen are correct on their argument of personal identity, there are just some imperfections on each of the views. My view of “persons are identical with brains” fills the gaps of ideas of them. Brain is the junction that could bring mind and
The desire to avoid dualism has been the driving motive behind much contemporary work on the mind-body problem. Gilbert Ryle made fun of it as the theory of 'the ghost in the machine', and various forms of behaviorism and materialism are designed to show that a place can be found for thoughts, sensations, feelings, and other mental phenomena in a purely physical world. But these theories have trouble accounting for consciousness and its subjective qualia. As the science develops and we discover facts, dualism does not seems likely to be true.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Dennett leaves his own definition of the mind incomplete where we are in the readings, mulling over the concepts he reviewed and focusing on the border of sentience and sensitivity. Dennett’s own account of the mind is focused on drawing the line between sensitivity, exemplified by reacting to the environment, and sentience, which he defines as “the lowest grade of consciousness” (pg 64). In Dennett’s explanation on page 64, he proposes that while all intentional systems respond to the environment, sentient systems or “genuine minds” enjoy their sentience. Combining these theories, Dennett defines the mind as functional sensitivity in concert with an “undefined factor x” (pg 65) which allows the enjoyment and emotional aspects of thought to take place and therefore create a
In this paper, I will explain and argue for two-way interactive substance dualism. Dualism is a term referred to the idea that there are only two basic kinds of things and everything real is categorized under those two things. Dualism is split into two types, substance dualism, and property dualism. Substance dualism is the idea that the mind and body are two different sorts of basic substance, whereas property dualism is our mental and physical properties are two separate types of basic properties even though they may be properties of the same thing (lecture). Branching from dualism, mind-body dualism argues that the mind and body are two separate entities. Although they are two different substances, i.e. brain/body being material and
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Deep in the minds of human beings lies a vast ocean of emotions and experiences. The human mind is often misconstrued and simplified by those who possess one, but delving deeper into the mind and it’s processes you see a whole other world that is veiled beneath the surface. One of the most famous examples of the human mind is the image of an iceberg, what is on the surface is so minimal compared to the immense body that lies underneath. Sigmund Freud was the father of psychoanalysis and believed in the idea of the unconscious and subconscious that help power who we are. Through psychoanalysis Freud began to reclaim the self as an individual and stressed the importance of the external world and it’s direct role with the internal realm of an individual. Although it was originally found to be a sort of therapy for those with mental illnesses, it has an interesting and analytical and philosophical view of the self, and through this spawned new beliefs in philosophy. Through the establishment of the id, superego, and ego, and the past’s affect on the shaping the present state of the self, psychoanalysis reclaims the self for an individual and is successful in doing so.
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.
...have struggled with the nature of human beings, especially with the concept of “self”. What Plato called “soul, Descartes named the “mind”, while Hume used the term “self”. This self, often visible during hardships, is what one can be certain of, whose existence is undoubtable. Descartes’s “I think, therefore I am” concept of transcendental self with just the conscious mind is too simplistic to capture the whole of one’s self. Similarly, the empirical self’s idea of brain in charge of one’s self also shows a narrow perspective. Hume’s bundle theory seeks to provide the distinction by claiming that a self is merely a habitual way of discussing certain perceptions. Although the idea of self is well established, philosophical insight still sees that there is no clear presentation of essential self and thus fails to prove that the true, essential self really exists.
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949) is a critique of the notion that the mind is distinct from the body, and is a rejection of the philosophical theory that mental states are distinct from physical states. Ryle argues that the traditional approach to the relation of mind and body (i.e., the approach which is taken by the philosophy of Descartes) assumes that there is a basic distinction between Mind and Matter. According to Ryle, this assumption is a basic 'category-mistake,' because it attempts to analyze the relation betwen 'mind' and 'body' as if they were terms of the same logical category. Furthermore, Ryle argues that traditional Idealism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce physical reality to the same status as mental reality, and that Materialism makes a basic 'category-mistake' by trying to reduce mental reality to the same status as physical reality.