In David Halberstam’s historical monograph The Best and the Brightest, Halberstam works to unveil exactly what led to American involvement in Vietnam. “The best and the brightest” of American politics and society were singularly responsible for the horrific decisions that led to the worst war in American history. Halberstam’s detailed and articulate accounts of these men give the reader a greater understanding of the mistakes that were made. The men of both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were considered unparalleled in their fields of study, however their actions contributed to the utter mess of the Vietnam War. Through detailed accounts, illustrious descriptions, and honest reports Halberstam’s writing describes the harsh decisions
One of the key strengths of this book is the author's first-hand knowledge of the people, places, and events that he is writing about. He also supplemented this first-hand knowledge with extensive interviews. In one example, he elaborated on the "chain of command" in Vietnam, which began with General Paul Harkins (and William C. Westmoreland) to the CINCPAC (Admiral Harry Felt) and from CINCPAC to Washington. "Not once in their four years of mutual agony in Vietnam did Harkins's successor, General Westmoreland, pick up the telephone and call his commander-in-chief, President Lyndon B. Johnson. Westmoreland did not have the authority, he told me."(169) This information came directly from an interview with Westmoreland. There are other anecdotes similar to this with each contributing to the extensive nature of the book's detail.
Chris Appy’s s American Reckoning is a book-length essay on the Vietnam War and how it changed the way Americans think of ourselves and our foreign policy. This is required reading for anyone interested in foreign policy and America’s place in the world, showing how events influence attitudes, which turn to influence events.
Stein, Joel, and Josh Sanburn. "The New Greatest Generation." Time 181.19 (2013): 26. Academic Search Complete. Web. 13 Mar. 2016.
Lawrence’s purpose in writing this book was concise and to the point. In recent history, due to the fall of the Soviet bloc, new information has been made available for use in Vietnam. As stated in the introduction, “This book aims to take account of this new scholarship in a brief, accessible narrative of the Vietnam War… It places the war within the long flow of Vietnamese history and then captures the goals and experiences of various governments that became deeply embroiled in the country during the second half of the twentieth century” (Lawrence, 3.) This study is not only about the American government and how they were involved in the Vietnam conflict, but highlights other such countries as France, China, and the Soviet Union. Lawrence goes on to say that one of his major goals in writing this book is to examine the American role in Vietnam within an international context (Lawrence, 4.) Again, this goes to show that the major purpose of Lawrence’s study included not only ...
This unfortunate legacy of failure in Vietnam carried far past the end of his service as Secretary of Defense. For years after, there have been ongoing debates as to what factors led the outcome of the Vietnam War. It wasn’t until 1995 that Robert McNamara contributed his own viewpoint on where the responsibility for the result of the war fell. McNamara’s memoir, “In Retrospect”, chronicles his perspective on the role he played as Secretary of Defense. It is apparent in his memoir that the public image associated with McNamara is vastly different from the McNamara he presents. Ironically, this infamous war he was so commonly know for may have been a war that privately he did not support.[1] This raises the question—was this hawk actually a
As part of his campaign, Linden B. Johnson directed his efforts toward the improvement of life of those in poverty, focusing little attention to the Vietnam War. Yet once elected, he brought upon “the escalation of the Vietnam war to an intensity that few Americans expected when they cast their ballots for him” (Walsh). Johnson’s increased interest and support for the war created a major issue of misrepresentation, his election came from his ideas aimed at the “Great Society,” yet he authorized the increase of the original “20,000 U.S. troops to more than a half million” to serve in Vietnam (Walsh). The policies that the former president was elected under was what the general public hoped would come from his stay in office, yet his legacy would go on to be almost entirely regarding his involvement in the war. Not only did he bring the United States deeper into the war, he also failed “to honestly discuss how badly the war was going and to reveal the true costs of the conflict” (Walsh). This duplicity on the part of the former president, forged for a severe difference in preference and policy between him and the majority of United States public that had elected him into office for his first official presidential term in
Roark, James L. "Vietnam and the Limits of Power 1961-1975." The American Promise: A History of the United States. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2008. 1,062- 1,100. Print.
He was also a Gulf War veteran who commanded an armored cavalry. His desire in writing this book was to examine, through the recently declassified documents, manuscript collections, and the Joint Chief of Staff official histories, where the responsibility for the Vietnam foreign policy disaster lay, but also examine the decisions made that involved the United States in a war they could not win. This book details the discussion of government policy in the stages of the Vietnam crisis from 1961-July 1965. It examines the main characters of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, in addition to the military, which included the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It began in the Kennedy era amidst the Bay of Pigs incident and how that led to mistrust of the military planning by advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
So many things influenced our involvement in the Vietnam War, and Lawrence examines the decisions we made in a greater context than just our own. He argues that international pressures controlled the attitudes and ideas of the United States, for the most part.
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the political dynamics that were in play at the very beginning of the Vietnam crisis that eventually lead to the disastrous war in Vietnam. It will examine the historical record from various viewpoints and hope to discover those instances where a failure in communication lead to a cascade effect of fear and uncertainty that set into motion those events that drew the political leaders of the United States deeper and deeper into the quagmire of Vietnam and south-east Asia. How did the Logic of Fear dominate the thinking and policies at the time? The hypothesis of this paper is to show that those failures in communication and signaling could plausibly have been avoided with more adept diplomacy, and subsequently the war in Vietnam could have been averted.
Kamps Jr., Charles T. The History of the Vietnam War. New York: The Military Press,
Anderson, D. (2002). The Columbia guide to the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia University Press.
Foster, Gaines(1990, January). Coming to terms with defeat: Post-Vietnam America and the post-Civil WarSouth. Virginia Quarterly Review. Vol.66, pp 17.
Hellman, John. American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
In Defense of Elitism. Summary The dominant theme in this essay appears to be this: post war social changes such as offering increased university admission promote the view of egalitarianism in education. The author’s main issue with “secondary” education is the sheer numbers of our population that the United States as a whole educates. According to Mr. Henry, the United States educates nearly thirty percent of high school graduates who go on to a four-year bachelor’s degree. He believes that the increased number of graduates has led to a workforce of mediocrity.